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PREFACE

Swaziland is in many ways a unique country on the African
scene. The last African state to receive political independence
from colonial Britain (in September,1968), it has since been
politically and socially dominated by the considerable personage
of the world's longest reigning Monarch, His Majesty King Sobhuza 11.
The King, with absolute sway in the traditional sphere, is also
proving a considerable binding force for a Nation being atomised
by the forces of westernization. The Nation, a single tribe, is a
relatively small one of approximately 520,000 population in a
country of just over 6400 square miles.
Process is,of course,no respector of scale and as has been pointed
out on a number of occasions, Swaziland duplicates many of the
phenomena and dynamics of Independent Africa at large. For the
student its size becomes a distinct advantage since it represents
a compact laboratory which encapsulates much of the African past
and present.
Swaziland has been my periodic home for the last twelve years. I
was fortunate to be there during the 'heady' days of independence
in 1968 and to experience at first hand the dissolution of many
of the pernicious racial barriers which had been allowed to
penetrate from neighbouring South Africa during the colonial period.
In the years since one has been made aware of the signs of increasing
prosperity and material welfare and a 'booming economy'.
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In recent years, as knowledge of the country has increased and
a more perceptive eye hopefully gained, it has become increasingly
obvious that the greater prosperity is the preserve of a privileged
few, that the economy is controlled by the forces of multi-national
capital way beyond Swazi reach and that deep internal social
contradictions are developing in the country. In addition, regional
inequalities in health and wealth have if anything intensified and
what was once called the colonial legacy - its distinctive human
landscape - is still very much present.
In African studies as a whole there has been a growing awareness over
the last decade that much of Africa is de facto still colonial; at
least still tending to serve the purposes of the former European
colonial power.
A desire to uncover the nature and implications of these purposes
in Swaziland has led to a growing interest in the Swazi past. This
interest has been fuelled by the geographer's appraisal that the
human landscape bears the visible imprint of these purposes as
they were worked out during the colonial period. It is within this
interest area that the objectives of this thesis were framed.
Research for this thesis was undertaken during leave of absence
from Wilfrid Laurier University from August 1977 to January 1978.
The time was evenly divided between Britain,where research was
primarily archival, and Swaziland, where archival research was
coloured by first hand experience and by conversation with both
black and white within the country.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

"Swaziland is an unusual country,in some ways quite unique."
Sir Alfred Pease,1914.

1.1 INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this research paper must be viewed in
the context of the new research field of African historical
geography, particularly as it relates to the contribution of
defunct colonialism to the geography of newly-independent states.
This objective is,in essence, to provide a deeper historical and
geographical understanding of the arrangement, patterning and
organisation of space in contemporary Swaziland. In particular,
it seeks explanations for a distinctive pattern of land ownership and control, and the relationship of this pattern to the
space-economy of development.
The use of an orthodox developmental perspective on Third
World spatial organisation, even were a coherent one to exist,
appears doomed to flounder on the rocks of classic ideological
bias and abstracted empiricism as previous studies of spatial
2
organisation in Swaziland have done.
The search for alternative
modes of explanation was triggered in the first place by the
realization of persistent and intensified regional and social
inequalities in the post-colonial period and by the fact that
the first decade of independence (1968-78) has witnessed no
substantial reorganisation of colonial space and hence,presumably,
also of its underlying structure.

2
The penetration of Marxian-structuralist interpretations of
colonialism, imperialism and development/underdevelopment into
geography in the recent past (post 1970) have, however, provided
a new range of theoretical constructs which appear to have much
greater explanatory depth in the analysis of spatial organisation
3
in the Third World.

Commitment to such a mode of explanation,

with its fundamental emphasis on historicity, would also breath
new life into the stagnant state of African historical geography.
In this initial chapter of the study the basic geographical
patterns in Swaziland are constructed as a contemporary backdrop
to the historical emphases of this dissertation (1.3). This
follows an outline of the basic aims and intentions in attempting
to construct the underlying structures of spatial organisation
in the historical context (1.2). Data used and methodology
deployed are discussed (1.4) and a summary of the structure of
the thesis presented (1.5).
1.2 SUMMARY OF INTENT
In pursuit of the primary objective of this dissertation
postulated in 1.1 above the following focii need to be enunciated.
In the historical context of the thesis, it is intended to try and
establish the association and connections between regional
and international economic and social forces and the organisation
of space at the local level, within Swaziland. This has already
been attempted for a number of other countries in Africa (see
Chapter Two). It will entail the construction and analysis of
the process of European capitalist penetration of Swaziland for

3
the colonial period; looking at the agents of capital and their
links within the metropolis and with the colonial state, and at
the aims of capital in relation to methods of surplus appropriation, prospective and realised.
At the local level the study will explore the particular
way in which space was organised in Swaziland in response to
the implicit and articulated social and economic aspirations of
a metropolitan settler class in relation to control over land,
labour and raw materials. Examination of the details of land
alienation and partition, as proposed and implemented, will
reveal the ways in which an apparently unordered spatial array
is, in reality, the product of an ordered social and economic
structure of capitalist integration.
To mitigate a total Eurocentric bias it is further intended
to pinpoint the areas of value conflict between imposed and
indigeneous systems and to show how the will of the former
inexorably dominated at points of conflict. It is proposed that
the empirical focii of the thesis be sited in neo-Marxian
structuralist conceptualisations of social and economic reality
as an integrating explanatory framework.

1.3 CONTEMPORARY SPATIAL ORGANISATION
Swaziland has existed as a definite political entity
since the 1870's. Its location in relation to other southern
African states and its small size are illustrated in Map One.
It was ruled as a British colony from 1902 - 1968; receiving
formal political independence from Britain on 9th September,1968.
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General elections in the same year under a Westminster-style
constitution returned the Imbokodvo National Movement, with
its leader the traditional monarch Sobhuza 11, to power. After
the 1972 elections, the King suspended the constitution and
disbanded parliament as a prelude to investing supreme
legislative powers in himself. This autocracy has continued
4
to the present . Economically, the country is committed
to its colonial inheritance of dependence on South Africa for
imports and its neo-colonial status as a supplier of raw
materials for the western capitalist world 5
As regards internal spatial patterning, Webster,Murdoch &
Lawrance (1968), I'ons (1967) and Murdoch (1970) all give some
indication of the environmental diversity prevailing in Swaziland. But it has become common practice in the heterogeneous
mass of secondary accounts to divide the country up into four
north-south running natural belts, clearly distinguished by
several environmental indicators (Table One and Map Two).
Superimposed over this pattern of spatial environmental
diversity, and not totally unrelated to it, is a complex and
dynamic patchwork of land holding and ownership. Two general
categories of land holding can be identified, based on
diametrically opposed principles of holding and ownership;
1. Individual Tenure Land (I.T.L.),which is held under freehold
or leasehold by international capitalist corporations (10% of
the total area) and individual white owners,resident and
absentee (32%)

. In 1974, there were 589 farms and estates.

Of these a mere 35 covered 60% of I.T.L., or almost one-quarter
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TABLE ONE
THE NATURAL BELTS OF SWAZILAND
MEAN ANNUAL
TEMP.( F . )

ELEVATION(m)

AREA

(sq.km.)

MEAN

RANGE

MEAN ANNUAL
RAIN.(mm)

DROUGHT
HAZARD %
20

HIGHVELD

5200

1200

790-1820

60

1000-2300

MIDDLEVELD

4700

600

330-1050

67

750-1150

20-45

LOWVELD

6200

270

80-750

72

500-900

40-80

LUBOMBO

1400

550

40-900

68

600-1000

40-60

% of years with less than 635mm rainfall,
Source: Murdoch(1970),Hughes(19
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of the total area of Swaziland.
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2. Swazi Nation Land (S.N.L.), which is held "in trust" for
the Swazi nation by the monarch. Individual ownership of land
is consequently not practised. Land allocation and tenurial
practice is still largely traditional within the bounds of a
complex social framework elaborated by Hughes (1964,1972) and
O

Kuper (1966).

It comprises land allocated to the Swazi in

1907 by the British colonial state and subsequent extensions
during the colonial period. Also included are extensions since
1968 (11% of total area).
The breakdown of control between these types of land
holding is portrayed in Table Two and Map Three.
A number of other spatial configurations tie in closely
with this basic subdivision of space. These include population
distribution, landscape form and functional organisation.
As regards distribution and density of population,Murdoch
(1970) writes that "the overriding factor determining gaps in
the network of homesteads has been the 1907 partition" (p.62).
Table Three illustrates the clear difference between S.N.L.
and I.T.L. in population holding. A demographic analysis is
still more enlightening. This reveals that the male : female
ratio on S.N.L. is 75 : 100, on I.T.L. it is 126 : 100, and
in urban areas 192 : 100. These are startling differences
which indicate the existence of a marked differential migration
9
pattern in the colonial period
(Map Four).
Second,with reference to landscape appearance,inspection
of the 1972 Swaziland Ministry of Agriculture air photo coverage

9

TABLE TWO
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND HOLDING,1976
SWAZI NATION LAND
of which;
Tibiyo Fund,Govnt.
Stations etc.
Land held or grazed
by Swazi farmers
INDIVIDUAL TENURE LAND
of which;
Urban land
Title Farms
Corporation Title

ACRES
2.461.250

56TOTAL AREA
57

461,250

11

2,000,000

46

1.879.750

43

23,250
559,200

1
32
10

458,500

Source : Swaziland Ministry of Agriculture,Land Planning
Section.
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TABLE THREE
SWAZI POPULATION DISTRIBUTION,1966
POP.( •000s)

SQUARE MILES

DENSITY (per sg.mi

65

ITL
48

SNL
770

ITL
1230

SNL
84

ITL
39

ALL
57

135

28

1190

590

113

48

92

LOWVELD

64

32

1420

980

45

33

40

LUBOMBO

16

4

270

270

60

15

37

Total

279

113

3650

3070

76

37

58

SNL
HIGHVELD
MIDDLEVELD

Source : Jones (1968).
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13
shows up the visible differences between Swazi rural landscape
with its dispersed settlement pattern and the larger-scale
commercial farms and plantations

.

Most striking,however, is the functional variation. Table
Four illustrates the major differences between tenurial type
in terms of agricultural practice. As regards total agricultural
G.D.P., almost 60% comes from I.T.L. while about 39% originates
from S.N.L..Of the total area of land under I.T.L. control (43%
of Swaziland) only 6.8% is crop cultivated (3.1% is sugar
plantations). Of the area under cultivation, nearly 60% is
owned by only 20 farms or estates

. Thus agricultural production

is the dominant preserve of 20-35 estates (a number of which
are completely owned by foreign capital), while considerable
areas of unused or under-utilised land are locked-up outside the
control of the Swazi nation 12. S.N.L.,on which 76% of the
total population reside, are characterised on the other hand
by over-population, over-grazing and concommitant environmental
degradation.

In 19 76, 65% of rural Swazi families were

unable to satisfy minimum required levels of nutrition and
imports of maize reached an all-time high of $ 1.6 million 13
It is possible to be somewhat more definitive about the
structure of the contemporary space-economy under capitalist
development. This was first analysed by Fair,Murdoch and
Jones (1969) who identified four "core development regions",
but which are better referred to as zones of intensive
capitalist articulation 14. These zones are delimited on Map
Five. The severe regional imbalances which they represent are

14

TABLE FOUR
LAND USE AND MAJOR CROPS (1975)

SWAZI NATION LAND
Land Use (%)
Cultivation
Fallow
Homesteads
Grazing

12.2
2.7
0.6
84.5

Major Crops(%)
Maize
Groundnuts
Sorghum
Beans
Others

76.9
8.2
4.9
1.7
8.3

Sugar Cane
Cotton
Maize
Rice
Citrus
Others

42.5
17.0
14.4
6.3
5.6
4.2

INDIVIDUAL TENURE LAND
Cultivation
Fallow
Grazing
Forests
Other Land

6.8
1.3
70.4
16.0
5.5

Source: Central Statistical Offie
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highlighted by the following statistics;
(i) These zones comprise 15% of the total area of the country
and contained,in 1966, 24% of the Swazi and 75% of the white
populations
(ii) Land in these zones is 95% non-Swazi controlled.
(iii) These zones were together responsible for 91% of G.D.P.
in 1975 and accounted for 92% of the total value of exports in
the same year
(iv) The flow of foreign private capital investment and foreign
aid since 1968 has continued to be almost exclusively towards
these zones. These are therefore the zones of most intense
surplus extraction. The International Labour Organisation
estimates that external payments of foreign-owned corporations
were at least $ 22 million in 1974 (as high as 20% of G.D.P.) 1 7.
Foreign domination of the economy and the consequent external
conditions of dependency are examined by Fransman(1973) and Crush(1977).
(v) Almost 93% of the total wage-earning labour force of 61,000
is located in these zones (84% of which is unskilled or semiskilled).
(v) Per capita incomes show sharp regional inequalities. The
15% of the population in urban areas/corporation towns received
43% of the total personal income; the 20% on I.T.L. received
16% of the total; whereas the remaining 62% accounted for only
18
18%
. There are also wide income discrepancies between the
white/black urban-based middle class and the wage labourers
within the four zones.
(vi) The sex-age structure of the population is significantly
different between these zones and the rural periphery.

16
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(vii) government expenditure on services,infrastructure,housing
and so on is heavily biased towards the capitalist cores 19
The poorly-developed transport infrastructure of the country
(except in the Mbabane-Manzini region) is a reflection of the
external orientation of the capitalist zones. The lack of
internal integration is shown up by Maasdorp(197l) in a traffic
flow study. The railway serves purely as an agency for export
of the products of foreign exploitation.
This background information on the contemporary spatial
structure of Swaziland highlights the existence of considerable
regional inequalities within the country and also suggests that
the arrangement of contemporary space is controlled by the
social and economic processes of integration into the international
capitalist system. The argument to be sustained in this thesis
is that this link between capital and spatial structure is not
merely a contemporary phenomenon or indeed only a function of
the advent of the multi-national corporation since 1940. It is
rather a link which goes back to the earliest penetration of
foreign capital into the country.

1.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The materials and data analysed in this study comprise
empirical and empirically-based information from a variety of
sources. The direction of the research proposal (presented in
March 1977 in Wilfrid Laurier Graduate Seminar Series) indicated
that qualitative source materials of primary and secondary
nature were the chief concern. Quantitative data tends to be

18
fragmentary in the historical record. Where available,however,
it was recorded and is used to amplify and support the major
arguments of the thesis.
Research was conducted in two locations during the period
August to December, 1977. These were Britain, the colonial
hearthland, and Swaziland, where the effects of colonialism
were most strongly felt. Certain relevant documentation has
found its way into proximate South African archives, and these
sources were consulted where necessary. Data sought was in
accord with the stated aims of the research, outlined and
discussed in this chapter and Chapter Two.
In Britain, The National Registry of Archives (London),with
its comprehensive bibliographic catalogue, in combination with
N.Mathews and M.D.Wainwright (1971) A Guide To Manuscripts And
Documents In The British Isles Relating To Africa, are the
natural jumping-off points for the primary source material
search. Attention was directed from there to The Public Records
Office and to two Oxford University libraries (The Bodleian
Library and The Rhodes House Library). The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office Library and the Royal Commonwealth Society
Library contain little pertinent information on Swaziland that
cannot be found elsewhere.
An unhappy coincidence was the closure of the Public
Records Office (moving its location from Chancery Lane to
Kew), during the period of the research season in England
( 1 August - 10 October, 1977). It is believed that this
omission may not be as damaging as at first thought since most
of the documentation catalogued in Mathews and Wainwright

19
proved available for consultation elsewhere.
Important collections of private papers were consulted
at Oxford (Appendix la). These included those of Lord Milner
(Governor of the Transvaal,1897-1905) and the Earl of Selborne
(Governor of South Africa ,1905-1910) in the Bodleian Library
and Sir Robert Coryndon (Resident Commissioner,Swaziland,19071916) in the Rhodes House Library. L.B.Frewer (1971) Manuscript
Collections Of Africana In Rhodes House Library.Oxford is a
good guide to the holdings of the latter library.
The British Museum Reading Room proved to be a useful source
for some of the more obscure secondary texts concerned with
Swaziland. These include such works as Davis (1898),Griffith

(1890),

Coryndon(1914) and O'Neill (1921).
In Africa, The Swaziland National Archives was the major
source of primary and secondary materials. In January,1978
the archives were moved from Mbabane to a new centre at Lebombo.
For primary source materials, V.F.Ellenberger (1962) Catalogue
Of The Swaziland Records. 1881-1949 proved a satisfactory guide
to the invaluable collection of original colonial, settler and
Swazi documentation for the period up to 1940. The files consulted
were in a state of disarray but the required catalogued information
was,with one notable exception, fortunately generally available
(Appendix la). A patchy index available at the Archives covers
the period from 1950 but these files were not available for
study due to the change of location.
The extensive Swaziland National Archives Library, built
up by R.V.Hiller in the early 1970's, contains a great deal of

20
official and unofficial published material. For the period prior
to 1900, the Colonial Blue Books were consulted for information
about the nature and processes of colonial offialdom. In the
Blue Books, Convention agreements, individual and commission
reports, and private correspondence are a mine of qualitative
data. S.B.Williams,M.B.E., a member of the first British
colonial administration in Swaziland in 1903 and still resident
in Swaziland generously consented to the loan of his personal
set of Blue Books for further study.
For the early colonial period, The Times Of Swaziland proved
worthy of close scrutiny. Despite its unashamed role as an
advocate of white interest it carries much valuable comment on
the pre Boer War era (pre 1899). It also provides objective
accounts of the proceedings of the Swaziland Concessions
Commission and the work of the partition commissioner. Several
publications of the Commission itself were drawn on for
supplementary information and material (Appendix lb). The High
Commissioner's Gazettes and Notices contain all legislation
passed by the colonial state during the colonial period. These
are currently being indexed at the National Archives (but see
also, M.G.Balima A Guide To Official Publications In Botswana
Lesotho and Swaziland.1868-1968 ).
A sojourn in Durban,South Africa, enabled research on the
private papers of A.M.Miller at the Killie Campbell Africana
Library (University of Natal). This proved to be an important
exercise considering Miller's role in early colonial Swaziland
(Appendix la/lc). The private papers of G.Grey,Partition
Commissioner for Swaziland 1907-8, proved impossible to trace,

21
but a comprehensive picture of his role can be pieced together
from the aforementioned sources (Appendix lc).
C.S.Wallace (1967) Swaziland : A Bibliography , J.P.Webster
and P.Mohume (1968) A Bibliography of Swaziland, and particularly
J.J.Grotpeter (1975) An Historical Dictionary of Swaziland are
good guides to the published secondary material on Swaziland,most
of which was available in the National Archives Library. The
National Archives has a small map collection but the most
important discovery for the purposes of this thesis were the
maps of the 1906 Concession Boundary Survey, found by chance
in an office of the Ministry of Works,Power & Communications,Mbabane.
An obstacle encountered in research was the paucity of
primary Swazi documentation for the period under study. Since
it was necessary to obtain information (particularly for Chapter
Six) the same documentary stock as above was utilised. Its
interpretation must therefore be a matter of some care.
Retrospective comment on earlier eras and personal
interpretations of the contemporary scene were obtained in an
informal manner from a number of Swazis, white residents and
S.B.Williams.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The review of the literature in Chapter Two traces the
development of neo-Marxian perspectives and theory in development
and historical geography, through a summarised critique of
orthodox approaches to the appropriation of a model deemed
suitable for the study of Swaziland's spatial evolution. Chapter
Three provides a historical background and base to the period
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under specific study. Chapters Four,Five and Six constitute the
core of the thesis, analysing the interplay between capital,
the colonial state and the Swazi population in generating a
distinctive colonial, spatial, patterning and organisation.chapter
Seven briefly traces the changes in spatial organisation in
the remainder of the colonial period (1914-1968) and afterwards,
while the final chapter is a statement of conclusions to be drawn
from the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

" The theory of development is simply a theory, and a bad one."
J.M.Blaut,1973.

2.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to
and synthesis of neo-Marxian approaches in development and
historical geography. This is prefaced by a summary of the
critique of orthodox development geography from within the
discipline (2.2). Approaches to a general theory of imperialism
and colonialism, and the related question of Third World
spatial form and organisation are then elucidated (2.3 and 2.4).
The argument that attention should be focussed on the structures
of imperialism is carried through in the elaboration of a
model within which the study as a whole can be framed (2.5).
A summary of theoretical elements at the heart of the study
is then presented (2.6).

2.2 ORTHODOXY
Brookfield(19 73) marks the nadir of orthodox geographical
approaches to development as Hodder's "Economic Development In
The Tropics",published in 1969. It seems,however, that ingrained
perspectives die hard as exemplified by the work of Johnson (1970),
Weinand (19 72), Logan (1972) and Ginsburg (1973). Under a
breaking wave of criticism of inherent Eurocentricity and
capitalist ideological bias from Hurst (1973), Blaut (1973),

24
Santos (1974), McGee (1974), Brookfield (1975), Slater (1975a,
1976), Cannon (1976) and Hudson and Carney (1976), such recent
contributions as Knight and Newman (1976) and De Blij and Best(l977)
stand out as lonely and largely inarticulate voices. The
neo-Marxian critique is directed at orthodoxy in general but
also applies to specific studies of internal spatial organisation.
Slater (1975a) lays most of the blame for the redundancy
of orthodox approaches at the door of geography's "quantitative
revolution" and its unquestioning application in the Third
World:
"Instead of a concentration on theoretical issues embedded
in any substantive attempt at explanation of social
reality, relative sophistication in the measurement
and description of a set of abstracted relationships
has become the major gauge of scientific worth." (p 161)
Slater designates this as an inverted methodology. Other
characteristics of this "abstracted empiricism" are an overriding
concern with surface descriptions of spatial patterning at the
expense of exploration of underlying social process, a failure
to grasp the inter-connections between spatial structure and
political economy, and uncritical derivation of theory from the
social sciences.
Slater (1973) identifies three orthodox models of analysis
of Third World space common in geography in the 1960's and
early 1970's. These are (i) spatial differentiation (economic
dualism,centre-periphery models), (ii) spatial diffusion
(modernization studies), and (iii) spatial integration (models
of national integration,growth pole models). The particular
emphasis of these approaches is the construction of elaborate
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descriptive models of contemporary space-economies based on
the operation of supposed spatial processes and on offering
inadequate prescriptions for resolution of growing Third World
regional and social inequalities. Johnson (1970) undoubtedly
represents the worst excess of this methodology in an
intensely ahistorical study which expresses a concern to
identify "the dominant organising principles of organised
space" in the Third World. Johnson falls far short of his
stated mark.
Both Brookfield (1975) and Slater (1975a) are highly
critical of the "modernization" school in geography represented
by the work of Gould (1964,1970), Soja (1968), Witthuhn (1968),
Riddell (1970), Soja and Tobin (1972) and, in the Swaziland
case. Lea (1972)

. It is significant that this school has

been silent in the last four years. The early concerns of the
school were to identify spatial patterns of "modernization"
in the Third World.

Modernization , as defined, was alarmingly

Eurocentric and deeply ideological. In fact, the choice of
variables to describe modernization were invariably representative
of colonial and capitalist artifacts; but the theory was seen
to break down in its equation of development and modernization.
That the spread of modernization would lead to greater social
and economic egalitarianism and the destruction of regional
inequalities was perfunctorily assumed and never questioned in
the light of experience. Modernization exposed to the light
was seen to imply the introduction of capitalism to pre-capitalist
social formations and to function to the benefit of development
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at the metropole to the detriment of the peripheral country.
The school had some of the trappings of an historical
approach but Riddell's (1970) study of the diffusion of
modernization is only superficially historical. It assumes that
all things Western are beneficial to development and therefore
gives no history to the indigenous society or economy; particularly the manner of its weakening and destruction under
the impress of capitalism.
Duality, and its attendant centre-periphery model of the
space economy, are core concepts in Fair,Murdoch and Jones (1969)
and Maasdorp's (1976) description of Swaziland's space. For
the former:
"The geographic pattern of economic development in
Swaziland comprises a number of social and economic
enclaves, representative of the modern economy, and
widespread economically backward areas of subsistence
activity on the other." (p 39).
The simplistic dualism which they propose and which Maasdorp (1976)
extends is obfuscating for a number of reasons;
(i) They propose the existence of two discrete, mutually
exclusive entities for what is, in reality, a single social
and economic whole. Relations between "backward" regions/social
groups and "modern" regions/social groups represent,according
to Slater (1973):
"The functioning of a unified society of which these
are two poles which originate in the course of a
single historical process " (p 23).
Holistic emphasis would grant a history to the so-called
backward sector which might lead to the conclusion that its?
backwardness should not be counterpoised with the modernity
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of the capitalist centre but that it is, in a more profound
sense a creation of it. This approach fails to take account
of the actual mechanisms which gave rise to the dichotomy
in the first place.
(ii) While both authors admit to the weakening and destruction
of the pre-capitalist economy in the early colonial period
neither analyse the mechanisms underlying this process, and
both unquestioningly assume that closer integration of all
social groups and regions into the international capitalist
system is the path to future development.
(iii) Iliffe (1971), with reference to Tanzania, has argued that
the whole country is directly or indirectly integrated into
the capitalist system. This could also be argued for Swaziland,
if we regard individual tenure land as a rural extension of
capitalism and the Swazi nation land as essentially a peripheral
labour-supply zone.
(iv) A serious weakness of the centre-periphery model is its
failure to identify the social and economic contradictions
within the centre, which is by no means homogeneously egalitarian.
The point is not to belabour the superficiality of the
dualistic approach in relation to Swaziland but to point out
that it gives little credence to the penetration and destructive
impact of capitalism in the country.
National integration of the assymetrical space economy is
deemed a planning necessity by Fair,Murdoch and Jones (1969) to
ensure "balanced regional development". This should incorporate
a strategy to "spread modern development to the rural areas"(p 9).
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This process is conceived within a framework which insists
upon the inevitability of a development path following along
patterns established in the western world. Most of the
strategies suggested are designed to benefit foreign capital
and not the local population.
Brookfield's (1975) pertinent criticism is that orthodoxy
tends to locate the Third World country in a "historical vacuum"
2
with no real history of its own. Slater (1977 ) extends
Brookfield's criticism in a paper which takes orthodox approaches
to task for their avoidance of the realities of the world
capitalist economy :
"One is struck by the total absence of any serious
consideration, or in some cases even mention of,
capitalism
no analysis or even description is
provided to enable a move towards a comprehension of
the development and expansion of western capitalism
and its profoundly significant effects on peripheral
social formations. The specific historical position
that these social formations occupy in the polarised
structure of the world capitalist economy is evaded
and yet without an understanding of their position,
no analysis,whether it be concerned with spatial
structure or not, can hope to advance beyond a
superficial and mechanistic analysis of forms and
appearances" (p 18).
Such a criticism, while harsh, is exemplified in the descriptive
historical approaches to colonialism adopted by Hellen (1968,1969),
Witthuhn (19 76) and Crowder (1970).
The school they are in argues that colonial administrative
policies per se are fundamental to the evolution of landscapes
in the colony

which are likely to be obliterated in the post-

colonial period. This does not lead that far. There is no
real suggestion of the factors influencing and reasons for
such policies and particularly lacking is any analysis of the
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historical relationship between capital and the colonial state.
Christopher's (1971) empirical study of the evolution of land
policy in Natal, under two different systems of white land
settlement is of a similair genre.
Mention should also be made of the 1960's debate between
Floyd (1962), Roder (1964) and Hamilton (1965) about land
alienation in Rhodesia. The point at issue is the agro-potential
of black and white held land. The argument that Roder and
Hamilton convincingly rebuff through consideration of historical
evidence is that land alienation per se had no inimical effect
on the indigenous society and economy since the whole country
is of

uniform agro-potential and that land perceived as desirable

by capital was uninhabited by blacks. It is left to Arrighi (1970)
to show how land alienation was a major measure responsible for
the creation of a black labour force. Porter and de Souza's (1974)
excellent summary of Arrighi highlights the fact that with a
penetrating historical analysis contemporary land control
patterns assume a quite different significance when tied in with
the expansion of international capitalism.
The sparse and often ineffectual writing of geographers
on African history prompts one to cast the eye over methodological
stances of social and economic history writing. Such work is
profoundly aspatial in intent and execution but invariably
focusses on the social and economic processes and structures
which the geographer cannot afford to ignore if understanding
is to penetrate beyond the naive. Arrighi (1970) on the
proletarianisation of the African peasantry, Polanyi (1971) on
the structure of pre-capitalist economies, Rodney (19 72) and
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Amin (1972) on the process of underdevelopment, and Wallerstein
(1974) and Cohen and Daniel (19 75) on dependency theory are mere
samples from a burgeoning literature which aims at a critical
re-interpretation of colonialism and imperialism and reiterates
the importance of firmly locating any particular country of
study within the broader context of the world political economy.
At the empirical level, Pachai's (1973) otherwise vapid
study of colonial legislation in Malawi suggests, by implication
rather than explicitly, that a reorientation towards constructing
the links between capital and the colonial state would be a
fruitful exercise in explaining colonial policy. Henderson (1974),
for colonial Zambia, stresses the close relationship between
the colonial state and the large mining corporations and also
argues for a redefinition of the roles of white settlers and
black populism in determining colonial policy. Both Austen (1975)
and Neil-Tomlinson (1977) propose that isolation of the mechanics
of capitalist expansion in the late 19th Century would provide
a clearer insight into the colonial legacies of the colonial
states. It is left to SlaterrH. (1971,1975), in penetrating
case studies of the changing methods of capital to appropriate
surplus in colonial Natal, in response to changes in the regional
political econmy, to suggest how such a rationale might be
implemented in practice.
Studies by Thompson and Aldoff (1975), Gann (1975) and
Hammond (1975) focus attention on the official economic policies
of the colonial state with reference to Africa for France,
Germany and Portugal respectively. A particularly penetrative
analysis by Peemans (1975) of capital accumulation in colonial
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Belgian Congo reveals the particularly active role adopted by
the colonial state in facilitating the inflow of Belgian
capital and the expropriation of peasant surplus. In sum, these
recent studies indicate that new interpretations are not
confined to British colonialism and imperialism in Africa.
Nevertheless, the social and economic history fields have
their own orthodoxies as evidenced by a number of works on
Swaziland. Swaziland in general and the period under consideration
in this thesis have been badly neglected research areas to date.
Boyce (1947) was the first of a rather weak series of descriptive
accounts of the period 1870-1915. Following in this tradition
are Whittington and Daniel (1969), Mashasha (1973), Drooglever
(1976) and Nyeko (1976). Nothing presented goes much beyond
reproduction of official published sources from the period and
the detailing of various colonial legislation. With an overemphasis
on political rather than economic history little attempt is
made to develop an appropriate theoretical framework for studying
the actions of the colonial state. Thus locating the country
in the broader historical context of the expansion of capitalism,
a fundamental location to explain many of the internal social,
political and spatial dynamics, is ignored. Youe (1977) is the
first to take halting steps in this direction. His focus is
on a comparison of British colonial policy towards black
attempts to regain expropriated land in Rhodesia and Swaziland.
Even this study is inadequate, however, because it fails to
give due credence to the role of metropolitan capital in
Swaziland in the period concerned.
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Both theoretically and empirically this study therefore
attempts to break new ground in the study of Swaziland's past
and present.
What is called for is an alternative methodology with
an historical perspective for examining the spatial structure
of colonialism and development under capitalism. Two interlinked directions are taken in the search. First to the
attempts by geographers to derive and expand an holistic theory
of imperialism and ,second, to a consideration of structuralist
approaches to spatial organisation in the Third World.

2.3 GEOGRAPHERS AND THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM
With regard to the theory of imperialism Slater (1977)
writes:
"When studying the geographical literature published
prior to 1970 one finds very little evidence indeed
of an awareness of the theoretical importance of
imperialism" (p 3 ) .
Blaut (1970,1975), Folke (1973), U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977)
have all published cases for the inclusion of a general theory
of imperialism in geography. Their argument is first a negation
of the purely politico-historical definitions of imperialism
favoured by political historians and, in geography, the
Hellen school:
"In this view imperialism is seen purely as a political
phenomenon closely related to the nineteenth century
concept of Empire. Consequently attention is diverted
away from its economic and social elements" (Slater,1977 ,
Secondly, they call for the development of a rigorous
neo-Marxian definition and concept of imperialism consistent
with the refocus of scholarly attention on the international
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capitalist system as an objective of research. A new theory
of imperialism promises to be:
"An alternative theoretical system which can enable
us scientifically to explain the socio-economic
phenomena which development geographers are concerned
with but unable to account for " (Slater,1977 ,p 1).
Thirdly, they argue that in the development of such theory,
admittedly still in its infancy, it is insufficient merely
to describe the process of penetration of the periphery by
3
capital as Porter and de Souza (1974) propose. A theory of
imperialism would hope to explain the essentially expansionist
nature of capital and the manner of its world penetration in
the past and present.
Several social scientists have produced summaries and
extensions of the theories of imperialism to be found in
Marx, Lenin, Hobson and Luxemburg.

The nuances of this debate

on the content of a theory of imperialism are not the concern
here although all of the work by geographers on the theory
give due consideration to these studies. The positive contributions
to theory by geographers to date are limited to Blaut (1975),
U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977).
Blaut (1975), ever-conscious of the paucity of class-analysis
in neo-Marxian geography, conceives imperialism as the export
of the class struggle from the developed to the Third World in
a manner castigated by U.S.G. (1976) and Slater (1977) . The
spatial homogeneity of class explicit in Blaut's model is a
basic failing and Slater (1977)

even challenges Blaut's

understanding of class as being inverted and non-marxist.
Both U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977) consider the inherent
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expansionary nature of capital. The former draw their
conceptualisation from the work of Emmanuel (1972) and
Amin (1974) on the process of "capitalist accumulation" in
specific historical contexts. Harvey (19 77) on the other hand
attempts to rediscover a classic Marxist theory of imperialism.
Of these, Harvey is the more useful and penetrating. His
analysis of Marx leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon
of capitalist accumulation is inherently expansionary. Thus
he writes:
"The Marxian theory of accumulation under the capitalist
mode of production says that capitalism is bound to
expand through both an intensification of the relationships
in the capitalist centres of production and a geographical
extension of those relationships in space" (p 281).
Harvey (1977) claims that the theory as elaborated is an
abstract one which awaits application in specific historical
contexts.
Slater's(1977)
more eclectic.

approach to a theory of imperialism is
He derives his basic definition from

Kemp (1967) :
"The Marxist theory of imperialism is centred around
the aim of explaining the immanent characteristics
of the capitalist mode of production in its latest
and most advanced stage, and in fact the theory uses
the term not to signify the relationship between an
advanced imperial country and the colonial areas
falling within its formal empire, but to analyse a
special stage of capitalist development" (p 5 ) ,
and, more succinctly, direct from Lenin (1963) :
"Imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism" (p 5 ) .
Slater tries to empirically address several of Lenin's
assertions about the charactersitics of the monopoly stage.
These include the concentration of capital, the merging of
bank and industrial capital, the export of capital, the formation
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of international monopolist combines and the territorial
division of the world. Slater finds Lenin's contribution on
the historical export of capital from the metropole to be
5 "
deficient as others have done before him.
The relationship
between imperialism and colonialism is then addressed.
Summarising a lengthy

argument, imperialism is seen to

be a stage in the development of capitalism and colonialism,as
territorial division and control, as an adjunct to but not
prereguisite for imperialism. They should therefore not be
seen as synonymous. European colonialism in Africa in the
ninteenth century is seen as closely related to imperialism
in that it provided the specific historical context for monopoly
control of territory, for protection of capitalist interests
and for anticipatory capitalist penetration. Acceptance of the
last point would certainly challenge Robinson and Gallagher's (1961)
widely held thesis that British colonialism in Africa was
purely strategic, albeit to protect British capital investment
in the east.
While concurring with Slater's(1977)

thesis that the

focus of study of Third World social and spatial formations
under western impact should be couched within a general theory
of imperialism, the question of the linkages between imperialism
and colonialism still lie largely unresolved both theoretically
and empirically. The issue is addressed again in 2.6 where the
role of the colonial state in capitalist expansion in ninteenth
century Africa is considered.
Slater(1977 ) finally quotes extensively from Luxemburg (1968)
to argue that a

holistic theory of imperialism must incorporate

study of the impact of capitalism on pre-capitalist social
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formations, modes of production and the spatial organisation
of the Third World. To pursue this point further this
review now turns to geographical studies which incorporate
an explicit consideration of Third World spatial organisation
within structuralist formulations.

2.4 SPACE AND STRUCTURE
The cue for the structuralist paradigm is taken from;
Coutsinas and Pax (1977) :
"We need to take into account past or present forms
of the integration of the country into the dominant
capitalist system. This integration is at the root
of the explanation of internal spatial dynamics....
we should look for the determining factors of spatial
organisation in Third World countries in the
functioning of the dominant capitalist system" (p97),
from Corragio (1977) :
"There is a need to conceptually separate what constitutes
material spatial manifestation from the social structures
proper which regulate the production of such phenomena"(pl5)
and from Slater (1975b) :
"An approach to the explanation of spatial organisation
and inequality might well be couched in terms of the
historical development of a particular spatial structure
....we must situate the phenomenon in an overall context
of international capitalist expansion and focus on time,
space and structure"
Structuralism and structuralist approaches to spatial
organisation in geography tend to draw their inspiration

from

approaches in the social sciences. To date,however, only a very
few geographers have attempted to come to terms with the need
for an articulated structuralist paradigm. Most obvious are
the contributions of Gregory (19 76) and the earlier expositions
of McTaggart (1974) and Olsson (1974).
Taking the premise, as Gregory (1976) does, that the reality
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of process and function cannot be unambiguously determined from
form since underlying relationships, dialetical change and
conflict are not mappable, prompts the conclusion that the
focus of attention in explanation should not be unrelated
spatial aggregates but related structured systems.
Gregory (19 76) thus distinguishes between two common
understandings of 'structure' in geography. The more orthodox
view sees social structure as being made up of observed
patterns of interaction, so that the term 'structure' refers
to some visible ordered arrangement of parts or components.
The structuralist view proper is that the elements of manifest
reality must be mediated by a concealed structure. De George (1972)
argues that :
"If there is one common idea which ties together the
many different forms of structuralism, from Marx to
Freud to Piaget to Levi-Strauss, it is the conviction
that surface events and phenomena,the explicit and
the obvious, can be explained by structures and
relationships which are below the surface,implicit,
not obvious,out of conscious awareness. This attempts
to move beyond (but by no means ignore) the empirical
patternings derived from actual observation" (p 123).
The importance for De George is that structuralism does
attribute special significance to concepts such as mode of
production and class contradiction. De George (1972) is also
a salutory reminder to Gregory (19 76) who appears to be all
for rejecting any actual observation of empirical patternings.
Elements of structuralist approaches to spatial
organisation in the Third World can now be considered. BuchHanson and Neilsen (1977) conceptualise spatial organisation
as "territorial structure". This is seen as both a condition
for and tho rerult of the social and economic development of
a society. They claim that oarli modf oi production (lr»url<jl.
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pre-capitalist, capitalist, and so forth) forms its own spatial
structure through dialectical interaction with various
"elementary conditions" which further or hamper the development
of such a structure. These conditions include the natural
resource base distribution (the objects of labour as defined
by the mode of production), the distribution and growth of
population, the social superstructure (including the state) and
the territorial structure of the pre-existent mode of
production. The last condition is taken up by Santos(1977) :
"A mode of production is expressed in space through
a struggle and interaction between the new, which
progressively dominates, and the old" (p 5 ) .
The conceptualisation of exactly how the capitalist mode
of production creates its spatial structure is only suggestive
though the idea that spatial organisation is likely to be the
most optimal for surplus appropriation and capital accumulation
is a basic one. Harvey (1977) ,however, goes a step further
and argues that the continued development of the capitalist
mode of production is not a contradiction-free process in space :
"In order to overcome spatial barriers and to annihilate
space with time, spatial structures are created which
themselves act as barriers to further accumulation.
Capital comes to represent itself in the form of a
physical landscape created in its own image to enhance
the progressive accumulation of capital on an expanding
(and intensifying) scale. The geographical landscape
is both a crowning glory of past capita development
and a prison which inhibits the further progress of
accumulation" (p 273).
Slater (1975a) elucidates a framework for explaining the
nature of spatial structure under colonialism in areas where
there is more than one mode of production with the capitalist
mode becoming dominant and where, through the institute of the
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colonial state, capital develops a unified control over the
processes of production. In a rather abstract elucidation
Slater identifies the following components of the capitalist
mode of production which in combination and applied to a
specific country would help explain the spatial configuration;
(i) The uneven development of the productive forces (objects
of labour, instruments of labour and the division of labour),
(ii) The manner and pattern of surplus appropriation (including
the type of surplus appropriated - either surplus value,
merchant profit or surplus labour),
(iii) Class structure ( comprising the expatriate or local
capitalist class, the merchant class, the proletariat and
the peasantry),
(iv) The mode of utilising the surplus (including expropriation
to theraetropoleand the distribution of the remaining surplus).
The role of the colonial state is an implicit theoretical
element in Slater's schema.
Slater (19 75b) attempts to build on this earlier model by
identifying the specific mechanisms employed by capital to
appropriate surplus (plantations, settler states and mining
concerns). He also argues that as the capitalist mode of
production penetrates, a distinctive spatial structure evolves
and crystallises and spreads to new territory via the construction
of a physical infrastructure. Using Luxemburg (1968), capital
is seen to pursue the following ends;
(i) Possession of the objects of labour ( land, raw materials),
(ii) Liberation of labour-power from indigenous modes and
co-ercion of labour into its service,
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(iii) The introduction of a commodity economy.
The colonial state is perceived as an apparatus erected in the
metropole to ensure the stable political conditions reguired
by capital to achieve these ends. Slater applies his historical
schema of the plantation mode of production to Tanzania in
an extremely enlightening exercise. Consideration of the
settler-state such as Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia, the Portugese
colonies and Swaziland is deferred to another date. Porter
and de Souza's (1974) description of spatial evolution in Kenya
is not much clearer on this point. Their excessive concern with
identifying the general motive for European expansionism

("the

drive for tropical raw materials") leads to an ignorance of the
role of the settlers themselves in affecting spatial evolution.
Santos(1975) introduces a further dimension to the argument
in his conception that an essential facet of the capitalist
mode of production is "spatial domination of one space by
another" :
"Spaces are being regarded as differentiated by the
amount of capital they represent, by their produce
and the amount of profit they bring in, and in the
last resort,by their power to attract investments" (p 347).
Santos argues that there is a need for an understanding of
spatial domination and the "blatant inequalities" it produces.
The idea that the capitalist spatial structure embodies within
it "the process of the domination of man through the domination
of space" is a useful one.
Barrios (1977) whose primary concern is the political
organisation of space, also suggests that the relations of
capitalist domination are founded on the appropriation of physical

41
space. The implication of this is clear : land alienation in
the colony was a means to control one of the objects of labour
for the exploitation of capital (land) and one means to promote
the creation of a labour force.
Harvey (1977) is a fitting postscript:
"The landscape which capitalism creates is seen as
the locus of contradiction and tension,rather than
as the expression of harmonious equilibrium" (p 274).
A number of the concepts discussed above must be included
in the construction of a model for the evolution of Swaziland's
space. A suitable historical model for the structuring of these
concepts and several other dimensions is to be found in the
work of Brett (1973), Banaji (1973), Good (1976) and Friedland (19770.
This is the notion of settler colonialism.

2.5 THE COLON MODEL
Banaji (1973) identifies two specific historical forms of
the restructuring of an indigenous mode of production by
capitalism;
(a) Rapid integration into the world subjugation to the dominance
of merchant and usurer capital, as in much of West Africa, and
(b) The

rapid destruction of productivity of the traditional

mode of production by economic and legal mechanisms as part of
an internal process of primitive capital accumulation. Most
settler-states are seen to accord with this second form though
it should be stated that even within the evolving settler-state,
particularly in the early colonial period, there often existed
conflicts between policies to control or undermine peasant
production.
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Good (1976) has attempted to construct a model of the
second form, the settler-state or colon model, from an empirical
and dialetical base. It derives from a consideration of the
"important similarities" between settler societies such as
South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya and Algeria. The model is divided
into four sections;
(a) The geographical and social origins of the settler class
or petit-colon.
(b) The aims of the petit-colon in regard to the objects and
means of production,
(c) The linkages between the petit-colon, metropolitan capital
and the colonial state both within the colon and within the
metropole,
(d) The consequences for the indigenous mode of production of
capitalism in the colon.
First, the origins of the petit-colon are considered.
Good (1976) argues that historically the settler-state generally
emerged where militarism and domination of'indigenous society
by force were particularly heavy. Force, for Good (1976), is not
to be viewed as sadistic racist fury but :
"An integral aspect of Europe's advancing industrial
superiority with its purpose of gaining greater control
over African land and labour" (p603).
Bradby (1975) provides an interesting discourse on the
associations between violence and the spread of capitalism in
the Third World. Her contention is that force was not a sine
qua non for the domination of capital and had little direct
function in forcing the indigenous population to accept wagelabour or participate in the money-economy. It was rather primari
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a function of local resistance to metropolitan attempts to
control and produce raw materials for home industry.
Settlement was encouraged by the metropolitan state and
capital for several reasons. Robinson and Gallagher's (1961)
thesis is that the settler-state was a strategic "must", a more
forceful claim to a particular region for the metropole
desiring to protect interests elsewhere ( Africa for India).
Good (1976) agrees that strategic motives certainly were one
element underlying the encouragement of settler societies but
re-iterates that in the context of international political
economy the African settler-state was also viewed by state
and capital as:
"the natural as well as the most rewarding mode of
imperialist capitalist expansion" (p60l).
For the state, the economic strength of the metropole was
consolidated by improved access to raw materials and by the
provision of export markets for home industry. For metropolitan
capital:
"the settler as fully developed capitalist man was a
loyal and energetic partner" (p60l).
Good (1976) thus makes the assumption that the settler was
drawn from a capitalist class in the metropole, with consequent
links with metropolitan capital and an ideological commitment
to the capitalist mode of production in the colon. These
assertions need to be tested in empirical contexts. They also
lead to the second section of the colon model.
According to Good (19 76) the twin motivating aim of the
petit-colon was to acquire control over land and raw materials,
and over labour, as a means to primitive capitalist surplus
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appropriation. Various mechanisms were employed by the petitcolon to accumulate surplus. These included land speculation,
extraction of rent from black tenants and the use of the black
population as a cheap wage labour force. A major problem for
the petit-colon was thus to free labour from the indigenous
mode of production and to co-erce it into the service of capital.
Good (1976) argues that land expropriation while an end in itself,
also enabled the petit-colon to acquire control over labour.
This had two dimensions. First, blacks left resident on expropriated
land could either be ejected or if necessary immediately be
forced into a new set of social relations by the imposition of
rent or the extraction of labour service. Friedland (1977)
elaborates on the second dimension. Through constriction of the
area under black control the traditional system, perceived of
as inefficient and backward, would become unviable. With
concommitant economic scarcity the African was forced to enter
into relationships with the petit-colon. That this was a motive
for land expropriation is not,however, well-documented although
historically this was seen to be the case.
Friedland(1977) notes that the process was hastened by
the imposition of political legislation such as a taxation
system on blacks (head and hut taxes) forcing them either to
sell productive surplus or to sell their labour. The apparent
motive for taxation was to generate income for administrative
costs; the inevitable result was the promotion of control over
black labour by the petit-colon where blacks were forced to sell
labour to pay taxes.
Banaji(1973), in an otherwise doctrinaire statement,portrays
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the penetration of capitalism under a settler-state as a form
of primitive capital accumulation and as a transitory phase;
"In the settler colonies in Africa the colonial mode
of production emerged as a purely transitional and
subordinate phenomenon,fuelling an internal expansion
of the capitalist mode of production" (p 399)..
This observation was historically verified in the South African
and Rhodesian cases but elsewhere it was not. The difference
requires explanation.
Third, the links between the petit-colon, metropolitan
capital and the colonial state are of some importance to Good's(1976)
model.
On the theoretical level,a number of geographers have
advocated study of the relationship between colonialism and
imperialism (2.3). The major concern here is a subset of that
debate ; that is, to identify the ways in which the colonial
state was used to further the ends of capital in what U.S.G.(19 76)
have called the "age of classic imperialism" (1870-1914).
Harvey (1976) provides an excellent synthesis of classic Marxist
views of the state as applied to contemporary imperialism.
U.S.G.(1976), drawing on similair sources,show how classically
the colonial state is viewed simply as a co-ercive tool of
capital with very little autonomy. Neo-Marxian writers give
the colonial state much greater autonomy since it functions as
a mediator and pacifier between conflicting capital interests
and between different social classes in the colony (similair
to the role of the state in the metropole).
In the "age of classic imperialism" the colonial state
is seen as an essential element in the process of expansion
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of metropolitan capital and the tieing in of the colonies to
the metropolitan economy. The role of the colonial state in
this context is viewed by U.S.G.(1976) as;
(i) The destruction of pre-capitalist economies through legaljuridicial measures such as taxation, forced migration, land
alienation and labour importation, to supply labour for the
capitalist mode of production.
(ii) The development of a transportation and communications
system designed to enable areas to be best exploited by capital.
(iii) The administration of colonies. Taxation of blacks was
used to pay for the maintenance of subordinate administrative
systems which forced blacks into the money-economy.
(iv) The provision of loans and services, differential to white
enterprise.
General colonial state expenditure within the colony is
viewed as of two types with the underlying purpose of facilitating
capitalist enterprise under a facade of benefiting the black
population. These are social investment, including infrastructure
and education with the aim of increasing labour productivity
and profits; and social expenditure, including investment in
projects and services for blacks,to maintain harmony in the
system, and on military and policing for the same purpose.
Writers thus

relationship between capital and the

colonial state as essentially one of necessary collusion during
this period. But what of the specifics of the colon model ?
In the early development of the settler-state or colon
the colonial state provided active support and was particularly
interventionist. The basis of this interventionism was to facilitate
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petit-colon control over land and labour. As a consequence:
"Wide scale state intervention contributed to the
evolution of a capitalist economy" (Good,19 76,p605),and
"The British state was committed to capitalism in Africa
as it was at home" (Brett,1973,p 7 9 ) .
The links between colonial state and petit-colon must,
according to Brett (1973) be seen in the context of a managed
economy to which both accepted a commitment. This pre-supposed
the colonial state would take responsibility for general economic
guidance and arose from the needs of capital for infrastructural
investment which it would not or could not afford to supply
itself. Thus, the colonial state provided infrastructure services,
agricultural extension and research, and control of the legal
framework of production and marketing; and the petit-colon had
the reserved right to develop production,processing and marketing,
through external capital or peasant production.
Petit-colon demands, to which there was invariable
acquiesence, were elaborated thus :
"The aim was to ensure that the metropole made no
liberalising concessions to the black majorities
(since the common and overriding interest was in
the exploitation of the black majority) and their
basic method was constant reactive clamour and
blocking manoeuvres" (Good, 1976,p6.11 ).
Brett (1973) elaborates the political structure of the colonial
state and convincingly demonstrates the priviliged access which
the petit-colon was allowed at all levels of the hierarchy.
Locally, with colonial state officials, and in the metropole,
with the Colonial and Foreign Offices, through its links with
metropolitan capital. So much so that :
"The most pervasive and effective influence on
economic policy was certainly exerted by the
representatives of British capital directly or
indirectly involved in Africa" (Brett,1973,p 63 )•
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Brett (1973) identifies two further influences on colonial
state policy. First, he argues that it is important to establish
the personal linkages between colonial administrators and
metropolitan capital. It is often summarily assumed that there
were no such linkages. Such an assumption needs careful testing.
Second,he attempts to identify the ideological impulse of
the colonial ruling class. Their values were embodied in the
assumption that :
"The colonized peoples were not capable of governing
themselves "under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world" and that the relationship between the
interests of colonised and coloniser was an essentially
reciprocal and creative rather than an exploitative
and contradictory one" (Brett,1973,p 41).
This was a powerful ideological justification for the promotion
of capitalist interests in the colony.
Fourth,the model posits the consequences for the indigenous
mode of production. Good (1976) perceives a much faster
disintegration of the pre-capitalist mode and advanced articulation
into international capitalism under the colon than under other
circumstances. An obvious feature is seen as the growth of a
new class structure based on capitalist social relations with
the concomittant proletarianisation of the peasant.
Banaji(1973) perceives the conseguences as more complex,
however :
"The capitalist subordination of the traditional mode
of production required a certain restructuring of the
latter, which by its very nature led to the disintegration
of certain of their characteristic forms and intensification
of others" (p 696).
H dual process of dissolution and conservation is unelaborated
but appears to represent the fact that some conservation was
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inevitable since the petit-colon was unable to absorb the
total black population into a labour force.
Ignored by Good (1976) are the series of programmes
instigated throughout the colonial period in Africa to force
rural dwellers into cash-cropping as a further raw material
source for capital..

2.6 SUMMARY
This multifarious survey of current geographical approaches
to colonial spatial organisation has suggested a number of
elements essential for consideration in the course of this study.
These can be summarised as ;
(a) The sources and aims of capital with regard to land, raw
materials and control of labour.
(b) The nature of the linkages between metropolitan capital,
the petit-colon and the colonial state.
(c) The explicit and implicit roles of land alienation in
pursuing the aims of the petit-colon, as well as the mechanisms
of such alienation, and
(d) The response of the indigeneous society to the dominance
of the petit-colon and the colonial state.
In the next Chapter,the focus is once again empirical as
the historical origins of the period of early British colonial
rule in Swaziland are traced.
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CHAPTER THREE
EARLY INTERACTION : STATE, CAPITAL AND SWAZI

"the country awaits the capitalist"
Rev.Joel Jackson,1890

3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers the period up to 1902 in Swaziland. It
identifies the roots of processes which were to come to fruition
in space in the post-Boer War period. The origins of the Swazi
state are reviewed and the major characteristics of the precapitalist mode of production outlined (3.2). The role of
Swaziland as a political football in the development of the
broader regional southern African political economy is then
described (3.3). The penetration of metropolitan capital into
Swaziland prior to 1899 is examined. Particular stress is placed
upon the development of an incipient settler-state or colon,
and upon the links forged by the early white immigrants with
metropolitan capital (3.4). Finally, the historical base is
summarised(3.5).

3.2 CONQUEST AND CONTROL : DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZI STATE
An important distinction can be drawn between the two
methods of early conquest and control which prevailed in this
area and to whose interaction may be attributed the origins
of Swaziland's present extent and location.
Under the indigenous system conquest was invariably by open
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force, and once subjection was achieved integration and fusion
of the conquered and conquerers followed. The following brief
account of the emergence of the Swazi as a socio-politically
organised state is drawn from research into the strong oral
traditions of the Swazi by Matsebula (1972), Kuper (1952, 1961,
1966), Marwick (1940) and Scutt (1966).
The Swazi trace their origins from the great southward
Bantu migrations from the eleventh to eighteenth centuries
along the line Nguni - Tekela Nguni - Bembo Nguni. It was not,
however, until 1750 that the bakaNgwane clan settled in what
is now S.Swaziland at Eshiselweni ( "the Birthplace of the
Nation"). Under Ngwane 111 (Appendix 2a), their conquest
procedure, which was to characterise their subsequent expansion
of control, was to eliminate pre-existent Sotho clans in the
area who refused to submit to their authority and to absorb
those who did. Around 1820 they where driven to the north
by a temporarily more powerful clan where the principal
homesteads were established. Map Six shows how the period
1820-1870 was spent in consolidating their position under
Sobhuza 1 and then Mswati. By 1845, Sobhuza had laid the
foundations of the nation-building process and had extended
his control by the vehicle of armed conquest over an area of
some 18,000 square miles. The picture is of a diffusion of
control from a central nucleus out over an area three times
that of present-day Swaziland.
It is not necessary to report in full the investigations
into the Swazi pre-capitalist mode of production of Kuper (1961),
Marwick (1940) and Hughes (19 72) except to highlight the roles
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of land and labour under that mode.
The homestead and extended family was the basic unit
of production and consumption :
"While the subsistence economy obtained the unit was
almost entirely independent....each individual
household was self-supporting and the need for trade
was non-existent" (Kuper,1961,p 45).
Division of labour within the unit was based on age/sex
differences rather than technological specialization. Labour
mobility existed on a local and hierarchical level. The
aristocracy could demand communal labour from their subjects
as tribute with no reward, while individual units could reguest
labour from fellow units with an obligation to reciprocate
and usually a festive reward.
Wealth, conceptualised in terms of a complex mythological
interplay between land, cattle and wives was unevenly distributed
but no class structure along western capitalist lines could
be identified. As Kuper (1961) writes?
"There is no capitalist class with the monopoly of
the means of production, no proletariat from whom
the means are debarred and no leisured class that
maintains itself on the labour of others" (pl37).
Land was held by the King in trust for the Nation and rights
to usufruct were allocated out down a socio-political hierarchy
of chiefs and sub-chiefs. Individual ownership of land was
non-existent and grazing land was held communally. Land was
,however, representative of the power the rulers held over
the people.
Cattle were the real basis of wealth and status-prestige
was accorded to quantity holdings. Certain circulation mechanisms
ensured that this wealth was concentrated in the aristocracy;
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particularly noteworthy being the lobola system involving
cattle-wife exchanges. Wealth was largely a privilege of the
aristocracy and, according to Kuper (1961), approved by the
masses. Wealth was, however, a side-benefit of prestige and
power not a condition for it as under the capitalist mode"The basis of power and prestige is birth not the
accumulation of property" (Marwick,1940,p
)

3.3 CONQUEST AND CONTROL : CONFLICTING IMPERIAL DESIGNS
The Swazi were one of a minority of southern African
tribes with whom early contact with whites was not marked by
armed conflict.

Economic conquest and subordination was no

less effective here than elsewhere however. The last quarter
of the ninteenth century marks the period of white penetration
and the loss of political sovereignty by the Swazi.
At this time in southern Africa, both Boer and Briton
were demarcating their boundaries and defining their spheres
of interest. The expansionist and republican policy of the
Transvaal Government under Paul Kruger after 1877 is wellattested by Robinson and Gallagher (1961), de Kiewet (1966),
Moodie (1975), Leyds (1919),

and others. The primary

aspiration was to establish an independent outlet on the
eastern seaboard free from British interference. Control of
Swaziland was seen as an essential preliminary step to the
building of a railway (Best,1965). Britain, with its own
designs in southern Africa, had no apparent desire to annex
an isolated country of dubious economic potential but was
equally opposed to complete Boer control and the implied coastal
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link.

2

The early result of such conflicts of territorial

interest were two conventions to which both states were party
(Pretoria Convention of 1881, London Convention of 1884) which
prohibited each from unilaterally annexing Swaziland and, in
effect, guaranteed the independence of the Swazis within the
3
boundaries arbitrarily defined by a commission in 1880. Despite
an enforced contraction of the area under direct Swazi control,
the role of the newly-defined Swaziland as a pawn in a BoerBriton power struggle ensured the survival of the political
autonomy of the Swazi state, for a time at least.
As Hughes (1964) writes :
"It could be said that Swaziland owes its present
existence as a separate political unit to the
historical accident that it lies in an area where
the interests of Boer and Briton clashed during
the ninteenth century. Neither was prepared to
allow the other to gain any undue influence over the
country; its independence was protected until nearly
the end of the century by the mutual jealousies of
powerful neighbours" (p 60).
Throughout the 1880•s the South African Republic continued
to press Britain for the annexation of Swaziland and followed
4
a number of strategies in pursuit of their ends.
There were
unofficial attempts by Boer groups to obtain documents of
cession from the Swazi monarch.

At another level, the

Republic spent almost £ 90,000 on acquiring crucial concessions
from the Swazi to control revenue collection and transportation
in Swaziland. This was ostensibly to improve its bargaining
power with the British state and private capital. Two agents,
Harrington and Cohen, were employed by the Republic to obtain
these concessions.

Most crucially,however, Kruger repeatedly
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petitioned

Britain and in May 1889 offered to withdraw all

South African Republic claims north of the Limpopo in exchange
7
for control over Swaziland.
The offer touched a responsive
chord in British state and capital circles?
"We should be much abused in this country if we let
the Boers annex Matabeleland and Mashonaland....as
they are rich territories, and concessions by Lo
Bengula are held by some influential people; but we
shall have to face considerable danger of conflict
with the Boers if we bar them from extension to the
North. I should be inclined to compromise with them
by letting it be known that if they come terms with
the Swazi king we shall not prevent them from protecting and annexing Swaziland. This will bring them to
the sea which is their chief desire" (8).
A potential deal fell through when the Republic rejected an
additional British demand that they join a Customs Union with
Natal and the Cape Colony.
Meanwhile,agitation within Swaziland and a conflict of
interests between representatives of all three national groups
(Swazi,Boer and Briton) led to a Swazi appeal to both states
9
in 1889.
Mbandzeni's inability to exert traditional authority
over the white immigrants had earlier precipitated the introduction
of administrative machinery to implement a form of dual control
whereby Theophilus Shepstone, independently installed as Resident
Adviser and Agent by the King, and a British-dominated "white
committee" of fifteen property-owners were given a charter of
self-government to administer the whites while still subject
to the sovereignty of the King (Drooglever,1976 ; Matsebula 1972).
The committee failed to exercise control. Inefficiency, Boer
antagonism and factional interests mitigated against its
authority and it was disbanded in 1890.
Ostensibly in response to the protection appeal both states
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agreed to a joint commission of enquiry. This was the De Winton
Commission, which from the British point of view, was also charged
with investigating the prospects for British capital in
Swaziland. De Winton's brief from the Colonial Office was that; :
"It is an essential feature of our policy that there
should be no undue restrictions upon the advancement
of British trade and enterprise in any part of South
Africa " (11).
The De Winton report was published in 1890 and is an extensive
document detailing the proceedings of five meetings with
representatives from different national groups, perceptions of
exploitable resources and economic potential in Swaziland and
suggestions for the protection of British capital interests.
Temporary Boer residents were predictably in favour of incorporation
into the South African Republic but British residents opposed
it. The Boers had a numerically superior voice but "do not
represent much capital". Swazi fears were allayed by reassurance
of political independence. De Winton concluded that :
"Matabeleland and Mashonaland are ten times larger
than Swaziland. The land is rich in minerals and
would be a good opening for British commerce,manufacturers
and enterprise. To acquire control over these large
and important territories for the British Empire rather
than cling to doubtful possession of a territory
difficult to protect, is a necessity. British commercial
interests and the interests of investors of capital in
mining or other enterprises in Swaziland could in
addition be protected by treaty arrangements" (12).
This view was actively supported in the upper echelons
of British state and capital. It led to the promulgation of
the 1890 Convention which provided a three-cornered provisional
government in Swaziland pending further investigation. 13
Kruger's Republic continued to press for annexation in the early
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1890's and consolidated her internal control by purchasing
concessions up to a value of ,£200,000 ( Table Five and Map Seven).
Kruger could then argue that;
"We hold all valuable concessions and we have the
right to all the practical expenses of administration.
The right to build railways,the roads,the posts, the
telegraphs - all state rights are in our hands. Swaziland surrounded as it is on three sides by the Transvaal,
represents merely an extension of our own system....
historically,geographically and administratively
Swaziland is ours" (14).
In 1894 Britain,under the powerful influence of Rhodes'
designs, finally waived her objections, and abandoned the
assurances to the Swazi nation in the interests of consolidating
the strength of British capital north of the Limpopo.

Without

the necessity for Swazi consent and despite concerted protest
from metropolitan capital in Britain, the 1894 Convention
provided for Swaziland's becoming a protectorate of the South
African Republic.
The Swazi guarantees of independence were consequently
sacrificed on the altar of British capitalist interests to the
north. At the same time the Convention provided for the
protection of British capital within Swaziland.
As a postscript to this section it might be added that the
Republic's railway designs were finally thwarted by British
annexation of Tongaland in May 1895; a move which incidently
was to have severe repercussions on the development of a colon
in Swaziland after 1910.
The South African Republic administered Swaziland until
the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. At this time all whites
were ordered out of Swaziland by their respective governments.
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TABLE FIVE
CONCESSIONS ACQUIRED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC

A.MONOPOLIES
COST ( £ )
RAILWAY
SURVEYING
POSTAL SERVICES
CANALS & NAVIGATION
TELEGRAPHS & ELECTRICITY
RAILWAY BARS
Cost
B.REVENUE

12,000
2,000
12,000
4,000
7,000
2,000
£ 39,000

LICENSING

50,000

CUSTOMS REVENUE
PRIVATE REVENUE CONCESSION

3,000
12,000

Cost
C.LAND CONCESSIONS

/ 65,000

P 2 (/4000), PI and P6 (/45,000), P23 (^3,700).
L5 (/ll,800), L6 (^2,800), L8 (^600), L60/61 (/4000), L64 (^860)
L75/76/77 (^3700).
Total Number : 16

Total Cost :/88,7l0

D.MINERAL CONCESSIONS
M9.

Source : c 7212 (Appendix lb)
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3.4 THE COLON :

DEVELOPMENT AND METROPOLITAN LINKAGES

In this section the processes of early white penetration
of Swaziland are traced, including the methods employed to
gain control over the objects of labour (land and mineral
resources). Two sets of linkages are then outlined; those
with metropolitan capital and those with the two rival colonial
states.
Swaziland was isolated from the mainstream of white
migration in southern Africa and contact with whites was limited
before 1850. Thereafter, rapid penetration of the area was a
function of the desires of Boer pastoralists from the Transvaal
and British mining prospectors, traders and agriculturalists.
For the Boer, winter grazing for sheep was perceived as superior
to that of the Transvaal,and transhumance became common practice :
"For a good many years Swaziland has been the favourite
grazing ground of the Boers. In the winter time a number
of them with their flocks move to the warmer veldt of
the lower country and have been allowed to squat there
by the King for the winter months. Some of them have
obtained grazing licenses from the King,the consideration
given being a horse or heifer. Granting of licenses has
gone on for eight years but only in the last four have
the Boers come in any number"(17).
The annual influx of Boers reached 1000 by 1890.
Gold was discovered in 1874 in the north-west of Swaziland
and this prompted a rapid influx of Britons in the 1880's :
"The news that gold was found fired men's imagination with
the idea that Swaziland was a veritable Eldorado. The
finding of a few small reefs and some alluvial tin sufficed
to send adventurers into the country in swarms,and there
was a constant stream of potential concessionaires going
and returning from the royal kraal" (18).
In the wake of the miners followed a large number of traders,
farmers and speculators, fiercely competetive and acquisitive in
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the drive for profit. The permanent white population, including
dependents, rose to 500 by 1890. 1 9
Paying lip service at least to the sovereignty of the
Swazi over their own resources and to avoid overt physical
conflict the incipient petit-colon sought some sanction for
its projected exploitation. The years 1877-1890

marked a period

of intense concession-granting by the Swazi King Mbandzeni,as
he was pressured by whites trying to obtain his mark on the
often complex, legally-prepared concession documents they were
brandishing. The use of concessions as as obtuse mechanism
to obtain black sanction of the appropriation of desired rights
was common throughout Africa at this time (Pedler,1975 ; Slinn,1971).
The method undoubtedly reached its worst excess in Swaziland.
Concessions obtained by whites, which ceased to be granted
after the' death of Mbandzeni in 1890 on the order of the rival
colonial states, were as follows;
(i) Grants of grazing rights over specific areas for periods
of up to 50 years

(there were 76 of these),

(ii) Land grants in freehold or leases of land in perpetuity (31),
(iii) Agricultural rights over specific areas for periods up
to 99 years (138),
(iv) Mineral rights over specified areas (54),
(v) Trading rights over defined areas (7)
(vi) Speculative industrial monopolies (60)
(vii) Miscellaneous rights including the right to collect the
King's revenue, rights to customs duty exemption and the
Unallotted and Lapsed Land and Mineral concessions.
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The remuneration accruing to the Swazi elite from the
granting of concessions was estimated as £ 150,000 between
1885 - 1888 and from 1890 - 1899 the munificent annuity was
/12,000. By 1900 the rulers had received £ 270,000 from
,.20
concessionaire interests.
The temporal distribution of the concessions is illustrated
in Figures 2 and 3. The marked peaks in the late 1880's in
Figure 2 are a reflection of increasing white immigration and
levels of aquisitiveness.21 Figure 3 is a partial surrogate
for white mobility. The predominance of grants in the winter
months. May to August, is consistent with the Boer pattern
of temporary residence for winter-grazing. The more even
non-Boer distribution is a function of more permanent residence
in the country. All concessions, except the monopolies,contain
explicit spatial clauses and the guaranteed protection of
•native rights'. 22
The excesses which this speculative drive to control the
objects of labour precipitated are highlighted by Forbes (1938)
(Appendix 2b), and by a retrospective glance at this era in
1909 :
"Practically the whole country was covered two,three
or even four deep by concessions of all sizes,for
different purposes and for greatly differing periods.
In but few cases were even the boundaries defined;many
of the areas have been subdivided several times,and
seldom were the boundaries of the superimposed areas
coterminous. In addition to this,concessions were granted
for all lands and minerals previously unallotted.Finally
over these three or four strata of conflicting interests
there had to be preserved the rights of the natives to
live,move,cultivate,graze and hunt" (23).
Nevertheless it has proved possible to construct a map of
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prior-granted concessions which reveals the spatial configuratiion
of different types of land grant ( Map Eight). Of particular note
is the consolidated block of grazing concessions in the southwest of the country.
A number of scholars have speculated on the excesses of
the concession granting process (Boyce,1947 ; Drooglever 1976).
The irregularities and dubious nature of the whole procedure
are often referred to from various first-hand accounts. Drooglever
(1976) goes further and argues that the appointment of white
advisers (Shepstone and Miller) by the King had the opposite
effect to that intended and that both took advantage of their
post for personal benefit and became channels of co-ercion for
white interests as a whole. 24
From the Swazi viewpoint (Matsebula,1972) there are claims
that the King would have had little conception of the rights
demanded by whites (minerals, industrial processes and exclusive
land ownership), that his intention was to grant usufructury
rights in accordance with the traditional framework and that
the King took advantage of short-term material benefit in
recognition of the inexorable domination of whites in the region.
As he himself expressed it:
"You are getting rich from my country and I should be
able to do the same....we must eat before we die" (25).
The whole process was obviously facilitated by the autocratic
decision-making role of the King and the investiture of ultimate
control of land and labour-power in him under the traditional
mode of production. A primitive form of co-option thus enhanced
the appropriation by the incipient petit-colon of the objects of
i w

labour.

25a
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The need to legitimise the appropriation in the eyes
of any prospective colonial state inevitably arose and here
there is a need to briefly examine the linkages with metropolitan
capital and the colonial states during this era. For the transient
Boer population :
"They are anxious to convert their grazing rights into
rights of ownership" (26).
While the Boer national group, as Moodie (1975) and Lincoln (1977)
argue, were increasingly to adopt the capitalist mode of production
as their productive norm, at the stage of penetration of
Swaziland this was probably more nascent than realised. Yet the
objectives of the Boer faction were in essential concurrence
with those of British based capital at this time. For the Boer,
confining his activities to extensive pastoralism, unfettered
land control was a necessity. Land alienation also later appears
to have represented a means of gaining control over Swazi labour
to channel to the farms of the Eastern Transvaal.
For the Briton :
"Companies are now being floated and refloated in England
on the frail tenure of Mbandzeni's grants and money
amounting to millions will shortly be invested by the
English public on properties of doubtful security"(27).
In 1890 De Winton was conscious of the factionalism and overt
social conflict within the incipient colon and suggested, in
response, the organisation of a legal tribunal to arbitrate
in cases of conflicting rights. The white residents pressed for
wider legal powers for the court in meetings with De Winton,
demanding the permanent establishment of all rights and title
and that concessions granted should be recognised by any future
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government. The acquiesence of the two colonial states in consort
is embodied in Article 2 of the 1890 Convention.28 The court was
duly established, sat in what is now Manzini from October 1890
to January 1891, and confirmed legal title to all concessions
supposedly approved by the Queen Regent. 29
The incipient petit-colon thus successfully concluded the
first stage of its appropriation with the sanction of the colonial
states;
"These concessions have been validated by the Court
established for their examination under the 1890
Convention and Great Britain was a party to the
Convention and is bound to respect them" (30).
Two unsuccessful attempts were made around this time by
capital interests to control the country as a chartered state.
Prior to 1889, Cohen, later an agent of the South African Republic,
was employed by a firm of financiers (Porges & Eckstein) to
obtain controlling concessions in Swaziland with a view to
obtaining a charter for the firm. 31 The failure of this scheme
is attributable to the similair rival interest of the Republic.
The second attempt revolved around the acquisition of the
Unalloted and Lapsed Land and Mineral concessions on which the
Umbandini Concession Syndicate (later the Swaziland Corporation
Ltd.) was floated. The activities of this Company are examined
in depth in Chapter 4.
On the basis of achieved legitimacy of their concessions
the British faction forged links with metropolitan capital to
obtain the necessary capital backing to exploit their acquisitions.
Twenty companies were floated in England on the basis of mining,
agricultural and industrial monopolies. By 1894 these comprised an
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aggregate capital o££3

million and represented over 5000

British shareholders (Table Six). Original concessionaires
resident in Swaziland invariably became local managers but
were ultimately responsible to Britain-based boards on whom
sat numbers of well-connected capitalists. It is clear that
all of the share capital was not immediately invested in
Swaziland but as early as 1890,^25,000 p.a. was flowing into
the country.
The major obstacles to mining development did not therefore
lie in the area of capital scarcity. Instead the main hindrances
were seen to be the lack of a transportation system and
32
"the drawback of a scarcity of African labour"
. As Miller
wrote in 1900:
"During 1897 labour was unprocurable and several mining
companies were forced to close down" (33).
Despite the strong metropolitan links and the intense
lobbying which these links facilitated the British faction lost
their attempt to influence the British colonial state against
the annexation of Swaziland by the South African Republic, and
had to be content with the 1894 Convention guarantees of the
protection of British capital. The concerns expressed in the
metropole in protesting the proposed South African Republic
takeover covered a number of issues. 34
There was the obvious desire to protect invested capital
and to ensure that future capital flows in and out of the country
would not be adversely affected. Then, as far as the mining
fraternity were concerned, there was a great fear of the imposition
of the Republic's gold mining taxation system in Swaziland. A
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TABLE SIX
BRITISH BASED COMPANIES OPERATING IN SWAZILAND IN 1892

COMPANY

SHARE CAPITAL(£) SHAREHOLDERS

Acton's Concession Ltd.
Bird's Swaziland Concession Ltd.
Swazi Goldfields Ltd.
Havelock Gold Mining & Exploration Co.
Indimba Land Exploration Co.
Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co.
Swaziland Gold,Exploration & Land Co.Ltd.
Forbes Reef Gold Mining Co.
Southern Forbes Reef Co.
Piggs Peak Estate & Gold Mining Co.
Wyldsdale Gold Exploration & Devnt. Co.
Umbandine Concessions Syndicate.
Pullen's Concession Co. Ltd.
Horo Syndicate
Ruby Creek Syndicate
Seaforth Mining Co. Ltd.
Unity Gold Mining Co. Ltd.(London),
Komati Goldfields Syndicate.
Swaziland Mercantile Association.
Ryland (Swazi) Gold Mining Co.Ltd.
Source : c 6200, c7212 (Appendix lb).

36,000
30,000

354
150

250,000

138
160
37
353
170

120,000
16,750
150,000
150,000
400,000
250,000
250,000

995
118
1700

250,000

126

50,000
250,000
100,000
25,000
15,000
100,000
30,000
100,000
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further threat was perceived by the holders of industrial and
revenue monopolies from any administration which would seek to
acquire them. A more widely discussed issue was that the trade
of the South African Republic would eventually be diverted away
from the British colonies in South Africa.
Nevertheless, despite local and metropolitan lobbying, the
annexation was concluded. To the British colonial state it was
a function of the inefficiencies of dual control, the geographical
location of Swaziland and the Republic's control of revenue
concessions. But as Miller ruefully admitted in 1900,:
"In the 1890's Africa's most powerful voice, Rhodes, urged
the handing over of Swaziland to Boer mis-rule to secure
capitalist development for the territory north of the
Limpopo" (35).

3.5 CONCLUSION
The historical process of capitalist penetration of
Swaziland attempted prior to British colonial rule provides
a clear illustration of the domination of the local population
at international and sub-national levels, in the pursuit to
consolidate control over land,labour and minerals and to begin
to extract surplus. The links of the early white settlers of
Swaziland with metropolitan capital interests are demonstrated
in 3.4. Major obstacles to the inflow of capital are seen to
be the broader political uncertainties due to Swaziland's place
within the broader regional political economy in a state of flux,
the essentially spatial conflict of interests between whites in
the country caused by the excesses of the concession granting period,
and the inability of capital, in and of itself, to force labour
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out of the indigenous economy and into a new set of social
relations under capital. All three issues begged resolution
before capital could begin to extract the surplus desired.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COLONIAL STATE AND CAPITAL IN INTERACTION AND COLLUSION
"Some four millions of capital and the livelihood of those who
are resident and interested in Swaziland depended on His Honour's
announcement", Times of Swaziland,1908.

4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter a chronological framework is first outlined
and the primary colonial state policy-makers in relation to
Swaziland are identified (4.2). The aims and objectives of
capital in Swaziland in the period 1902-1909 are then presented (4.3),
and the structuring of the colon in pursuit of these aims is
described (4.4). The ideological acquiesence of the colonial
state policy-makers is examined (4.5) and the influence and impact
of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd. in this period is analysed (4.6)

4.2 CHRONOLOGICAL SYNOPSIS : 1903 - 1909
The administration of Swaziland was inherited by Britain from
the defunct South African Republic after the Boer War and validated
by Order-in-Council of 1903 (Appendix 3a).
Despite being labelled from the first as a 'protectorate',the
precise colonial status of Swaziland vis a vis the Crown was never
actually defined (Youe,1976).

To all intents and purposes,however,

its status was that of a dominion colony under the Colonial Office.
The 1903 Order-in-Council vested control of Swaziland's affairs
in the Governor of the Transvaal and after,1906, in the GovernorGeneral of South Africa who was also High Commissioner for the
2
Protectorates despite being resident in South Africa. Perusal
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of the 1903 Order-in-Council reveals the high degree of decisionmaking autonomy invested by the Colonial Office in the High
Commissioners ,,Milner and Selborne,in administering Swaziland
(Hailey,1953,1956) (Appendix 3b). The historical record bears
this out. Both Milner and Selborne exercised considerable power
in the colonial resolution of Swaziland's perceived problems. The
role of these two is therefore a crucial one in examining colonial
state policy. Both were ultimately responsible to the Colonial
Secretary but, in practice, the contact was limited to keeping
the Secretary informed of decisions and to those instances where
the full weight of the colonial state was required to reinforce
3
decisions (see Chapter 6.3).
Within Swaziland, at a lower level of the administrative
hierarchy, a Resident Commissioner and four District Commissioners
4
were appointed by the High Commissioner, m practice, the Resident
Commissioner was a mediator between the High Commissioner and
Swaziland residents, informing them of colonial state policy and
monitoring response for the High Commissioner. Familiarity with
the local scene also made him a considerable information input
into the decision-making of the High Commissioner. Thus,for
instance,Coryndon's influence is clearly seen in Selborne's policy.
The Swaziland Concessions Commission also performed the role
of an information source for policy-making.
Colonial state policy-making in Swaziland was therefore
highly decentralised, localised and individualistic.
The immediate purpose of the British colonial state in
Swaziland, since armed subjugation was not an issue, was to bring
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some arbitrationary order to the visible legacy of capitalist
penetration of the previous two decades. Milner visited Swaziland
in 1903 to familiarise himself with the local conditions and
commissioned J.F.Rubie to prepare a set of recommendations for
colonial state policy in Swaziland. Rubie's suggestions formed
the basis of the first major administrative proclamation in
5
1904. Under this Proclamation a 5 man commission was appointed
(Swaziland Concessions Commission)

to (a) define the boundaries

of all land and mineral concessions,

(b) expropriate from

the holders at pre War value all industrial and trading monopolies,
(c)arbitrate on the nature and priority of claims between
whites, and

(d) provide the Swazi with the use of that land

"to which they are entitled."
The country was subjected to a detailed field survey in 1905
and the detailed decisions of the Commission re the expropriation
of monopolies and conflicting white interests are recorded in
their 1906 and 1908 reports (Appendix lb). Under the 1904
Proclamation all land concessions for 99 years duration or for
50 years with right of renewal became freehold farms,as did all
perpetual land grants. All concessions of less than 50 years
duration were confirmed as leaseholds conferring exclusive and
comprehensive land rights on the holder. In cases of spatial
overlap the procedure was to determine the basal concession
which gave fullest rights to the surface (usually the prior-dated
ones) and to define any leases registrable as servitudes against
it.
Two superimposed networks of basal concessions were
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consequently defined- one of mineral concessions, the other
of land holdings.

These are shown in Maps Nine and Ten.

Skiborne visited Swaziland in September 1906 to consult
the Swazi rulers and the whites and as a result the controversial
Partition Proclamation of 1907

was issued.

This Act allowed

for the setting aside of one-third of the area of the country
for Swazi reserves; leaving the remaining two-thirds under the
7
control of white landowners and the Crown. It also provided
for the appointment of a Special Commissioner to carry out the
land partition. George Grey was enlisted from C.Africa by
Q

Selborne for the purpose.
January and December 1908.

The partition was effected between
9

4.3 THE PROSPECTS FOR CAPITAL
From contemporary published accounts it is possible to
construct a picture of the optimistic perceptions of the petit-colon
as regards the prospects for the capitalist mode of production
under the British colonial state.
The keynote to the era is provided by the rationale of the
Swaziland Corporation :
"The weight of the Corporation's influence will go towards
the opening of its lands and minerals with the sure
confidence that the exploitation of these holdings will...
earn the speediest profits for shareholders" (10).
The mineral wealth of Swaziland was still something of an
unknown quantity in the period 1903-9. Certainly there was little
sign of the "orgie of enthusiasm" (Miller,1937) of the 1880's but
the apparent failure of the mining companies to pay the expected
dividends in the 1890's was rationalised away.

Miller (1900)

attributed the failure to (a) poor mine management, (b) political
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uncertainty, (c) high transport costs for mining machinery and
(d) the absence of a railway. The first two were considered to be
transient problems and a railway was thought to be immanent (Best,1965).
The Swaziland Corporation annual report of 1906 posits the lack
of capital for underground mining as a further causative factor
of failure in the 1890's.12 This too was not viewed as an
insurmmountable obstacle.
A more serious potential handicap was, as before the War,
the production of a regular black labour-supply :
"The most serious handicap to mining is the scarcity
of native labour" (13).
The Swaziland black mining labour force was to reach 1087 in
14
1906 and 2017 in 1910.
At a later stage, the mining fraternity
was to see their small labour supply severely affected by the
powerful capitalist competitors for labour on the Witwatersrand.
Thus, in 1911, Miller wrote :
"A battalion of labour recruiters from South Africa has
invaded and disorganised the local labour supply" (15).
Apart from mining, there was an increasing awareness of
the environmental potential of Swaziland for large-scale
agricultural production. This was frequently articulated as was
the perceived role of the Swazi in these potential developments;
"The low country will one day produce cotton and tobacco
on so large a scale that great areas will be put under
the plough. The middleveld is suitable for all classes
of sub-tropical produce, including citrus, and the
highveld will become the home of the stockraiser. If
European energy and capital are devoted to the agricultural
development of these productive areas the prosperity of
the native will follow. He will soon learn to imitate
what the higher race initiates and a close industrial
inter-mixture of the two peoples would assist towards
the regeneration of the native race" (16).
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Or again, with a note of qualification :
"The soil and climate of Swaziland are suitable to the
growth of products which would not rely solely upon a
local market for their disposal. Possibly 50% of Swaziland
is adapted for the cultivation of plantation produce such
as tea,coffee,tobacco,fibrous plants and for cattle rearing
....but a railway is necessary to the development of
agriculture on a large scale" (17).
One of the reasons for such faith in the plantation potential
of the country was the perception of distinct locational
advantages

:

"We are within 60 miles of the finest port on the East
African coast and 40 miles of a railway communicating
with the populous districts which will grow in consuming
power more rapidly than it will in supply" (18).
It was also founded on the results of experimental agricultural
work on a variety of cash-crops, ranching and timber by both the
«

Swaziland Corporation and the Henderson Consolidated Corporation.
I
19
Cotton,in particular, showed promise o f £ 5 per acre profits.
Success would, it was anticipated, attract capital from further
afield :
"On this plantation we will be able to build up an industry
and be in a position to attract American planters by showing
that Swaziland offers wide scope for the cotton grower"(20).
Any impediments to the realization of profit were considered
resolvable. Best (1965) describes the Milner-Davies railway
proposals of 1902-5. This railway was to join Johannesburg
with Lourenco Marques via central Swaziland and the whites in
Swaziland were accutely aware of the implications of this scheme
in providing market accessibility. 21 The creation of a labour
force, as with mining, was considered a necessary pre-requisite
for plantation development but here too there were grounds for
optimism.
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With reference to prospective cotton plantations:
"We do not anticipate difficulty in getting raw hands
to pick cotton. If we can make the work popular there
w 11 be an inexhaustable labour supply"(22).
Competition for labour was anticipated from outside Swaziland
as well,however, though this concern was best articulated by
Selborne :
"The whole interest of the Boers of the Eastern Transvaal
lies in the direction of Swaziland since all of them want
to open up trade with Swaziland and increase their supply
of Swazi labour"(23).
The promotion of private settlement schemes was viewed as a
means to realise the prospective agricultural development by the
introduction of a large settler management class, as well as to
increase the speculative value of holdings. 24
The primary pre-condition to agricultural exploitation and
the deployment of a managed black labour force was,however, the
confirmation of control and titular security over land by the
colonial state. Thus :
"The concessionaires had not deemed it advisable to commence
the development of their concessions until they knew what
servitudes the concessions carried and what their boundaries
were" (25).
The objectives of the petit-colon at the outset of this era
can be summarised from this section as the consolidation of control
over raw material sources, the creation of a local labour force
and the application of further foreign capital to extract surplus
via mining and plantation agriculture. The colonial state had
an integral role to play in the fulfillment of these objectives
as well as in providing a suitable transport and service
infrastructure.
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4.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE PETIT-COLON
The permanent white population of Swaziland was 890 in 1904
26
and 1083 in 1911.
This implies a rapid in-migration after the
emigration of the Boer War period. The temporarily resident
population of sheep farmers from the E.Transvaal reached upwards
of 500 during this era, with their annual influx of 200,000 to
300,000 sheep. 27

The petit-colon was consequently sharply

differentiated along lines of nationality and mobility.
Another disseminating influence within the petit-colon was
the individualistic nature of white interest in Swaziland.
Centralization of control had developed only in the mining industry
where 75% of concessions were corporately controlled. Only 14
land concessions were owned by companies and there were 56 British
and 152 Boer owners. The Boers had achieved some small measure
of unification with 68 concessions being syndicate-controlled.
The argument to be sustained here is that internal differences
and antagonisms within the petit-colon, so evident in the pre War
period, were now subsumed in the interests of a common quest to
consolidate control over land and labour. A consolidated front
was a necessity for collective bargaining with, and lobbying of,
the coloni al state.
The unifying voice for white interests was the local
representatives of foreign capital. Table Seven lists the
companies registered as operating in or as interest holders
in Swaziland in 1905. The aggregate share capital for these
companies was o v e r / 4 million.The companies with the most active
capital involvement in Swaziland were also the most vocal,
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TABLE SEVEN
COMPANIES IN SWAZILAND.1904

COMPANY

SHARE
CAPITAL (/)

Henderson Consolidated Corp. 2,000
,000,000
Swaziland Corporation Ltd.
500,000
Swazi Goldfields Ltd.
250,000
250,000
Toweli Gold Mining Co.Ltd.
Swazi Coal Mines Ltd.

200,000

S.Swaziland Gold Co. Ltd.
Piggs Peak Gold Mining Co.

200,000
200,000
100,000
100,000
100,000

Swaziland Tin Ltd.
Anglo-Swazi Co. Ltd.
Mercantile Association
Consolidated Concessions ltd.
Pullen's Concession Co. Ltd.
Usutu Tin Co.Ltd.
McCreedy Tins Ltd.
Acton's Concessions Co.Ltd.
Swaziland Gold & Land Co.
A & I Estate & Exploration Co.

SWAZI
EMPLOYEES

CONCESSIONS
I. L. M.
3

403

11

50,000
36,000

10
3
1
2
1
1
1
4

166
900
2
5

75,000
70,000
50,000

2
7

1
60
128

1

1
1
1
3
1

15,000

1

7,500

1

S.A.Tin Co. Ltd.
African Estates & Mining Co.
Rylands Gold Mining Co.

27

1
1
1
1
1
1

Indimba Land & Exploration Co.Ltd.
New Goldfields Syndicate
Henderson Forbes Gold Mining Co.
Johnston Syndicate
Swaziland Monopolies Syndicate

5

Chester Diamond Drilling Co.Ltd.

1

Sources : Rubie's Report of 1903 (Appendix lb),
Swaziland Concessions Commission Report (J 906)
K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.11 MS 418.
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in particular the Swaziland Corporation and the Henderson Consolidated
Corporation.
Local officials of the companies were given easy access to
Milner, Selborne and ,particularly, Coryndon; often
by-passing the appointed Commission in the statement of their
demands. To consolidate an effective lobby, the various capitalist
interests,as well as individual farmers, formed the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry in 1903. The Chamber saw itself involved
in :
"The persistent fight to rescue Swaziland from native
absorption and to maintain through years of inoperation,
cost and loss,those properties which by purchase and
judicial confirmation were European property"(28).
A Swaziland without whites and without capitalist development was
an anathema to the Chamber. The Chamber's elected representatives,
of which A.Miller,Chairman of the Swaziland Corporation, was a
prominent personality, met regularly and published an annual
progress report. On 21 October 1905, the Chamber was assured
of the support of the E.Transvaal faction and on 28 October 1905,
that of the farming community of Swaziland which had earlier
banded itself together into a number of Farmer's Associations. 29
In addition to the Chamber we have to reckon with the
considerable, consolidated and vociferous advocation of their
"rights" by the white residents. Personal representation, written
petitions and the Times of Swaziland were the major channels of
protest. The Swaziland Corporation published the Times as a
continuous monitor of events and as a voice for white sentiment
and interests. The paper undoubtedly played a significant role
as a channel of information communication and concrete expression
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of the interests of capitalist development in the country. Apart
from comprehensive reports of events and issues of interest to
concession-holders, the editorial policy of the paper shows a
distinct white bias in which the aspirations of the Swazi were
frequently criticised and the effects of white settlement and
foreign capital invariably feted. The need for solidarity of
aspiration and attitude within the petit-colon led to the
conclusion

in 1908 that :

"The paper has exercised a powerful influence upon the
public life and commercial development of Swaziland"(30).

4.5 CAPITAL AND STATE LINKAGES
A basic postulate of this study is that the colonial state
played a fundamental role in the early capital penetration of
Swaziland. This emerges both explicitly and implicitly at various
points in Chapters Four through Seven. Bearing in mind the
highly de-centralised decision

making of the colonial state in

relation to Swaziland (4.2), it is of value to draw out the
linkages between capital and colonial state officials as background
to the more specific discussion which ensues. To this end, personal
linkages with capital interests are first discussed and then
some privately and publicly articulated general attitudes towards
capitalist development and the role of the Swazi in such development
are elucidated.
Marlowe (1976) contains a lucid exposition of Milner's links
with metropolitan capital during his South African commission,the
ways in which his obsessive concern with British capital interest-,
in southern Africa affected his policy-making and the fact that
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after leaving the colonial service he spent several years in
the direct employ of capital.31 Marlowe contains no specific
reference to Milner's Swaziland dealings but his negotiations
with the Swaziland Corporation (4.6) indicate a fundamental
empathy with the aims of capital in Swaziland.
Selborne's entire career was in politics and the colonial
service and there is consequently no overt personal linkage

with

capital,as with Milner. The revelation of possible non-apparent
linkages awaits the publication of a definitive biography. 32 The
only discernable connection in the Swaziland case was with a
British-financed settlement scheme for whites (5.3) which appears
to have had a significant effect on his partition policy.
Both Coryndon and Grey had very strong links with British
capital prior to their Swaziland commissions. Stokes and Brown (1966)
document Coryndon's period of employment by the British South
Africa Company in Rhodesia and Palmer (1977) and Yaue (1978)
consider the relationship between Coryndon's linkages with
capital and his attitudes towards capitalist development.
Brelsford (1965) and Coryndon (1914) show that Grey's work in
Swaziland was his only colonial commission. The remainder of
his career was spent in the service of capital in Central
Africa

(Appendix 3b).

Selborne made few,if any, public declarations of policy
towards development in Swaziland. In private,however,statements
of support for capital interests were frequent. A characteristic
of Selborne, in particular, in relation to the Swazi was his
extreme cultural and racial arrogance and dislike of the nation.

33
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Thus he said to a delegation of farmers in 1907:
"The Swazis are inferior...mentally,morally and
intellectually. Continued contact of the European
with them is necessary to raise them out of barbarism...
it is our duty to elevate the native from his lowly
state and make him useful for State and society. The
first step is to teach him diligence, orderliness
and obedience" (34).
To Grey he later wrote :
"They are indeed a most uninteresting people;stupid
and sulky" (35).
To the Colonial Secretary,Elgin,he said :
"The Swazis are the most barbarous,least advanced,the
least intelligent and the least reasonable of all
natives living under the tribal system. Civilisation
has made no progress with them, and at the head of the
tribe is the Chief Regent who differs from the tribe
in being clever but whose moral standard is lower than
its average member"(36).
Selborne's strong dislike for the Swazi Queen Regent can be
traced to her opposition to the policies of the colonial state
(Chapter Six).
Coryndon,on the other hand, displays no such overt
arrogance though his paternalism is clear in dealings with
the Swazi. But as Youe writes:
"Coryndon is often dismissed as a reactionary follower
of Rhodes who was pro-settler and therefore anti-African.
In fact,his attitudes were not that simple though his
racial arrogance cannot be denied. He was 'pro-economic
development* rather than pro-white or anti-black. In
Swaziland he thought the whites were better suited to
develop the land" (37).
Coryndon's private and public expressions of support for capital
were frequent. For instance, in his arrival speech in 1907 he
saw his role in Swaziland as "expending all energy in the
development of Swaziland" and he perceived the Swaziland situation
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as :
"A triumph of chaos. The complications which have
hampered its development are fast disappearing and
we can now work to transform the country into the
home of a well-ordered,prosperous and contented
British community" (38).
Coryndon's attitude towards retaining the investment of the
Swaziland Corporation in Swaziland can be seen as symptomatic
of his general ethos (4.6). The role of the Swazi in 'development'
was also apparent to Coryndon. In discussing •arious land
partition schemes he argued for one which would hasten the
breakdown of tribalism and which would ensure an evenly
distributed labour supply which could be kept in closer contact
with white demands.
Grey's 'development' attitudes are clearly seen in the
proceedings of his partition work (Chapter Five).
Thus while there were no overt colonial state- capital linkages
specifically in Swaziland (with the possible significant exception
of Selborne) the general rationale of colonial state officials
was clearly to further the aims of capital in Swaziland. This
becomes apparent in considering the case of the Swaziland
Corporation (4.6) and the land partition question (Chapter Five).39

4.6 MONOPOLY EXPROPRIATION : THE CASE OF THE SWAZILAND CORPORATION
In 1903 Rubie had recommended to Milner that all trading
and industrial monopolies should be expropriated from the owners
with compensation and that all land and mineral concessions
should be confirmed. 40

The grounds for this differential

treatment of concession;; are elucidated by Rubir. Historical!•„ t
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the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the monopolies
were considered sufficient enough grounds for their expropriation.
Socially, the confirmation of monopolies was regarded not to be
in the public interest,however vaguely that was defined. The
primary grounds were,however, economic ones. Thus, the need to
maximise revenue for administration would be inhibited by the
confirmation of importation monopolies and the trading/industrial
monopolies were considered contrary to principles of laissez-faire
competition and therefore "a hindrance to legitimate development".

4

The reasons for the expropriation decision were largely uncontested
by capital though lobbying for liberal compensation was a feature
of the Swaziland Concession Commission enquiry.42
The real objectives of capital lay elsewhere. These objectives
were seriously transgressed by Rubie's recommendation that two
concessions known as the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession
and the Lapsed and Unallotted Minerals Concession should also
be expropriated with compensation.

These two concessions are

reproduced in full in Appendix 3c. The response to Rubie's
recommendation from the holders of the two concessions, the
Swaziland Corporation, was immediate and persistent.43 The
two concessions were of far-reaching implication and, if validated
by the colonial state, would have confirmed the Corporation
in the immediate control over three extra mineral and seven
extra land concessions. It also implied that with the passage of
time, the Corporation would eventually control all mineral rights
and well over one million acres of land as concessions expired
and lapsed. The speculative possibilities for the Corporation
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under this monopolistic form of control were clearly immense. The
colonial state, however, perceived a threat to its power in this
form of monopolism and the Corporation was given access directly
to the Governors,Milner and Selborne, so that the issue could
be resolved.44
The Corporation considered that it bargained from a position
of some strength:
"This Corporation holds the chief commercial and
financial position in Swaziland. It has been and is
the pioneer company in that country"(45),
and,
"Swaziland and the Swaziland Corporation are synonymous
terms
under the British flag the Corporation will
earn the reward that its capital,consistently directed
in the exploitation of this country entitles it to"(46).
The claimed holdings of the Corporation are given in Table Eight.
Map Eleven was constructed to show the potential expansion of the
Corporation's control over land if the Lapsed and Unallotted Land
Concession had been confirmed.
A.M.Miller,local manager of the Corporation, met with Milner
in Pretoria on 28.12.1904 after the promulgation of the 1904
Proclamation to present a case for the Corporation. Milner was
compliant and compiled a joint memorandum with Miller outlining
a deal with the Corporation. The interpretation of this memorandum
was later to be a matter of some dispute.

The Corporation

undoubtedly saw it as an agreement though the Colonial Secretary,
Elgin, later dismissed it as merely a tentative directive to
the Swaziland Concessions Commission.47 Miller was consequently
anxious to push through with the agreement but was thwarted by
the wider forces that led to Milner's resignation in 1905 and the
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TABLE EIGHT
SWAZILAND CORPORATION HOLDINGS,

A.MONOPOLIES
Printing and publishing, Gas and electricity,Construction of animal
Pounds, Banking, Lithography, Treatment of Tailings, Liquor Import,
Liquor Manufacture (25%), Iron Manufacture (33%), Tobacco Import (25%),
Diamond drills (25%).
B.MINERAL CONCESSIONS

.„,.,„,
AreavAcres;
M.75 Forbes Reef
55,050
M.33 Horo
263,040
M.36 McNab's
66,560
*M.l Albu & Davis
9,600
*M.27 Kannemeyer's
190,080
(* Claimed as lapsed under the Lapsed and Unallotted Minerals
Concession.)
C.LAND CONCESSIONS
L.153
L.177
L.10
**
**
**
**
**

Peebles
Du Pont/Cummings
Steyn's
Campbell's
Umvurulisn's
Bell's
Beatrice's
Mather's
Total

170,000
7,000
13,000
32,000
2,500
100,000
69,700
20,000
414,200

(** Claimed as lapsed under the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands
Concession.)
^.SUMMARY
1. Land
_ _ ,
2. Land

OF LAND HOLDINGS CLAIMED (Claimed : 1,245,160 acres)
to be surveyed
414,200
3. Areas affected by 111,500
,
.
.„
_,, ,nr,
personal ri ghts
lapsing in 12 yrs
92,600
f i r i n g on death
in 25 yrs
79,600
*
->r

nc ccn

in 35 yrs
in 40 yrs

65,560
14,000

of owner

4. Grazing areas over 464,300
which Co.claims rights
Source : Swaziland Corporation(1903),Annual Reports K.C.L.MS MIL 1 08 3.
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PROJECTED EXPANSION OF SWAZILAND
CORPORATION LAND CONTROL
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inception of Selborne as Governor. 48
The memorandum itself (reproduced in Appendix 3d) contained
an undertaking by the Corporation to forfeit all their monopolies
and the two Lapsed and Unallotted concessions in exchange for
the confirmation of ownership to five mineral concessions and
title to a maximum of one million acres of land and an agreement
to encourage white settlement of Corporation land holdings.
The Swaziland Concessions Commission reported to Selborne
on 7.7.1905 in a report critical of the Corporation for making
no attempt to prove the value of their monopoly concessions as
other corporate interests were doing at the time. The Commission
nevertheless recommended to Selborne that the idea of a land
grant to the Corporation in settlement of their claim was a
reasonable one, on the condition that the Corporation's claims
about the extent of their actual and

potential holdings were

substantiated by the General Survey,then in progress. Selborne
did not appear to be in favour of the ad hoc proposals of the
memorandum and agreed with the Commission that the survey should
be completed first.49

The Corporation agreed to suspend their

claims until 1907 though Miller accused Selborne of back-tracking
on Milner*s memorandum.
When the British directors of the Corporation petitioned
the Colonial Office in early 1907 they were informed that Selborne
would not negotiate further and that they should proceed with
their claims through the Concessions Commission.

The decision

of the colonial state was acidly criticised by Miller in February,
52
1908.

Despite the temporary closure of channels to the po?icy-
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makers of the colonial state :
"Mr Miller attended all sessions of the Commission....
and most actively pressed the claims of his company
to lands unallotted or lapsing at a future date"(53).
Selborne appears, at least in 1907, to have been acting
under advice from the Colonial Office. The Colonial Secretary,at
one stage, advised him of the inadvisability of a generous
arrangement with the Corporation and of a non-pecuniary
settlement.54 Selborne

instructed the Concessions Commission

to begin evaluating the Corporation's holdings including the
two controversial concessions. 55
The evaluations of the Commission were based on the guiding
principle for the general expropriation of monopolies; that is,
to minimise compensation costs for the administration. Thus
only the pounds (/204) and the banking concessions (/5,109) were
compensated and the value placed on the Lapsed and Unallotted
/
56 This total evaluation contrasts
Lands Concession was/30,450.
sharply with the Corporation's own evaluation of this concession
at/ll6,000. 5 7
In September 1908 the Corporation was offered^35,763 as a
cash settlement for their claims or in lieu of cash an area of
land of 350,000 acres, location undefined. 5f°t The Corporation's
British shareholders were incensed but were inclined to accept
the cash compensation. 59

The colonial state, ex officio, did

make one last unsuccessful attempt at appeasement;Coryndon offered
to approach Selborne about increasing the land offer by 200,000
acres since :
"It seems a pity that the long and intimate connection
of the Swaziland Corporation with the country should be
severed without an effort being made to retain these
interests of vours" (60)
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The Corporation were unmoved and were left with their mineral
holdings,50,UoO acres of land (Map Eleven) and a cash payment
to pay off their litigation debts. As a direct result the share
capital of the Corporation was reduced to j^2 million and the
Corporation considered devoting all its future attention to
. .
61
mining.
The failure of the Corporation to achieve finally the
degree of land control solicited was ultimately

attributed by

the Corporation to the replacement of Milner by Selborne as
High Commissioner.

ft"?

No unequivocal evidence was uncovered that

Selborne was acting under direct orders from the Colonial
Secretary although the Secretary did remark,somewhat enigmatically,
in late 1907 that :
"His Majesty's Government would find great difficulty
in defending an arrangement which seems to be too
generous to the Corporation."(63)
Rather, Selborne seems to have taken a more thorough and pragmatic
approach to the whole problem, desiring that a precise definition
of Corporation holdings should be obtained. To this end he
appears to have preferred to work through the appointed Swaziland
Concessions Commission in search of a solution. It was the
Commission's recommendations that eventually dictated Selborne's
policy and the Commission were far from generous in their
treatment of the Corporation's case for the following reasons.
First, the Commission challenged the circumstances surrounding
the acquisition of the Lapsed and Unallotted Concessions. These
(jero s^^n

to bo highly dubious, as was Miller's role in their

acquisition though Miller himself strenuously denied the accunaticr
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Second, although the Corporation repeatedly claimed liberal
treatment on the grounds of its opening up of Swaziland to
British capital, the Commission argued that the capital was
predominantly prospective and not realised. It was concluded
that the Corporation therefore held its interests for speculative
purposes. ThJrd, while the colonial state preferred that a
private company should take responsibility for the opening up of
a white settlement programme, it was argued that :
"It is inadvisable to have large areas of single
ownership of land as the experience of Transvaal and
Rhodesia show that settlement and development is
impeded by this form of ownership"(65).
Monopolism of the form advocated by the Corporation as conducive
to capitalist development was conseguently abhorted by the colonial
state as, in fact, not in the best interests of capitalism
in Swaziland.

4:7 CONCLUSION
The examination in this chapter has been of the aims of
capital in relation to control over land, labour and mineral
resources for prospective mining, plantation

agriculture and

white settlement schemes in Swaziland. The consolidation of
a formerly-disparite petit-colon in pursuit of the common goal
of

achieving dominance over the forces of production was, it is

argued, a noteworthy feature of the early years of British
colonial rule. Articulation of demands in collusive interaction
vi th the colonial state was facilitated by the local and
"'etrcpoli ta'> i r ^rosen t^t Ives of foreign c<-pi+"al. The Sva73^r'
Corporation, in particular, is seen to have a fundamental role in
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this laying of the groundwork for the articulation of the Swazi
into a new set of social relations under the capitalist mode
of production. The case of the Swaziland Corporation per se in
its attempts to obtain monopoly control is presented to highlight
a particular facet of interaction between capital and the colonial
state, where despite basic ideological empathy conflict arose
on the best means of implementing capitalist development in
Swaziland.
The actions of the colonial state as a mediator between
the petit-colon, the implementation of its inflexible demands and
the Swazi, in the translation of the capitalist ideology into
space is presented in Chapters Five and Six.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE

"There is nothing haphazard in the partition"
Times of Swaziland,1908

5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the access of capital interests to the
colonial state is first considered in relation to petit-colon
lobbying with regard to the question of alternative spatial
schema for land control (5.2). Then, the spatial implementation
of the provisions of the 190 7 Partition Proclamation by the
colonial state is considered. The selection of a suitable
proportional division of land between black and white is
examined and the attitudes of the colonial state towards crown
land are shown to have worked to the advantage of the petit-colon
(5.3). The explicit and implicit principles underlying the
spatial division of land are then analysed in some detail (5.4).
Some summarised comments on the social and economic structure of
space are then proferred (5.5).

5.2 ALTERNATIVE SCHEMA
A reading of the sources shows that five different schema
were proposed to effect an alienation of land in Swaziland and
create reserves for the Swazi. In this section, each of these is
examined in turn; identifying its protagonists, critics and
the reasons for its acceptance or rejection by the colonial state.
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Such an exercise highlights the interplay between capital and the
petit-colon and the colonial state,represented by the Concessions
Commission, the administrators Milner,Selborne and Coryndon, and
the Colonial Office in London. Initially,however, there is a need
to consider two foundational issues upon which the schema were
built. These issues which confronted the colonial state were,
firstly, whether to effect a general expropriation (cancellation
with compensation) of land and grazing concessions from the
holders, and ,secondly, when this course of action was decided
against whether to partition the land surface between black
and white or to allow both to occupy the land concurrently.
Rubie's report (Appendix lb), on whose recommendations
Milner's policy was based, considered a general expropriation
of land and grazing concessions by the colonial state, along the
lines of the industrial monopoly expropriation, to be both
undesirable and unnecessary. It would involve the administration
in additional expense and , in addition :
"The requirements of the public interest can hardly warrant
a general expropriation" (1).
"Public interest" was conceived in the narrowest sense as that
of capital and the petit-colon. Thus, for Milner, expropriation
was a dead issue and he became a clear advocate of a land partition
which would give white and black mutually exclusive ownership
to different portions of the land surface :
"Milner's idea was to divide the country up so that each
concessionaire had a piece of ground over which the
natives had no right and in return from this immunity
from native interference to give up a portion of his
concession"(2).
A general expropriation of all concessions was consequently
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rejected by the colonial state in the 1904 Proclamation.

3

Although

Selborne later mentioned it again in a letter to Elgin in 1906
he indicated that he too could not seriously countenance
expropriation as a viable strategy to further white interests . He
also indicated that it would place an intolerable burden on
4
local revenues.
Selborne's major dilemma in pursuit of a solution to "the
problem which has vexed me more than any other" was whether
to follow the course of partition favoured by Milner and pressed
for by the petit-colon or to favour a concurrent black-white
landholding until the expiry of the concessions when the land
would return to exclusive Swazi ownership.

Prior to September,1906,

and his official visit to Swaziland, Selborne still countenanced
concurrency but deemed it inadvisable on several counts* In
particular, he saw a natural increase of the Swazis and the
likely increase in white immigration as eventually posing
insurmountable difficulties for white enterprise under concurrency :
"Indeed as long as the present system of joint occupation
exists it will be impossible to develop the country
agriculturally" (6).
On his return from Swaziland, with his views reinforced by those
of the petit-colon, he considered a Spatial division of land
between black and white imperative since without it :
"Whites would eventually leave and men who were valuable
in civilising the country would be lost"(7).
Selborne appears to have given particular weight to the
arguments of the Swaziland Chamber of Mining,Commerce and Industry
g
against concurrency.
legal structure

The Chamber argued that a bureaucratic

would be a pre-requisite to ensure whites
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"the unrestricted right to exercise all rights in the original
concessions" and to prevent the wholesale immigration of blacks
from the Transvaal into Swaziland. In addition, they argued that
the possibilities for exploiting resources would be minimal :
"The concessionaire feels he cannot make beneficial use
of his rights without risk of native disturbance. They
are convinced no progress and no development of natural
agricultural resources can take place unless rights are
seperated"(9).
One white resident was more vitriolic :
"They are the laziest,dirtiest and most degrading of all
Bantu tribes...the undoubted resources of the country
can only be developed by European brains and industry.
Solve the concession problem and light would dawn. The
Swazie will never fulfil God's command to subdue the
earth;'From him that hath not must be taken away even
that he hath' must take its course, and this fair land
so long made hideous and vile must be entrusted to the
European whose watchword is 'Forward Swaziland' "(10).
Other criticisms of concurrency were that the whites would
not have security of title to land on which to make capital
investments, that the mobile Swazi would "spread out" and leave
no land suitable for white agriculture and that grass burning
by the Swazi would destroy white grazing and crops.

A type

comment on the perceived negative impact on white enterprise
was :
"The property of the concessionaire is worthless. What
is the good of the concessionaire turning out cattle
if the natives could do the same,eat the grass and
introduce disease" (12)
A crucially reiterated criticism of concurrency was that
the farmer would have no control over his labour supply under
such an arrangement.13 A partition was considered a necessity
by the petit-colon and the colonial state was assured of white
support if they retained at least 60% of the land surface and the
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power to retain Swazis on their land if required as a labour
T 14
supply.
For Selborne, the only real advantage of concurrency was
that Swazi rights would only gradually be eroded and :
"Their imagination would be confronted with no sudden
loss of rights over great tracts of Swaziland" (15).
This was related to his only uneasiness with partition which
revolved around the possibility of effecting it without violent
Swazi reaction.

He argued that built into any partition scheme

should be certain provisos which would minimise the chances of
unrest. These included that there should be no forced removal
of Swazis to reserves and that Swazis wishing to move should have
a minimal distance to travel.
An implicit colonial assumption of both Milner and Selborne
was that the petit-colon rights to the land surface superceded
those of the Swazi and that partition was a concrete spatial
exercise which would afford greater control over both land and
labour.

The Rand Daily Mail of 5.1.1905 commented :

"On the question of delimitation there has been a certain
tendency to lay stress upon what the Europeans are
prepared to give the natives and to say little about the
rights of the Swazi themselves".
It is now possible to move on to a consideration of various
alternative mooted partition schema. Clause 20 of the 1904
Proclamation stated that :
"Nothing in this proclamation shall in any way affect the
continued use and occupation by natives of the land now
in their possession and of all grazing or agricultural
rights to which they are entitled....but it shall be
lawful for the Commission to set apart a portion of any
concession for the sole and exclusive occupation of
natives and thereupon all rights of the holder shall cease
in respect of the portion of land so set apart but the
remaining portion of land shall not be subject to any such
use and occupation."
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The initial interpretation of Milner's directive by the
Swaziland Concessions Commission is embodied in the first
partition scheme of 1905, popularly called the "Spotted Dog
Partition" at the time.
PROPOSAL ONE : THE CONCESSIONS COMMISSION PARTITION SCHEME,1905
In all deliberations of the Commission the assumption was
that the majority of the land surface (excluding crown land) was
the property of the

petit-colon and hence that the Swazi

should retain "all grazing or agricultural rights to which they
are entitled" was explicitly construed as being merely as much
land as was required for the immediate purposes of each Swazi
family.
To determine this requirement the Commission sat in Pretoria
in 1905 to consider evidence from South Africa. Two South African
Native Affairs officials were questioned by the Commission as to
"native requirements". Their findings are presented in Table
Nine. Taberer's strictures must be interpreted in the light of
his belief that :
"It is against the interests of the country and the
natives themselves to provide for more than the
present generation" (17).
He argued that surplus population could then be directed to
labour centres. Krogh appears to have been more lenient in his
attitude to future expansion. At this stage, however, the Commission
tended to agree with Taberer.

A white delegation was informed

that :
"The Swaziland Concessions Commission has ordered what
are the Swazi•s present requirements
we make no
provision for the future at all"(18).
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TABLE NINE
NATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICIALS PERCEPTIONS OF BLACK
LAND REQUIREMENTS

Agricultural Land
Total
# Grazing
Required(acres/family) Required
Required
(acres/head) (acres/
family)

J.C.KROGH
M.M.TABERER

Total
Swazi
Reqd.
(acres)

30

2.1

50

837,000

8

2.0

28

500,000

* Both officials set family size at 7.
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In the deliberations of the Commission two issues specific
to Swaziland were ignored. First, the continental rinderpest
epidemic touched Swaziland in the late 1890's producing stock
losses estimated at 65,000 between 1901-4 :
"Within a short period the country was practically
denuded of stock" (19).
It was impossible to trace any reference to suggest the Commission
took this into account.
Second, given the prevailing level of Swazi technology and
farming practice, family variables such as size and stockholding,
the hierarchical structure of traditional society, and particularly
the factor of environmental diversity, the advisability of
producing a single land requirement which would be indiscriminatly
applied could well be questioned. Table Ten shows the land
actually found under Swazi use in the two locations for which
they collected data when in Swaziland. The differences with
Table Nine are salutory.
With the Native Affairs figures in mind the Commission
envisaged setting apart land on each defined concession for the
Swazis resident on that concession.

The Commission went to

Swaziland from July to December,1905, to effect this piecemeal
partition in the field on two concessions which had been defined
by the general survey.
The scheme was aborted in December,1905, as a result of
consolidated protest from the petit-colon :
"It is seldom that an outburst of public opinion so
unanimous and widespread greets a public act in
this country" (21).
Protest against what was perceived as the random scattering of
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TABLE TEN
LAND UNDER BLACK USE IN SWAZILAND

Families

Acres Used

Acres/Family

MBABANE AREA BLOCK 1

9

673

74

2

24

2592

108

3

7

914

130

4

16

1174

78

279

24534

88

LOWVELD BLOCK
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small Swazi allotments over concessions can be crystallised into
four issues. First, it was claimed that the scheme was a blatantly
uneconomical and time-consuming mode of solution. Second,equality
of treatment was demanded. Under the Commission scheme it was
unlikely that an equal proportion would be deducted from each
concession. Third, it was claimed that the creation of a "great
native rabbit warren" would promote conflict between white and
22
black.

Fourth,it was forcefully argued that white agricultural

development would be inhibited.
Thus,Forbes,of the Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co..claimed
the whites would be deprived of all quality land. Penfold,of the
Henderson Consolidated Corporation, desired that whites should
have free access to water resources and consolidated blocks of
land. Miller, of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd.. was more vocal :
"The impracticality is that if the farms are cut up by
small areas for natives in a country where the native
is an absolute savage (with associated practices) the
farming development of the country is at an end"(23).
Selborne agreed with such sentiments and abandoned the scheme
initiated under Milner in early 1906.
Having obtained an assurance from the colonial state that
a partition was to be effected, the petit-colon were not loath
to profer suggestions of their own for its implementation
(Proposals Two and Three).
PROPOSAL TWO : THE PETIT-COLON LOCATION PARTITION SCHEME
A proposed alternative solution by the petit-colon was
to set apart large'locations' or reserves for the Swazi into
which they could be forcibly moved if necessary. Generally,
either a single block or four blocks of land were proposed as most
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suitable .The scheme was officially proposed for the first time
in Commission sittings in early 1905 and is elucidated in
a newspaper editorial of a later date :
"Four large blocks should be expropriated. One in the
south to accomodate natives living south of the River
Usutu, one in the east, one in the west for the hill
residents and one in the north for those north of the
River Komati" (24).
The forced removal of large numbers of Swazis to these
reserves was a fundamental tenet of this scheme, leaving the
remainder of the land surface in petit-colon possession and
free for capitalist agricultural development. The petit-colon
were also concerned,however, about how to retain alack labour
for their usage. The production and control of a labour force
was a basic consideration in their proposal that the total area
of the reserves be 50% of that which the Commission considered
necessary for the whole population. Swazis could then be forced
to move to the reserves or be kept on white land as tenants.
This scheme does not,however, appear to have been
seriously countenanced by the colonial state (either the
Commission or Selborne) since it patently violated Selborne's
fundamental principles of partition that there should be no
forced movement of Swazis and that potential voluntary movements
to reserves should be of minimal distance.
PROPOSAL THREE : THE PETIT-COLON HIERARCHICAL PARTITION
This scheme, to which all petit-colon interests gave
assent, embodied an implicit recognition on the part of the
whites that the traditional hierarchy should be recognised in
any partition. 25 The concommitant advantage to the whites from this
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perceived appeasement of the indigeneous power structure was
seen as greater control over the rank and file Swazi. Two
similair hierarchical plans were mooted at different times. These
are presented in Table Eleven.
In Plan One it was proposed that the 30 acres per family
be held in consolidated blocks on the borders of each white farm
which was over 6000 acres in area. These blocks would initially
be for the Swazis resident on that farm but Swazis resident on
farms of less than 6000 acres could move to these blocks over
a proposed period of five years. Thus, there would be a labour
pool on the periphery of each large land-holding.
In Plan Two all white farms were to have blocks for
Swazis,irrespective of their size. Each farm was to have one
block and it would be formed by a constant proportion of land
being deducted from each farm.

The blocks would be on the

borders of the farms,as with Proposal One, and the Swazis outside
the blocks would be given three years to move to them. The
advantage of this scheme over Plan One was that each farm would
have its own labour pool, irrespective of its size.
In both Plans the power controllers of the Swazi were to
be allotted land held by the Crown.
The similarities of these Plans to Proposal Two will be
appreciated but they had the distinct advantage of creating
reserves for surplus labour while retaining a proportion of the
Swazi populace on,or close to, white farms as an immediately
exploitable labour force. If it was deemed desirable that some
Swazis would remain on the farms as tenants,this possibility was
also provided for.

Ill

TABLE ELEVEN
HIERARCHICAL LAND PARTITION PROPOSALS

A. PLAN ONE
13 dignitaries
Swazis

: 5000 to 6000 acres each

: 30 acres per family

Total Swazi land

B. PLAN

:

574,000 acres

TWO
Queen Regent

: 12,000 acres

District Chiefs : 18 blocks of 3000 to 6000 acres
each
Swazis

: 60 acres per family

Total Swazi land

:

1,097,400

Sources : Plan One - Times of Swaziland.21.10.1905
Plan Two - Memorandum from Chamber of Mining,Commerce
and Industry to Selborne,29.9.1906,SNA J205/06.
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The grounds of the colonial state for the rejection of
this scheme was again the desire to avoid unrest by minimising
necessary African movement. The confirmation to as many Swazi
as possible of land actually in their possession was viewed
by Selborne as an essential starting point for security.27 The
Swazi should also be given the choice to move at least for a
period of time. But as Selborne patronisingly wrote in 1907 :
"The chief object of reserves is not to compel all
natives to go into these areas but to move of their
own free will. As a rule natives make little use of
these reserves. The native choses his Master and looks
up to him for help,advice and protection....it is our
duty to elevate the native from his lowly state to
become useful for State and Society"(28).
The response of the petit-colon to the rejection of the
proposals highlights the rationale behind them :
"These proposals,if adopted,would have opened the country
to the full tide of European capital and energy"(29).
But for Selborne,it was not an outright rejection. He acknowledged
his debt to the Plans in the formulation of his final solution:
"I considered and accepted their basic plan and built
on it" (30).
In particular he noted their willingness to part with one-third
of the area of their concessions.

PROPOSAL FOUR : THE SWAZI PROPOSAL
The response of the Swazi to the deliberations in which their
say was minimal is considered in greater depth in Chapter Six.
However, the Queen Regent reportedly proposed a scheme which came
in for vitriolic attack from the Times of Swaziland.31 The
proposal was that one-third of Swaziland be transferred to the
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Transvaal in return for an annuity of </4,000 and the reservation
of the remaining two-thirds for the Swazi.
The idea does not appear to have been seriously countenanced
by the colonial state since it ran counter to petit-colon and
state interests but it does indicate the oft-expressed Swazi
desire to retain total control over a consolidated land surface. 32

PROPOSAL FIVE : THE SOLUTION OF THE COLONIAL STATE:GREY'S PARTITION.
The actual scheme chosen for the spatial implementation
of land alienation under capitalism was attendant upon the final
delimitation of concession boundaries by the general survey and
is embodied in the Partition Proclamation of 1907 (Appendix 4a).
Among the salient points of the Proclamation were the
disbanding of the Concessions Commission and the appointment
of a single Commissioner to effect a partition (Article 3),
provision for the deduction of one-third of the area of each
concession for the creation of Swazi reserves (Article 4), the
confirmation to whites of either freehold title or leasehold
title to the remainder of each concession(Article 7) and a fiveyear period of grace for the Swazi to move to the reserves (Article 6).
To force the Swazi resident on white land either to move to
the reserves or to accept a tenancy relationship with the white
landowner, a tax or labour tribute was exactable by the landowner
after the expiry of the five-year period, payable on pain of
eviction (Article 6).
This scheme is considered in some depth in 5.3 through 5.5.
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5.3 QUANTITY DIVISION
An outcome of the abandonment of the Concessions Commission
partition scheme (5.2) was petit-colon realization that any
scheme incorporating similair principles of quantity-division
would leave them in control of much less than 50% of the land
surface. A one third : two thirds division between black and white,
while construed as unnecessarily generous to the Swazi, was
determined upon as an alternative principle for bargaining with
the colonial state. To ensure internal cohesion and harmony within
the petit-colon, it was proposed that a similair proportion be
deducted from each holding.33
Selborne complied with the proposal, having anticipated
greater difficulty in obtaining such an agreement, and ratified
it to them in a memorandum on 12.10.1907, and in a statement
of policy on

6.1.1908 :

"At the request of the concessionaires,not that of the
Swazis,I am dividing the country. In my opinion they
are quite right to clamour for partition,because the
concessions over the land are worthless as long as the
natives have unrestricted right to prior use.... it was
the concessionaires themselves who offered to me to
surrender one-third and I accepted the offer on the
understanding they should retain the balance of the
concessions for their own use" (34)
A significant condition articulated by the petit-colon in their
offer

was concerned with utilization of the Swazi as a labour

supply :
"A division of rights is necessary. The Europeans will
agree to this if not more than 30% of the land is taken
for the natives, if they do not cause trouble and if
the Swazies are allowed to remain on white land as a
labour supply" (35).
Selborne's unprotesting compliance implied that a mere 25.2%
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of the land surface would be retained for Swazi reserves but was
to be interpreted in the light of the large pre-partition crown
holdings of 1,056,619 acres available for disposal by the colonial
state ( Map Twelve).
If all crown land had been transferred to Swazi possession,
over 50% of the land surface would have been under their control.
The Swazi were fallaciously led to believe that this was colonial
state policy for a period of time. Colonial Secretary,Elgin,
addressing a Swazi delegation in November 1907 said :
"It is provided that there shall be a deduction of onethird of its area from every land concession. That is
an enormous deduction to make .... and I believe that
taken in conjunction with lands belonging to the crown
it will make so ample a provision for native occupation
that half the land will be in their occupation"(36).
At the local level,Coryndon made the same assumption :
"In addition to the one thirds there are large areas of
crown land which will be available for native settlement.
Therefore the Swazi will see that the first thing the
British Government did was to give half the country
back to the Swazis"(37).
Other forces were at work to prevent the wholesale transfer
of crown land coming to pass. First, Selborne had instructed the
Partition Commissioner,Grey, to provide enough land for the
accomodation of the whole

Swazi tribe and the "reasonable expansion
of the tribe by birth not immigration".38 Grey later estimated
that one-third of the total area of the country was sufficient
to fulfil this condition (5.4). Little store was set by the
wholesale transfer of crown land ; only as much as was required
to bring the Swazi holding up from 25.2% to one-third. In the
final analysis this was 35% of crown land.
Second, a number of colonial state officials held highly
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critical views of tribalism,traditional culture and the efficiency
and utility of the traditional mode of agricultural production ;
in particular, of shifting cultivation and extensive pastoralism.
Land alienation and restriction of cultivable and grazing area
was viewed as a concrete means to effect basic changes in the
traditional mode :
"By limiting the area available for native agriculture
and pasturage, land will be improved by the necessity
for closer grazing and less primitive methods of cultivation
and will therefore be able to bear a larger native
population than now on it. The present practice of
shifting agriculture and impoverishing the soil will
then cease" (39).
This constituted a powerful justification for limiting the
designated area to one-third. It also implied that the colonial
state was perfectly justified in expropriating two-thirds of the
land surface for "modern","efficient" capitalist agriculture
under the petit-colon and that the traditional society would
inevitably benefit from being tied more closely to cash-cropping
in the money-economy.
Third, the colonial state began to perceive crown land as
a realisable asset - a mechanism to generate income for the
administrative costs of the country and ,incidentally as a mears
for consolidating the petit-colon via a joint capital-state
settlement scheme. Sale of crown lands to individual whites
and corporate interests generated an income of j£ 58,000 between
40

JT

1910-15 and a further/79,000 between 1916-25.

In 1909, the

Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme was founded as a joint exercise
between state and capital to "acquire land suitable for the
settlement of Britishers in Swaziland".

Th« purchase of 67,000
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acres from the crown at a nominal price by "anonymous public
spirited men assisted by Lord Lovat and the Earl of Selborne"
instigated a scheme which deprived the Swazi of any realistic
chance of obtaining crown land from the colonial state.41
A simple calculation reveals that the Swazi were allocated
36.9% of the land surface instead of a rounded one-third. This
differential could be set down to operational error but was it
transpires a curious attempt at window-dressing by Grey and
Selborne, which strikingly portrays the mentality which the
colonial state brought to bear on the land question as a whole.
Grey suggested to Selborne that he could add

some unproductive

land to the demarcated one-third to make the partition appear
more generous to the Swazi than it in fact was. It appears that
this suggestion was designed to pacify the belief that Elgin
had made a promise to the Swazi about the amount of land they were
to receive. Selborne replied :
"I think it well, where you could easily do it, to add
to the native reserves a lump or two of land. I understand that the land thus added would not be of good
quality or capable of supporting a large population and
that in addition it would be a shop-window addition;but
I think it a legitimate and not unwise thing to do under
the circumstances. It is legitimate to add some poor
land to forestall the ignorant criticism that we are
taking away two-thirds of the land surface from them"(42).
Grey's agreement to this explains the discrepancy, although he
was later to note that he had not been able to add as much as
he had hoped without incurring compensation costs.43
At partition,therefore, the petit-colon was given control
of 49.2% of the land surface, consolidated further to 58% by the
later purchase of crown land.
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5.4

PROCEDURAL CRITERIA
The translation of the principle of land expropriation into

physical space was effected by George Grey,appointed by Selborne
as Partition Commissioner,between January and December 1908 in
continuous consultation with both Selborne and Coryndon.44
Thirty two reserves were eventually demarcated after an
extensive field survey. These are shown in Map Thirteen. The
apparently haphazard patchwork has little obvious order and it is
therefore expedient at this stage to identify the set of procedural
critera . with which Grey worked and to determine to what extent
it is a function of a structure of capitalist articulation. This
set,culled from a number of different sources, is presented here
in numerical form for the sake of clarity.
(1) The question of explicit boundary demarcation was one
which pre-occupied Grey and Coryndon. At Coryndon's request
Grey attempted to use rivers and streams as clear demarcation
lines :
"Wherever possible I have adopted well defined watersheds,
watercourses or rivers as boundaries of native areas,such
boundaries will be easily understood and recognised by
the natives" (45).
Thus of a total boundary length of 1690 miles, 613 was perenial
river. The greater proportion of the remaining boundaries was made
up of concession boundaries.
Grey also foresaw the possibility of the necessity for more
definitive boundaries with white agricultural development :
"Whereas rivers may be suitable now,in a few years when
white land is better occupied and stocked many difficulties
will arise particularly if the white farmer wishes to fence
he would have to fence out water. I recommend that if a
white farmer wished to fence and still use water he may
submit a line of fence which crosses the river two or more
times but which ensures a fair proportion of river is on
each side of the fence" (46).
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(2) Selborne assumed that by confirming land already being
utilised to the Swazi (see 6), a partition would produce a situation
in which greater than one third of "fertile land" would be in
their possession.

Grey later claimed that "fifty per cent of the
most fertile portions of Swaziland are in native area".48
Crush (1975) has argued,however, that Grey's claim is difficult
to substantiate (Table Twelve).
In the field Grey tried to obtain information from Swazi
Chiefs about the land they were cultivating and which they
considered most desirable for agriculture, for inclusion in
the reserves. The response to his request was uniform :
"Generally I was given little or no information by
the Chiefs I visited. Usually they explained quite
civilly that without the Chief Regent's orders they
were unable to point out the land they most required"(49).
Consequently Grey could only make his own evaluation of land
the Swazi considered desirable though he was confident of his
own perceptions :
"I am confident that my partition will be found to have
provided for all the requirements of the native and
that the interests of the Swazi have been made known
to me as well as if they had co-operated" (50)
Nevertheless the reserve network thus contains no overt expression
of Swazi land desirability.
(3) The partition pattern is,however, related to Grey's
perception of the four environmental provinces identified in
Chapter One :
"The middleveld is the most thickly inhabited district and
has a greater capacity for carrying a large native population
than any other portion of Swaziland. The severe winters of
the highveld and the prevalent malaria in the lowveld seem
less desirable to the nation than the middleveld
while
the natives appreciate the valleys of the highveld and the
fertile middleveld, the concessionaires value more than any

TABLE TWELVE
GREY'S PARTITION : LAND QUALITY AND EQUITY
TOTAL
ACREAGE
(Murdoch)

GREY'S NATIVE
AREAS ACREAGE

% OF EACH LAND
CAPABILITY
CATEGORY IN
NATIVE AREAS

390,000
Good soil - suitable slopes
260,000
Fair soil - suitable slopes
720,000
Poor soil - suitable slopes
880,000
V.Poor soil - suitable slopes
260,000
Until.soil - slopes < 14
70,000
Good soil - too steep slopes
140,000
Fair soil - too steep slopes
250,000
Poor soil - too steep slopes
V.Poor soil - too steep slopes 200,000
Until.soil - slopes 14
1,140,000

148,396
63,342
222,042
412,919
87,676
29,256
37,536
70,564
52,210
340,259

38.05
24.36
30.83
46.92
33.72
41.79
26.81
28.22
26.11
29.84

10.1
4.3
15.2
28.2
6.0
2.0
2.6
4.8
3.6
23.2

GT Soil ratings A-D,too steep
1,800,000
slopes
HM Until.soils,all slopes(ES,ET) 1,400,000
AN Good soils,all slopes(AS,AT)
460,000

529,285

29.43

36.1

427,935
177,652

30.57
38.50

29.2
12.1

AS
BS
CS
DS
ES
AT
BT
CT
uT
ET

% OF TOTAL
NATIVE AREA IN
EACH LAND
CAPABILITY
CATEGORY

Source : Crush (1975) p. 43, based on land capability survey by Murdoch (1970).
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other area, the highveld grass for winter grazing.At
the present time most concessionaires value land more
for its pastoral than agricultural possibilities and
they therefore have a large proportion of lowveld"(51).
Thus as Table Thirteen shows, the Middleveld was Grey's
favoured zone for reserve demarcation ; based, it might be added,
on Grey's perception of the desires of capital which do not
entirely accord with the stated aims of capital, outlined
elsewhere (4.3). The Middleveld was not to be the exclusive
preserve of the Swazi,however, since white interests were
generally paramount :
"In the middleveld I have suceeded in keeping out of
native area two large stretches in which a considerable
white farming population might find settlement"(52).
A contemporary observer of Grey's work made an additional comment
upon the relationship of the network to the environmental
provinces:
"The Commissioner in his work has obviously proceeded on
a method, and that method has been to define the alternate
European and native areas on latitudinal lines - that is
as near as possible strips of land running from the
western to the eastern border"(53).
No such articulation could be located in the writing of Grey,however.
(4) Grey determined that any land already under white
occupation and cultivation in 1908 was automatically precluded
from the reserves. Thus in Grey's preliminary fieldnotes,which
were sent to Selborne,there are references such as :
"The best agricultural land and much good grazing land
is left to the white owner....the white owner should be
well satisfied with the portions;the most accessible are
left to him....the portion left to the concessionaire
contains some of the finest grazing country in Swaziland,
is well watered and contains good agricultural land"(54)
(5) The basic network of defined

concessions within which
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TABLE THIRTEEN
LAND PARTITION BY ENVIRONMENTAL PROVINCE

PROVINCE.

% OF SWAZI LAND IN
EACH ZONE.

% OF EACH ZONE
DEMARCATED AS
SWAZI LAND.

HIGHVELD

22.6

29.3

MIDDLEVELD

44.3

48.5

LOWVELD

27.6

33.6

LEBOMBO

5.5

27.3

100.0
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Grey was to effect a partition undoubtedly exercised a set of
spatial constraints on the possibility for producing consolidated
or symmetrical reserves. That Grey exercised his perogative not
to deduct a rigid on third from every concession represents,in
part,an attempt to circumvent these constraints. A further
complication would have arisen if concession sub-divisions had
been considered. Information on subdivision was only supplied by
the petit-colon on one concession and all others were assumed
to be discrete wholes by Grey.
The one third portions, together with the crown land being
used, were arranged to form compact blocks wherever the network
constraints permitted, under instruction from Selborne :
"I have attempted to make the native areas as large as
possible and at the same time to cut off exactly a third
of all land interests" (55).
Grey consolidated 32 blocks from the portions of 181 defined
concessions, though with a considerable size range (2,900 to
259,000 acres) and a mean size of 45,700 acres (Appendix 5b).
Selborne's directive to Grey in consolidation was that :
"The native areas must not be in one place nor in a very
few blocks. Neither should they be numerous small portions
dotted and mixed up with white farms which would lead
to friction and the diminished value of the white farms.
Avoid the evils of undue concentration and undue
dissemination" (56)
The stated rationale for a degree of consolidation was thus
(a) to minimize prospective black-white friction, and (b) to
preserve aggregated blocks of land for unfettered white enterprise.
Coryndon, while acknowledging the so-called evils of dissemination
held a degree of fragmentation to be desirable for a number
of reasons; (i) "the natives are easier to supervise and control",
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(ii) tribalism could be more easily broken up, (iii) the "material
development" of the Swazi would be more rapid and thorough if they
were kept in closer touch with the surrounding white population,
and (iv) the supply of black labour would be more evenly distributed
and could be more rapidly developed by closer contact with demand.57
From the comments of Selborne,Coryndon and Grey it is arguable
that the spatial pattern is a function of policy which pre-supposed
the expediency of cultural,social and economic domination

of

the Swazi by the petit-colon. It also reflects the desire of the
colonial state to promote the articulation of the Swazi into
the capitalist mode under a new set of social relations.
The desire of the colonial state to minimise the possibilities
of social and political instability, and fulfil its role as a
politically stabilising force,has already been seen as introducing
the principles of (i) no forced movement of Swazi to the reserves,
and (ii) minimization of potential distance to be travelled for
those who did chose to move (5.2). Accessibility of reserves to
all Swazi is a further element in the consolidation of blocks
by Grey. Thus no point on white land is greater than ten miles
from the nearest reserve.
Notwithstanding it was always a clear assumption of the
colonial state that the great majority of alienated Swazi would
chose to remain on expropriated land and enter into tribute
or labour contracts with the petit-colon.58
A further factor encouraging

consolidation was that while

there was a consensus that traditional agricultural practices
should be curtailed, unless blocks were consolidated "natives
would be deprived of freely moving their kraals which they so much

127
value" (59). Psychologically, according to Selborne, the mass of
Swazi were to feel no immediate deprivation or constriction of
rights.
(6) The security motive was also worked out in other
directions. Grey was directed by Selborne to reduce to the
smallest proportion possible the potential disturbance of
existing homesteads. The rationale was to maximise the number of
Swazi who would experience no residential change or overt and
immediate change of social and economic status in relation to the
petit-colon. Thus the most densely populated zones were a
pre-requisite for demarcation. In general, Grey attempted to
incorporate as many Swazi as possible within the reserves. For
this purpose, maps were drawn to show population distribution on
which an estimated 80-90% of the homesteads were marked.

Grey's

comment on these maps highlights the difficulty faced in effecting
this principle :
"It will be seen how evenly distributed the population
is, and how unavoidable it will be that a large proportion
of it must be left on those parts not laid out in native
areas"(61).
In consequence, of 6787 plotted homesteads, a total of 3914 (58%)
were within the reserves. That Grey was able to concentrate 58%
of the Swazi population on 36% of the land is explicable in,terms
of expropriation flexibility :
"While choosing as native areas those parts of Swaziland
most thickly inhabited by natives I have at the same time,
wherever possible, formed the areas out of exact thirds
of concessions. Owing to local population density I have
at times been forced to recommend the expropriation of
whole portions of concessions in excess of one third"(62).
Where population was less dense Grey tended to take less than a third.

128
Thus Grey still left 42% of the Population in residence on
alienated land, subject to the five years voluntary movement
rule, and in a subordinate social and economic situation vis a
vis the petit-colon and capital.
(7)The colonial state

was invariably conscious of the

strongly hierarchical social structure of the Swazi and the
concentration of power in the upper echelons of the hierarchy.
Appeasement of the Swazi rulers was thus a basic tenet of colonial
policy. The motive was basically in conformation with the
security- esire of the state and capital, and is built into
the spatial apportionment of Grey. As discussed above (5.2) the
suggestion of the petit-colon for appeasement was a differential
land

division which favoured the royal household. Selborne

conceived an alternative method which was more subtle but probably
just as effective.
Grey was instructed to ensure that every royal homestead,
chief's homestead,royal cattle post and royal burial ground was
within the reserves.

How fundamental this factor was is

confirmed by perusal of Grey's notes in which the identification
and location of these elements looms large (Appendix 4c).64Selborne's
assumption was that if neither royals nor regional chiefs were
required to move their locations Swazi protest as a whole would
be considerably muted. The success with which this criterion was
fulfilled is illustrated in the construction of Map Fourteen, which
shows how closely the distribution of elements of the traditional
social structure are correlated with the demarcation of reserves.65
Of 124 chiefs only one was left outside the reserves and all
royal households,royal cattle posts and burial grounds were included.
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In one instance a royal grave was too remote to be included in
a reserve without also cutting out "thousands of morgen of valuable
grazing ground" so a small enclave was declared around the grave.
The arrangement of the implementation of the partition around
elements of the traditional spatial and sacredotal structure by
the colonial state to implicitly further the interests of capital
was not an immediately obvious procedural criterion. More obvious,
and to be anticipated, was the arrangement around the incipient
colonial infrastructure.
(8) At this early stage

of colonial rule, both a transportation

system and an urban system were in a state of infancy but even
the prospective development of an integrated infrastructure
exercised an influence on the spatial array. This is particularly
obvious in two areas (Map Fifteen). Potential urban centres Mbabane,Manzini,Forbes Reef,Piggs Peak,Mankiana,Dwaleni and Stegiwere all clearly surrounded by land under petit-colon control
although the reserves were all proximate enough to ensure the
ready availability of an urban labour supply for commerce and
industry. No positive relationship was proposed or could be
detected between the road network of the time and land division,
but there is a correlation with a prospective railway line. The
railway, still in prospect in 1908, was seen by Grey as of minimal
relevance to the reserves and he thus attempted to maximise
petit-colon accessibility to the proposed line of rail.

Map

Fifteen shows this clearly where 80% of the route is over white
controlled land.
Grey's final exercise after demarcation according to the
above criteria, was to produce carrying capacity figures for the
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reserves. This was to determine how the reserves in toto could
bear an increase in total Swazi population. Grey estimated that
the reserves could bear an increase of 159,278 or 52%% of the
population. The theoretical assumptions which he used to determine
carrying capacity are given in Appendix 5d and the projected
carrying capacities for each of the reserves is listed in
Appendix 5b. The capacity of each reserve is related to his
perceptions of the areas in the light of his theoretical agricultural/
grazing land requirement estimates :
" I considered each area selected sep rately and apportioned
it a definite amount of land per family,varying with the
quality of agriculture and grazing land and the amount
of rocky barren hillside or wasteland. The unit apportioned
to each family varies from 15-60 morgen per family"(67).
No attempt was made by Grey to relate carrying capacity in each
reserve to the actual population resident there at the time
of partition. He did however argue that though the carrying capacity
figures would inevitably be reached at some stage in the future
it would take a considerable time since :
"Most farmers will try to keep the natives which they
have on their land" (68).

5.5 CONCLUSION
An examination of the historical backdrop to land partition
in Swaziland reveals how the spatial array is structured by a
set of procedural criteria implemented by the colonial state
which closely accord with the interests of promoting white
agricultural development and of articulating the Swazi into such
a mode of production. As Enraght-Moony,Resident Commissioner,1903-7,
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wrote :
"The European desires to expropriate the best ground
for himself, to stop indiscriminate cultivation and
to displace any natives not required for his own
purposes"(69)
The colonial state facilitated these desires at almost all points.
The patent inequality of alienation of two thirds of the
land surface to the crown and less than 600 whites , while
constricting over 100,000 blacks to the remaining one third is
explicable both in terms of the desire to expropriate land for
direct white utilisation and as being a concrete means to break
down the self-sufficient traditional mode of production and
acquire

to

control over its labour-power. Constriction was perceived

as a means to enforce and hasten change of the basically selfsufficient traditional agricultural base towards the money-economy
and to promote dependency on the petit-colon for taxation costs
and the essentials of life, by the sale of labour. Thus it was
necessary to leave a potential labour force on white land, to
create reserves for surplus labour and to institute measures to
force the Swazis resident on white land to sell their labour to
the petit-colon.
At the detailed level this chapter has identified how the
physical arrangement of space embodies several inter-linked sets
of criteria designed to facilitate exploitation of land and
labour. Thus the spatial pattern is related to Grey's perception
of the needs of capital. The desire for consolidation of reserves
is seen to be a function of a desire to create an optimal pattern
for minimising reactive political response from the Swazi and
hence to hasten the penetration of white settlement and capital.

134
The manipulation of the traditional spatial and sacredotal structure
by the colonial state to promote political stability and the
linking of the land pattern with the incipient colonial infrastructure
were further inducements to capitalism in the colon.
It should be noted that the policy-making of the colonial
state was both a function of and a medium for the ongoing process
of foreign domination of the country. Many of the decisions were
based on prospective developments under capitalism many of which,
however,eventually failed to materialise. But at this optimistic
time in which spatial patterns were erracibly imprinted on the
country the mood of the colonial state was aptly summed up by
Grey himself,
"I have been the instrument that has locked up much
beautiful and fertile country from which the European
is forever to be excluded" (70).
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PERIPHERAL RESPONSE : VOICES OF THE SWAZI
"Our land is being taken from us without reason.
We think it is being done because we are a separate
race. The land is ours."
Swazi Queen Regent,1908.
"I am convinced the settlement is both just and sound."
R.C.Coryndon,1908.

6.1 INTRODUCTION
Perceptions of the process of political, social and economic
domination by the colonial state, the petit-colon and capital are
undocumented for the mass of Swazi. The concentration of power in
the upper strata of the traditional hierarchical social system
meant that it was at this level that protest was articulated and
interaction with the colonial state occurred. This interaction is
well documented and talk of "swazi" attitudes,perceptions and so on
must be interpreted as those of the ruling group for the nation
as a whole.
First the channels of protest and the views of the Swazi on
colonial state policy on a number of land-alienation connected
issues and the stance adopted by the colonial state to counter
protest are considered (6.2). The intrigue and manouevering which
underlies this stance are then examined in relation to the 1907
Swazi Delegation to Britain (6.3). The almost total failure of
the Swazi to shift the monolithic colonial state in any policy
matter is in marked contrast with its accomodating position vis a vis
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the petit-colon and capital interests. The failure is seen to lead
to attempts to re-appropriate land through the open market. The
reactive response of the petit-colon to this strategy reveals again
the fundamental empathy between colonial state and capital (6.4).

6.2 CHANNELS AND ISSUES OF PROTEST
The Swazi rulers were allowed formal access to officials of
the colonial state under enforced conditions of subservience on
a limited

number of occasions. There was a delegation to Milner

in December 1904, two petition-bearing delegations to Selborne
in Pretoria in July 1905 and May 1909, a delegation to Gladstone
(Selborne's successor) in 1913, the Malunge delegation to England
in December 1907, and public meetings within Swaziland with
Selborne in September,1906, and on a number of occasions with EnragtMoony and Coryndon.
The issues of protest were relatively constant and were
reiterated as colonial legislation continued to be passed. They
can be crystallised into a number of areas ;
(1) The fundamental protest of the Swazi constituted challenges
to the political rights of Britain to exercise colonial rule in
Swaziland. The independence clauses of pre War conventions were
freguently cited to criticise the 1903 Order in Council by which
Britain assumed control of Swaziland and to criticise all subsequent
legislation in Swaziland by the British colonial state :
"The limitation of boundaries (for reserves) is an abhorrence
to the Swazi Nation,and to alienate their land,as is proposed
will be to treat them as a conquered people,which they are
not" (2)
The colonial state gave little credence to this challenge of its right
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to rule. The will of the state was inviolate in such matters.
(2) The Swazi were also critical of the means used by the colonial
state to generate income for administration and the costs of
partition. In effect, the Swazi were being forced to pay the
costs of actions by the colonial state to which they had fundamental
objections. The taxation structure imposed by the state in 1903
was overtly criticised, as was the sale of crown lands (5.3) and
the expropriation of concession rental revenue by the colonial state.
Prior to the Boer War, the South African Republic held the Private
Revenue Concession in which all concession rentals were collected
by them in exchange for an annual payment of ^12,000 to the Swazi.
No payments were made after 1899 and in 1904 the Swazi conseguently
claimed ,^60,000 and the continuation of payments.

The colonial

state blandly denied the debt, cancelled the concession and
expropriated all concession revenues on the grounds that the mass
of Swazi would benefit rather than just the ruling elite - a dubious
claim since virtually all early revenue went towards partition
. 4
costs.
(3) More closely related to the land question were calls for
the cancellation of all concessions on the grounds of non-payment
of rental during the Boer War. In effect, this was a call for a
blanket cancellation which was summarily rejected by the colonial
state under contrary pressures from the petit-colon and capital.
The stance commonly adopted was to claim the authority of the
5
1890 Concessions Court.
(4) The 1907 Proclamation and the alienation of land which it
provided for provoked bitter and impassioned response from the
Swazi. Thus images such as "being killed", "living in darkness" ,
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"cutting up the land", "being pushed into the mud",

and " b eing

stripped naked" are common in Swazi articulation of events. R.T.Coryndon,
the Resident Commissioner, was called Msindazwe or "he who weighs
down,sits heavy upon, encumbers or clogs the land".
Frequent appeal was made to the history of concession granting
and to the white manipulation of Mbandzeni and his intentions in
granting concessions :
"The dividing up of our land is a thing we feel very much
especially since land was only leased and was never parted
with irrevocably. The land was lent and should return at
the expiry of the time for which it was lent"(7)
and,
"If the Government were serious they would produce documents
to show that Mbandzeni sold the land. He lent land to whites.
The High Commissioner said the land was sold. I asked him
if "buy" and "lend" are the same word"(8).
The reiterated claim was that under the Swazi system land was a
national property and consequently inalienable. Land was therefore
by intention and definition only leased to whites under the terms
9
of the traditional system.
It was at this point of diametrically

opposed social

interpretations of the role of land in the productive process that
the will of the colonial state triumphed. Land had to be alienated
for capital and the petit-colon and the necessary actions were
taken despite vociferous Swazi objection and a total refusal to
co-operate at the local level with Grey's partition.
The stance which the colonial state adopted towards the Swazi
was that of an arbitrator between conflicting but equally -valid
rights to land. Thus Selborne said to a Swazi delegation in July
1905 :
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"Both Swazis and whites claim rights to land. I must
seperate these rights. We want to help you keep as much
land as you can use, and more, quite undisturbed by the
white man" (11).
Comments of this genre continued to be made by Selborne and Coryndon
in dealings with the Swazi throughout this period. The idea that
the colonial state was acting in the best interests of the Swazi
was patently a misrepresentation of its true role and cut little
ice with the Sv&ai. The Queen Regent, at least, could detect
the'hidden hand' of capital in colonial policy :
"Our land has been taken from us without reason. It is
Mr.Miller and Mr.Forbes who have done this",
and,
"Were the people also sold 7 My people are being taken
away from me too" (12).
At the local level there are no data available on Swazi
migratory response to land expropriation, although Annual Colonial
Reports of the period note no mass exodus from white land between
1909 - 1914. At the expiry of the five year period of grace,
eviction notices were served on

only 964 families by white

farmers, leaving, it is estimated over 35% of the Swazi population
on white land. These were immediately forced to enter a new set
of social and productive relations with the petit-colon by the
imposition of a standardised tax of £l
and labour tribute. 13

6.3 COLONIAL OBSTRUCTIONISM AND THE 1907 DELEGATION
Continual reference by colonial state officials to the
authority vested in them by the home government prompted a Swazi
desire to appeal to this higher authority. For instance,Coryndon,
in informing the Swazi of Selborne's partition decision had oaid :
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"We have laid all the facts before His Majesty King Edward Vll
and he has decided what is to be done. His Excellency(Selborne)
now desires me to tell you that the King has decided to
make a final partition of rights between you and the
concessionaires" (14).
The attitudes and actions of colonial state officials,Selborne
and Coryndon, in attempting first to obstruct a delegation and
then to minimise its impact display the view of the colonial state
towards the aspirations of the Swazi :
"Their history has never taught them the futility of
resistance to the unyielding decrees of a consistent
administration"(15)
Both Selborne and Coryndon saw the Swazi Queen Regent as a potentially
powerful threat to the effecting of a smooth land expropriation for
the petit-colon :
"The failure of the delegation will be a severe blow to
the influence of the Regent, whose influence is at
present the cause of most of our administrative difficulties"(16)
Initial attempts to negate her influence included a proposal by
Coryndon to depose her and install the under-age Sobhuza as Monarch
(rejected by Selborne) and the close monitoring of all correspondence
with the legal advisers to the Swazi. 17
Swazi pressure throughout 1906-7 for a delegation to Britain
was repeatedly opposed by Selborne. He confidentially requested an
order from London which he could use to support his views on
partition :
"I am sure that the only results of a deputation to London
will be harmful and cause increased trouble and fresh
misunderstandings. I hope you will be able to send me a
really stiff reply which can be communicated to the Regent
to the effect that the decision was the King's and that he
is surprised and displeased that the Chief Regent should
question that fact or try to reopen the matter,that the
decision is inevitable and that there is not the least use
in her thinking that a deputation to London would have any
effect in repealing it or modifying it"(18)
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An apparent change of heart was purely a function of realization
by the colonial state that a carefully manipulated delegation might
work to their advantage and serve to pacify the Swazi. Thus a
delegation was allowed to visit Britain from December 1907 to
February 1908.
The timing of the announcement of the 1907 Proclamation was
deliberately delayed until the Swazi ploughing season in October
with the thought that the mass of Swazi would be too pre-occupied
to take much notice of it.19 Colonial agreement to a delegation
was purposefully announced just prior to the publication of
the 1907 Proclamation since :
"The knowledge that the deputation is going to London
will act as a safety valve when the decision about land
partition is received"(20).
The Queen Regent, as most vociferous critic of the administration,
was barred from the delegation. 21 The delegation was repeatedly
informed that the purpose of its visit to London was to pay
homage to Edward. 22

It was predetermined that no concessions would

be made to the Swazi.23

The delegation was refused financial

assistance by the administration and had to raise their own funds.
Once in Britain, Selborne prohibited the flow of further funds
to the delegation so as to curtail the length of their stay :
"The delegation should not stay long in England in case
their case comes to the attention of and is exploited by
negrophilist interests"(24).
The delegation was given an audience with the Colonial
Secretary,Lord Elgin, to present their case and were met with
blunt expressions of support for Selborne's policy and the
immutability of colonial laws. 25 Marwick,a District Commissioner in
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Swaziland, who was sent with the delegation reported success in
keeping the delegation away from'negrophilists'.
The delegation returned :
"We are still not satisfied. We were told in England that
our petitions would not be granted,but we will continue to
cry to the Government
we did not know we were killing
ourselves by going under the British Government" (27).
The manouevering of the colonial state to effect maximum benefit
from the delegation at minimal cost is well-documented. They failed
to mute Swazi protest entirely and the Regent was far from
discredited, but protest was never to erupt into acts of violence
against the state or petit-colon and in 1909 the Regent declared
that the issue would be shelved until Sobhuza came of age.
With the implementation of land partition by Grey the Swazi
turned to other channels to attempt to regain control over land.
At this point there was a direct conflict with the interests of
the petit-colon again and the colonial state is seen to intervene
in response to white protest to undermine a perceived threat
to capital.

6.4 LAND REPATRIATION AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PETIT-COLON.
The failure of the Swazi to make any appreciable impact on
colonial policy prompted a decision

to instigate a land re-purchase

programme in 1909 :
"I felt I must lose no time. I told the Council that all our
weapons had failed and now with our own strength we must
set out with determination to buy back as much land as we
can of our Swaziland" (28)
Raising funds was a national effort and all Swazi males were urged,
29
in 1909, to seek employment and pay/ 5 to a land purchase fund.
The Swazi collected almost ^40,000 from this source. Attempts were
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made to supplement this figure with loans from South African banks
until the colonial state intervened,ostensibly to, protect the
Swazi from debt.30 Yet :
"To our great surprise the administration interfered in
every way to discourage capital,despite offering us no
financial assistance themselves"(31)
Eventually 77,000 acres were purchased but not before the colonial
state had passed legislation to give it control of any further
land transfers.32
Legislation against Swazi land purchase was a direct function
of petit-colon protest against the repatriation of land considered
suitable for white settlement :
"There is an intense feeling among the Europeans against
the indiscriminate purchase by natives of land suitable
for European settlement. The Europeans will organise
meetings in all parts of Swaziland and will call upon the
Government to regulate purchases"(33)
The resultant legislation gave the colonial state control over any
Swazi funds collected for land purchase and the right to veto all
prospective purchases.

The constriction proved such a complete

disincentive to the Swazi that land repurchase ceased after 1916
until the 1940's.

6.5 CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Swazi were doomed to failure in their
struggle against the forces of capital and the colonial state in
consort. That they confined themselves to orthodox, non-violent
channels of protest probably ensured their survival as a protected
dependency of Britain, but failed to carry sufficient weight to
thwart the inexorable march of capitalism in the region.
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Land alienation in particular was an imperialistic act clearly
and deeply resented by the Swazi. Yet, once effected, and in
association with other acts of the colonial state such as the
imposition of a harsh taxation system, the actual and potential
articulation of the Swazi into a new set of productive relations
under capital became virtually inevitable.
It could hardly have been anticipated by the petit-colon that
the Swazi would enter the land market to regain land and inadvertantly
promote the desire of capital, at least in the broader regional
context, to exploit labour.For the petit-colon,however, assured of
an adequate labour supply without this additional incentive,
entrenching land control was a more important concern. The petit-colon
in its own interests consequently forced the Swazi out of the landmarket and thus considerably curtailed the flow of labour to South
Africa.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1914-68) AND AFTER

"The claws of the white man sank deep into the soil of Swaziland"
David Forbes,1938.

7.1 INTRODUCTION
In this penultimate chapter there is a much less detailed
treatment of the evolution of spatial organisation in Swaziland
from 1914 to the present. In so doing it is intended to examine
the major characteristics of the evolving relationship between
capital,the petit-colon,the colonial state and the Swazi as the
structure upon which the organisation of space is built.
The failure of the petit-colon to capitalise on the land partition
is seen to be a function of minimal infrastructural support from
the colonial state and the peripherality of Swaziland in the South
African space-economy

(7.2). The advent of multi-national corporation

capital after 1940 is seen to produce a re-orientation in colonial
state attitude towards its role in the "managed economy". The role
of multi-national capital in entrenching the existing pattern of
land control and the superimposition upon it of a new pattern
of capitalist development is then considered (7.3). Actual shifts
of land from petit-colon to Swazi in the colonial period through
two colonially approved schemes are then examined. Both are seen
to flounder on the conflict of social and economic values between
the colonial state and the Swazi Nation (7.4). Some comment is then
proferred on the independence period. The question of the relationship
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between land control patterns and the commitment of the new ruling
elite to the capitalist mode of production in Swaziland is addressed
(7.4).

7.2

THE FATE OF THE PETIT-COLON
We have attempted to demonstrate that early colonial spatial

organisation in Swaziland was a fundamental product of the penetration
of foreign capital in the age of "classic imperialism". This is not
immediately obvious without an accurate historical analysis since
a distinctive feature of the pre 1940 period was the failure of
capital to appropriate the surplus promised in the heady 1885-1915
period. The petit-colon's metropolitan linkages were gradually
eroded and the petit-colon itself ossified into a small, isolated
petit-bourgoisie, unproductively controlling large areas of
Swaziland and utilising black labour on a small scale.
Figure Four is a clear indicator of this process. Tin mining
and cotton growing were the only fields in which metropolitan
linkages were sustained in the 1920's. Exports of tin to the Straits
Settlements continued into the 1930's, reaching a peak in 1924-6.
Gold mining was never to reap the promised dividends. Commercial
agriculture in tobacco,cotton and beef cattle was confined to a
small number of enterprises, and exports, fluctuating annually,
remained at a low level. Sporadic wattle-growing in the 1920's was
the only other export source. Various petit-colon instigated white
settlement schemes floundered and large areas of purportedly settlable
2
land lay idle. The petit-colon per se did,however,continue to exercise
an inordinate influence on local colonial policy through an elected
3
body,the European Advisory Council.
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The failure of the petit-colon to realise the prospective
developments of the early colonial period (4.3) can be partially
related to the failure of the colonial state to provide the
necessary infrastructure for capitalist development. Best (1965)
traces the failure of railway schemes in 1918,1921,1924 and 1946.
In 1928 the state offered incentives to white farmers in the form
of a loan fund but the petit-colon's inability to generate income
for the administration meant that local costs continued to be met
by crown land sales, grants in aid from the Imperial Treasury

and

heavier black taxation. Hailey(1956) notes that in the 1930's the
4
Swazi were the heaviest taxed blacks in the sub-continent. The
reluctance of the colonial state to undertake capital expenditure
on infrastructure in Swaziland may be related to lack of funds but
was certainly a function of the belief that transfer of Swaziland
to South African control was inevitable.
The peripherality of Swaziland in the incipient southern
African space economy also helps explain the fate of the petit-colon.
South African producers viewed Swaziland as a market for goods and
7
a labour source but as a potential agricultural competitor.
Thus
poor market accessibility for petit-colon producers was exacerbated
by the monopolistic control of road transport within South Africa
by the South African Railways system. Best(1965) notes the tariff
structure worked to the disadvantage of Swaziland producers forced
to use this as the sole means of transport to South African markets.
In addition, the Union state acted forcibly on several occasions
to protect its own producers from outside competition. From 1910-16
there was a total embargo on beef from Swaziland and from 1924-32
there were stringent veterinary controls and a weight embargo.
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Tobacco producers in Swaziland were forced by South African interests
to join a marketing co-operative which forced many to drop the
crop and production slumped. Cotton, grown under the aegis of the
Empire Cotton Growing Association (Wood,1927) by companies such
as the Swaziland Corporation, faded after 1926 due to falling
world prices and poor market accessibility (Doveton,1937). Free
South African access to the Swaziland consumer market and the small
size of that market effectively prevented the development of any
manufacturing industry.
The petit-colon's failure precipitated no appreciable spatial
re-organisation of land control,however, despite continued Swazi
pressure to the contrary. The whites continued to enjoy a protected
relationship with the colonial state and principles of individual
ownership and private property had been deeply ingrained. These
were entrenched with the advent of multi-national corporation
capital after 1940.

7.3 RENEWED METROPOLITAN LINKAGES
Metropolitan capital,on an altogether different scale, and
quite extraneous to the petit-colon penetrated Swaziland in the
post 1940 period (Best,1967,Harrington,1957,Hendy,1953). Penetration
of capital and associated control over an enlarging Swazi proletariat
9
was under the benevolent umbrella of the colonial state. The
British parastatal body, the Colonial (later Commonwealth) Development
Corporation initiated a number of capital and labour intensive
projects in association with British (Tate and Lyle, Lonrho,
Courtauld's, Turner and Newall, and Libby's) and South African
(particularly Anglo-American) private capital in mining and plantation
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agriculture.

As a direct result Swazi economy and society in

the colonial and post colonial periods have become ever more firmly
tied to international capitalism.
Penetration of capital had a strong spatial component since
integral to the success of these prospective developments in generating
profit was the acquisition of land for plantations. Between
1945 and 1960 400,000 acres were purchased on the open market for
a total cost of <£l.6 million.

purchase was within the pre existent

spatial framework (that is, no land was obtained from the Swazi) and,
in effect, tied up over 10% of the land surface under the direct
control of foreign capital (Map Three). Purchased land in four
distinct localities became the spatial focii for capital and colonial
state infrastructural expenditure, creating zones of intensive
capitalist surplus extraction towards which black labour was
drawn from the rural areas.12
The petit-colon was largely by-passed by the advent of
multi-national capital,except in so far as they were able to
capitalise on land speculation in the 1940's and 1950's, and
became a static,peripheral community holding large areas of land
in an increasingly vulnerable political situation

as the colonial

state began to relinquish its political control over the country
in the 1960's.13 Nevertheless in the historical context it
had exercised an inordinate influence over the organisation of
space in Swaziland*

7.4 SHIFTS IN LAND CONTROL
Figure Five shows the shift in land control during the colonial
period in favour of the Swazi but still leaving 40% of the land
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surface outside Swazi control in 1968. Consideration of this shift
of control reveals further significant facets of state policy
during the colonial period and highlights the interplay between
the colonial state and the Swazi regarding land repatriation.
Official Swazi protests to the colonial state under King
Sobhuza 11 were made at regular intervals in 1921,1926,1941 and
1958.14 The major points at issue were basically reiterations
of protest made in the 1902-15 period (Chapter Six). Challenges
continued to be made to Britain's claim to the historical right
to rule and legislate in Swaziland, particularly in 1926 when
the right of rule was challenged in the Privy Council. Such claims
were summarily dismissed until the post war era of decolonisation.
At the core of all Swazi argument was the expression of grave
injustice over land expropriation and the desire to regain total
control over the land surface for the exclusive use of the Swazi
nation. With no political power to challenge the structure of
landholding and to effect autonomous radical change, such as
nationalisation of land and abolition of the land market system,
the Swazi attempted to use the open land market as the only available
mechanism for regaining land. Chapter Six showed how the colonial
state, under pressure from the petit-colon, stymied early Swazi
attempts to enter the land market but by the 1940's other factors
had come into play.
Daniel (1962) writes :
"Whereas before the Swazi could move over the whole of
Swaziland in 1907 they were confined to one third of its
area. Not only did they have to produce as much food
on less land but they had to adapt themselves to a moneyeconomy. The fact is that the Swazi had to forsake the
customary system of shifting agriculture and develop
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something new in its place. That they had neither knowledge
skills or resources to do this was overlooked at the time
of partition".
The final point is a contentious one but it should be reiterated
that the destruction of shifting agriculture and pastoralism was
a fundamental tenet of state policy. The effectiveness of this policy
is identified by Fair,Murdoch and Jones (1969) :
"Along with the introduction of the Swazi to wage earning
the traditional economy showed signs of weakening and
modification in other directions. Absenteeism of ablebodied men and serious imbalances in family and tribal
organisation and productive capacity were inevitable as
the total impact of these events was compounded"(p 30)
and Marwick (1940) :
"The natives are heavily taxed. This means that the natives
have had to change from a subsistence to a money economy,
If they are not able to sell their own produce (they often
do not even have enough for their own requirements) or
their cattle (which they have a deep prejudice against
doing) their only other asset is their labour. This means
they must seek employment to meet their obligations to
the Government'.*
By 1934, the Swazi were only producing 20% of their food
requirements.

It was considered axiomatic that disintegration

of the indigenous mode of agricultural production would produce
a concommitant trend towards cash-cropping for export. The assumed
spontaneity of this process remained unfulfilled in 1940. This,
taken in conjunction with perceived environmental degradation
under increasing land pressure and falsely seen as a function
of the perpetuation of "inefficient","inherently destructive"
traditional methods of production, instigated colonial attempts
to hasten the articulation of peasant production into the capitalist
system :
"The Swazi must learn the new methods of civilised
agriculture and abandon shifting agriculture"(16)
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In addition, the colonial state was faced with the problem of the
existence of a non-employed population of 25,000 Swazis on
white land in 1936.

With the proposed advent of multi-national

capital the necessity for forced evictions was foreseen.
Tlie method for the solution of these supposedly intractable
problems as an elaborately conceived, large scale experimental
land resettlement scheme. Success of this scheme, it was assumed,
could lead to the wholesale reorganisation of land and agriculture
in Swazi reserves as well. Acquisition of land by the colonial state
18
was a prerequisite for the scheme.
Land was purchased in several
localities by grants under the Colonial Development & Welfare Act,
supplemented by crown land which was still unsold to whites.
Rigorous control of settlement, spatial organisation and functional
land allocation, basic infrastructure, crop and technical inputs
and marketing was proposed.19 Strict control of grazing,stock numbers,
rotations,soil conservation and rights of occupancy were also
suggested. Award of individual land tenure was considered a basic
adjunct to the success of this scheme.
Although 364,875 acres were set aside (including 130,000 of
crown land) for the whole programme only 120,000 was eventually used
and a

mere 1766 families or 8830 people settled. Total state

expenditure on the scheme was £230,000 (Map Fifteen).
The reasons for the abandonment of the scheme by the colonial
state are unresearched though Hughes (1972) has suggested some
possibilities. He blames financial stringency, spoon-feeding of
settlers, the influx of unauthorised settlers,the inability of the
state to enforce its rigorous settlement and production regulations
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and the experimental bias of the programme as contributory causes.
Hughes assumes that while the implementation may have been faulty
the underlying assumptions were legitimate and desirable. Thus, for
instance, that providing security of tenure automatically raises
productivity or that the aim of Swazi producers should be cash crops
for export is assumed rather than questioned by Hughes. Research
into Swazi perceptions of the scheme would undoubtedly shed greater
light on the failure of the scheme to force Swazis into cash-cropping.
To the Swazi nation the scheme could be counted something
of an inadvertant success since a further proportion of the land
surface was unlocked to Swazi use and eventual control at no extra
cost.
Consistent with stated Swazi policy,in 1941 Sobhuza 11 proposed
the re-entry of the Swazi into the open land market. The colonial
state agreed to this proposal.21 The reasons for agreement are to
be found in the state's interpretations of the Swazi proposals. These
were to raise funds by culling cattle from all Swazi stockholders
and selling the proceeds. Alarmist views on the 'explosion' of
Swazi stockholding were prevalent and the scheme appeared to provide
a method to control stock with Swazi agreement and to instil new
22
attitudes about the economic potential of cattle.
With certain restraints, such as the necessity for cash purchase,
the state assisted in the culling and sales of stock for this LIFA
fund,as it was called. Almost 219,000 acres of land was

eventually

purchased on the open market experiencing dramatic speculative
price rises as a result of the advent of the multi-nationals (Map
Sixteen).23
The overall response of the mass of Swazi to the scheme is
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difficult to gauge. Reluctance to contribute cattle has been
attributed by Hughes(1972) to the burden on the small stockholder
and to the fact that acquired land did not tangibly add to the
controlled areas of all chiefs who had subscribed to the scheme. 24
The petit-colon saw the scheme as a Swazi reiteration of the
values of traditionalism and called on the colonial state to abolish
the Lifa Fund on the grounds of its detrimental influence on
capitalist development in the country. Comments included :
"The policy is not economic development in the interests
of the Swazis but has a political aspect which should be
discouraged(a).This is not an attempt to improve the lot
of the Swazi but a political effort to buy out the
European from the country(b).Allowing this to continue
will discourage foreign capital(c)." (25)
These views coincided with colonial realization that the
scheme was not succeeding in fulfilling the aims of the state in
supporting it. The motive of destocking was patently not being
realised and the issue came to a head with disputes over the
quality of beasts to be culled.

From this point on it was only

a short time before the state withdrew its support for the scheme
as the underlying socio-political motive of the Swazi was re-appraised.
The land question formed an integral part of Swazi negotiations
for political independence in the late 1950's and the 1960's. As
a result of a petition from Sobhuza to the High Commissioner and
the appointment of a subsequent commission of enquiry both the
remainder of crown lands and the land obtained for the settlement
scheme in the 1940's were transferred to the Swazi.
In 1968 the first Swazi Prime Minister,Prince Makhosini, went
to London to discuss the question of a land shortage in Swaziland
and reguested a blanket grant for Swazi purchase of land.27 This
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was refused in favour of a monitored grant scheme ( 7.5).
It is instructive to consider the actions of the new Swazi
power elite once political autonomy was obtained in 1968. In
particular there is a need to elucidate Swazi response to the
inherited structures which produced and maintained the pattern
of land control and to examine any measures taken to regain land.

7.5 THE NEO-COLONIAL MILIEU
The Swazi

state

has made a small number of apparently

significant moves to promote the repatriation of land in the post
colonial period. The significance of these moves must be evaluated
in the context of the commitment of the government to the international
capitalist system.
In 1972 the Land Speculation Control Act was instituted. Prior
to this the colonial free market system in land prevailed. Thereafter
all land transactions have been monitored through a Board. Citizens
may buy and sell freehold title land virtually without restriction
but non citizens are generally prohibited

from purchasing, though

exceptions are made for corporate foreign interests. Ostensibly
the Act was to control rife speculation in land (particularly urban
land ) by absentee owners in South Africa.29 It carries with it
the idea of a gradual transfer of marketable land to Swazi
citizens :
"This establishes an institutional frame work which
allows the repurchase of the freehold title land
but at a pace slow enough not to adversely affect
the commercial agricultural sector" (30)
Direct or indirect attempts to force landowners to place land
on the market have thus far been minimal and no forced expropriation,

159
with or without compensation, has been instituted or is likely
to be under the present regime.
The legislation, or lack of it, can be seen as epitomising
the conflicts produced within Swazi society by the historical
penetration of capital and the more recent commitment of the
ruling elite to the western capitalist system :
"For my part I have always recognised that external
skills play a very important part in the development
of the country's substantial natural resources; and
I am confident that the entrepreneur will find in
Swaziland promising opportunities and a highly satisfactory
climate for investment" (King Sobhuza 11 ) (31).
The traditional element in power still regards land repatriation
per se as a National priority but the associated desire to retain
existing and solicit further foreign capital necessitates that no
actual or potentially destructive moves are made. Possible
restructuring of the land market system has been rejected in favour
of market manipulation through the Land Speculation Board. This
accords with a general policy of gradualism in land transfer.
Granted the confirmation of the inherited land market system,
two methods have been deployed to raise funds for land purchase as
it comes on the market. The first reveals the strong neo-colonial
links with Britain by whom land purchase is regarded as an integral
part of a general foreign aid programme. In 1968 the Swazi demanded
a blanket grant to buy land ; a demand rejected outright by Britain
in favour of an offer of a strictly controlled land repurchase
programme to buttress the colonially-instituted rural development
programmes in the country. Britain made/3 million available for
land purchase which could be added to existing rural development
areas or which the Swazi could prove would be "beneficially occupied".
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By 1976, i0.5 million had been disbursed on 68,500 acres of land.
Thus the ex-colonial state refused to buy land for any reason
that would not support its foreign aid aims. But the echoes from
the abortive settlement scheme of the 1940's must be strong as
considerable difficulties continue to be experienced in effecting
32
rural development programmes.
During the last two years the Swazi once again instituted their
own collection fund. It is intended to use the royalties from
foreign mining operations in the country to re-purchase land (Tibiyo
FundK Details are sketchy but it appears that land has already
been bought from this fund. I.L.O. (19 77) notes that land purchased
is being witheld from the mass of people in favour of :
"Commercial farms on which the aim is to introduce
effective management to make the farms profitable
enterprises"
Usage of land so dramatically opposed to traditional precepts
would undoubtedly be consistent with the commitment of the new
elite to

- capitalism in Swaziland. It would also tie

in

with

what appears to be an increasing trend,individual Swazi entry into
the land market to hold land under individual ownership with funds
obtained from foreign bank loans. The attitude of the power
controllers to this movement appears to be an ambivalent one.
The uniguely privileged position which the petit-colon appears
to enjoy after the first decade of independence must in one sense
be interpreted in the light of the Swazi desire not to alienate
foreign capital.

It is also a function of the privileged access

which the petit-colon built up with the traditionalist political
party during the vulnerable period of the 1960's. Potholm(197l)
has documented the role of the

petit-colon in supporting the
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traditional faction against anti-white Pan Africanists in the
political struggles of the 1960's.33 This strategy was designed
to ensure survival after independence and the strategy appears
to have met with a modicum of success since a number of whites
retained prominent positions in the first and second Independence
34
governments.
Despite the new autocracy since 1973, there is no
reason to suppose these links have weakened.

7.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted a brief overview of the remainder
of the colonial period, after the years under particular review,
and offered a few observations on the decade after British colonial
rule had ended. These periods are being examined in detail by other
workers. 35 An attempt has been made to trace the evolution of
spatial organisation from the time of the definitive

partition

onwards. The virtual redundancy of the spatial pattern created for
capital in the period 1903-1910 is highlighted by consideration of
the fate of the petit-colon in the later period prior to 1940.
The realisation of the resource and labour potential of the country
for capital awaited the advent of the multi-national corporations
in the post-war period,however, and it is to this advent that much
of the spatial restructuring of the past thirty years can be attributed.
The resiliance of traditional Swazi protest to land alienation
is evidenced throughout the colonial period and continues into the
present . Protest in the colonial period was kept in check by the
institution of the colonial state in collusion with capital and the
petit-colon. At the present time it is still confined by the
contradictions of the neo-colonial situation the country finds
itself in.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

"While the future's there for anyone to change, sometimes it
is easier to change the past" J.Browne,1974.

8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is presented as a brief recapitulation of
the rationale of the thesis (8.2), and the major findings and
arguments within a model of settler-colonialism (8.3). A possible
future scenario for spatial organisation in Swaziland is then
speculated upon (8.4) and the thesis concludes with a note on
future directions for study and practice in Swaziland (8.5).

8.2 THE OBJECTIVES RE-ITERATED
The research for this dissertation was prefaced by a set
of basic geographical questions relating to the historical and
contemporary organisation of space in Swaziland. These included
enquiry into the factors accounting for the original pattern of
black-white landholding in Swaziland, the manner and reasons for
change during the colonial period and the contemporary pressures
towards change in the pattern of holding. As the research focus
crystallised,attention was primarily directed to the first of these
three sets of questions and this is reflected in the space allocation
of this study. The problem underlying the research i s,ncverthe".r-r.r.
encapsulated within these sets of spatially-oriented questions
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That is, to describe and explain the genesis of a visible pattern
of land holding and control.
The problem was by no means a novel one, notwithstanding the
scanty research literature on Swaziland. Boyce (1947), Whittington
and Daniel (1969) and Mashasha (1973) ostensibly set themselves
similar

tasks. Their focus of explanation appeared to be deficient

in two major areas. First, in the tradition of Hellen (1969),
Crowder (1970) and Witthuhn (1976) their analyses are

largely

or purely political. Little explicit or even implicit credence is
given either to the powerful economic forces of expansionary
capitalism which were drawing much of the world into the capitalist
orbit in the ninteenth and early twentieth centuries or to the
ways in which these forces might be expected to organise and reorganise
space within the colonised world. So dramatic has been the post-1945
impact of multi-national corporation capital that the role of
capital in earlier eras has been obscured and left in a vacuum.
Second, with regard to colonial state policy, the literature
exhibits a tendency,in its more enlightened guises, to regard policy
as "unfair", "culturally arrogant" and even "racist" ( Leibrandt,1376,
and Matsebula,1972, in particular) but no attempt is made to relate
?t to what it was in essence ultimately designed for; that is, the
benefit of British capital interests and its associated metropolitan
settler-class. The ideological assumptions underlying policy are
left uncovered and the pragmatic effects of metropolitan economic
interests on policy

are ignored.

The reasons for these deficiencies can in one sense be relater
to an incomplete reading of colonial source materials. Study of the
published and official data base can lead to an acceptance of policy

164
at its face value. Unofficial and private colonial correspondence
and the untapped white settler data source cast quite different
interpretative lights on policy. In another more fundamental sense,
they relate to the failure to structure research in a broader
framework which examines the phenomenon of nineteenth and twentieth
century European imperialism and colonialism, and their linkages.
The recent studies of Brett (1973) and Leys (1975) are salutory
reminders of the necessity for this method of approach to African
studies.
In Chapter Two of this thesis, a number of new trends within
the field of development geography were identified. With a total
rejection of the'developmentalism' of the 1960's and a critique of
orthodox development models has come a call for a thorough-going
historicism in development studies. This suggests a point for a
suitable marriage between development and historical geography in
Africa. The potential contribution of the historical geographer
in Africa to the development field is an apposite one.
Tentative explorations in a theory of imperialism in geography
take two directions : (a) examining the expansionary nature of
capital in theoretical and specific historical contexts, and (b)
examining the impact of capital on economy, society and, for the
geographer, spatial organisation, in the pre-capitalist world. This
thesis takes its cue from the second direction. Attention was
directed, therefore, to a set of assertions about the impact of
capitalism in the settler-state and its relations to the phenomenon
of colonialism. These assertions have been tested for applicability
in the Swaziland case.
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8.3 THE COLON RE-VISITED
In Chapter Two, a historical model of settler-colonialism
was abstracted from the literature as a frame within which to
structure this set of assertions. It is within this framework that
some general and specific concluding statements can be made about
the early socio-economic and spatial impact of capital and the
colonial state in Swaziland.
The particular advantage of the empirically-based model for
areas in which metropolitan capital deployed a settler-class is
that it gives general statements about capitalist expansion a
specific and particular historical context which identifies the
concrete social mechanisms operative in articulating these areas
and their pre-capitalist modes of production into capitalism. Yet,
as Banaji (1973) has re-iterated, the settler-state or colon was
only one of a set of means adopted by European capital in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to restructure indigenous society
and economy to meet its own ends.
Conclusions from the study are presented within the four stages
of the model outlined by Good (1976).
First, the origins of the petit-colon were examined in Chapter
Three. Origins in this sense refers only secondarily to geographical
locale. That the Swazi, politically, did not go the way of all other
black flesh in South Africa in the pre Boer War period is attributable
to broader conflicts within the evolving regional political economy.
Socially and economically, however, the differences between the
two competing states as they affected Swaziland were minimal as
both sanctioned and legitimised penetration by their subjects. The
national duality of this penetration only superficially introduces
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a complicating element into the model. One can locate the Britishbased faction within a broader social class with its roots in the
metropole, with strong links with metropolitan capital and which
subscribed to the particulars of capitalist ideology (3.4,4.3,4.4).
While of different geographical and socio-cultural origins, the
objectives of the transient Boer population in Swaziland were in
essential concurrence with those of the British faction at this
time. Social conflict within the white community between 1885-1899
essentially had its origins in individual and group competitiveness
for monopoly control over the objects of labour and labour power
itself, and only secondarily was it along the explicit racialnational division of Boer-Briton.
The aims and objectives of the petit-colon closely accord
with the propositions in Good's (1976) model (Chapter Four).
Utilization of peasant surplus does not appear to have been a
countenanced strategy by capital in Swaziland. This is attributable,
at least in part, to the essential subsistence-orientation and
self-sufficiency of the indigenous mode so there was little visible
productive surplus to appropriate. The alternative was a three-pronged
monopolistic drive by British settlers to control mineral resources,
land for plantation agricultural development and to create and control
a black labour supply. A fundamental motive was therefore to extract
surplus by supplying raw materials to metropolitan industry. Land
expropriation, exclusive private ownership and concommitant labour
control were concrete principles embedded in the objective of the
British settler class (4.3). Both of Friedland's (1972) propositions
about the potential role of land expropraition from the Swazi in
producing a new set of social relations under capital are verified

167
in Swaziland (2.4).
The interpolation of industrial and trading monopoly
acquisition by the British settler in Swaziland, while purely
an unsuccessful speculative venture, is a dimension ignored by
Good (1976) which identifies a further monopolistic facet of the
drive for profit.
For the Boer, confining his activities within Swaziland to
extensive pastoralism, unfettered land control was also a necessity.
Land expropriation also appears to have represented a means of
gaining control over labour to channel to the farms of the Eastern
Transvaal. The aims of Briton and Boer in Swaziland were consequently
essentially similar

in this era.

The third stage of Good's (1976) model examines the ways in
which the colonial state facilitated the capitalist drive to
control land, labour and resources. The role of the colonial state,
at least in Swaziland, is to be found in neo-Marxian rather than
classic Marxist positions. This allows explanation of the state's
failure to sanction the Swaziland Corporation (4.5) and the industrial
monopolies. Nevertheless, underlying a guise of claimed protectionism
of the Swazi lay a fundamental commitment to restructuring the
indigenous mode of production, to confirming the petit-colon in the
exclusive control over land and mineral resources and to assisting
in the provision of labour power for the new industrial enterprise
via taxation and the sanctioning of tenancy relations.
A feature of the model which requires refinement in the
Swaziland context is the question of colonial state revenue and
expenditure. The neo-Marxian critique contains a clear view of the
role of colonial state expenditure in the colony (2.4). Less obvious
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is the question of revenue generation to effect this role. It
appears in the Swaziland case that a significant impact on policy was
had by the colonial state requirement that local administrations
be self-financing. Thus, expropriation of the Private Revenue
concession and duty-free importation monopolies, the sale of
crown lands, taxation of blacks, the appointment of a single partition
Commissioner and the decision not to effect an expropriation of
all concessions from the petit-colon can all in part be attributed
to the need to minimise costs and to generate revenue. Colonial
state expenditure in Swaziland is,however, consistent with the
postulates of the model. The particular irony of the Swaziland
situation is that the Swazi were forced to contribute the majority
of the revenue to effect a scheme to which they were diametrically
opposed.
Banaji (1973) claims that the natural development of the
settler-state is an internal expansion of the capitalist mode
of production. In the Swaziland case, not only did the country
fail to develop as a raw material base for metropolitan industry
under the petit-colon but that this projected expansion, as in
South Africa and basically because of South Africa, failed to
materialise. This may also be attributed to the eventual failure
of the colonial state to accept its share in the "managed economy"
posited by Brett (1973) and Good (1976) (Chapter Seven).
Detailed analysis of the articulation of the Swazi into the
money-economy and capitalism under the petit-colon and colonial
state lies outside the scope of this study. In Chapter Six this
study concentrated instead on the reactive response of the Swazi
to external domination and land alienation. Historically the outward
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signs (destruction of self-sufficiency, migration for wage-labour,
participation in the money-economy) are that fundamental changes
were being wrought at an early stage. Any advanced class formation
within the Swazi population was, however, delayed until the post-war
era of multi-national capital.
It is at this stage with the underlying social and ecomomic
processes recalled that one is free to move outside Good's(1976)
aspatial model to a consideration of the tangible working out of
these processes in physical space (Chapter Five). Hence, the procedure
of the colonial state in arriving at a suitable model for land
expropriation, acceptable to all white interests can be described
(5.2) and the details of partition can be examined (5.3-5.6).
Here the voice of a consolidated petit-colon and the local
representatives >of British capital (Swaziland Corporation, Henderson
Corporation) with landed interests in Swaziland are seen to have had
a significant role in determining policy formulation of the colonial
state in Swaziland. The considerable de-centralization of colonial
state control in relation to Swaziland should not, however, give
support to what Brett (1973) has called "the myth of the practical
official responding to fact rather than theory." The historical
particulars of the Swaziland situation were in one sense unique ;
the ideological impulse brought to bear on them by the colonial state
certainly was not (4.5). The superficial geometry of the partition
is historically structured by a set of procedural criteria deeply
sympathetic to the principles of capitalist articulation and to
capital control over land, resources and labour.

This emerged in

considering both the decision to effect a partition and in its
detailed implementation by Grey.
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The criteria used by Grey are all symptomatic of the colonial
state desire to further the interests of capital in Swaziland. Of
particular not* in view of the pacificatory role of the state
postulated in Good's model was the security motive implicit in the
partition. Actions of the colonial state in support of capital had
caused violent response elsewhere. In Swaziland a desire to minimise
the possibilities of violent protest is clearly seen in the partition
procedure. The subsequent decision of the Swazi to protest within
•legitimate1 channels was easily manipulated and controlled by the
state.

8.4 SPECULATION ON THE FUTURE
The growth of discrete social classes within the Swazi population
is a feature of development on the periphery of international
capitalism (Fransman,1973). The growth of a cohesive Swazi
proletariat in the post-war period of multi-national plantation
agriculture and mining development was indicated by the social
unrest of 1963, quashed by the colonial state, and unanimous worker
support for Pan Africanist political groupings in the 1968 and
1972 elections (Potholm, 1971). Concommitantly there has been the
growth, particularly since Independence, of a middle-class urbanbased elite

which has increasingly adopted many colonial economic

and social structures as its own. The colonial structure of production,
distribution and consumption is entrenched and the position of the
foreign multi-national corporation is reinforced.
Since this structure of production is unlikely to be
substantially modified under the present regime in Swaziland, despite
growing internal contradictions

between the different social groups,
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ancient and modern, it is possible to predict that there will
be little dramatic spatial re-organisation in Swaziland either of
physical space or the space-economy . What can be postulated
instead is the manipulation of this structure by the new elite
to work to its own material advantage and there are signs that
this is occurring already( Jones,1977).
The privilege of access which the white settler class enjoys
with the traditionalist element in government is likely to wane with
time and may do so dramatically if a new regime comes to power.
While their future as a class may be increasingly endangered, the
structures which maintain them, including the private property
market, are not. The manipulation of the property market for
returning land to traditional occupation and usage will undoubtedly
continue to be a priority with Sobhuza 11 in power but it may
increasingly be rejected, under the encouragement of British foreign
aid and banking loans,in favour of manipulation for the benefit
of the new middle class and of continuing to force the mass of
Swazi into cash-cropping for the ultimate benefit of capital.

8.5 FOOTNOTE
Palmer and Parsons (1977) write that Swaziland is "particularly
interesting to the economic historian as (a) compact laboratory of
processes evident elsewhere" in its exemplification of white settler
interpenetration and enclave development. Demonstrating this contention
has not been a major task of this study but their point is well-taken
and it is hoped that this study is a contribution not only to
re-interpreting the Swazi past but the African past as a whole.
For the present, R.T.Coryndon wrote in 1914 that " desperate
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diseases require heroic remedies". It is a moot point whether
contemporary Swaziland is in the grip of a "disease". The judgement
that one makes will in any case be largely a function of ideological
stance. The apparent prosperity and wealth of the country, glowingly
described by such as Nxumalo (1972), undoubtedly diverts attention
away from increasing internal social and economic contradictions,
a growing spatial and social maldistribution of wealth, and the
inherently destructive nature of the western-styled and foreigndominated development path as regards traditional culture,values
and lifestyle. If these are the symptoms of disease then identification
of root causes is a sine qua non which may not necessarily be
achieved within the confines of orthodox development theory. If, as
a counter-argument runs, the remedy lies in basic structural
transformations, it is obviously the historic right of the Swazi
themselves

to apply a "heroic remedy".
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER ONE
1

See,for instance,N.C.Pollock & S.Agnew, An Historical Geography
Of South Africa.1963. K.Dickinson, An Historical Geography
Of Ghana.1973. and K.Dickinson in A.R.H.Baker (ed). Progress
In Historical Geography.1972.

2

These works include T.J.D.Fair,G.Murdoch and H.M.Jones.Development
In Swaziland.A Regional Analysis.1969. J.P.Lea,The Differentiation
Of The Rural Periphery In Swaziland:A Multivariate Analysis,
South African Geographical Journal.54.1972. and G.Maasdorp,
Modernization in Swaziland, in C.G.Knight & J.L.Newman.Contemporary
Africa ; Geography and Change.1975.

3

Works which trace this process include M.Santos,Geoqraphy,Marxism
And Underdevelopment.Antipode.6:3.1974. R.Peet,The Development
Of Radical Geography.Progress In Human Geography.1:2.1977. and
R.Peet.Radical Geography.1977.

4

C.P.Potholm.Political Development In Swaziland.1967. and
C.P.Potholm.The Dynamics Of Political Modernization.1971.contain
detailed studies of the political evolution of Swaziland in
the last twenty years.

5

Swaziland's economic status vis a vis South Africa and the
western capitalist world is considered in a dependency framework
by M.Fransman,Development and Underdevelopment In Swaziland:
A Case Study.U.B.L.S.History Workshop.1973. and J.S.Crush,
Swaziland : Development,Dependence and Interdependence.A.A.G.
Meetings.Salt Lake City.1977.

6

In 1975, 40% of I.T.L. was under the control of absentee
owners (Central Statistical Office (C.S.O.) : Census Of
Individual Tenure Farms.1974-5).

7

C.S.O. : Census Of Individual Tenure Farms.1973-4.

8

There were 49,000 homesteads in 1972 and 152 regional chiefs
(C.S.O. : Census Of Swazi Nation Land.1973).

9

The national average is 91:100. Figures are calculated from
the 1966 Census returns (H.M.Jones.Report On The 1966 Swaziland
Population Census.1968). Age structure statistics suggest a
much higher proportion of individuals in the 20 to 45 age
bracket on I.T.L. than the national average.

10

Thanks are due to Mr Mick Abel of the Ministry Of Agriculture,
Mbabane, for permission to examine Swaziland's aerial photo
coverage. It was unfortunately not possible to reproduce the
photographs in this thesis to amplify the point.
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11

C.S.O. : Census Of Individual Tenure Farms.1973-4.

12

An estimated 30% of I.T.L. is considered to be "underutilised"
in International Labour Office (I.L.O.).Reducing Dependence.1977.

13

I.L.O. op.cit. puts the minimum figure at 2200 calories/person/
day. Also lamented is the lack of income to provide a minimal
standard of household consumption and the inaccessibility of
essential services to the bulk of the rural populace.

14

After the 'metropolis-satellite' theorising of A,G.Frank,
Capitalism and Underdevelopment In Latin America.1967.

15

C.S.O. : Annual Statistical Report.1975

16

I.L.O. op.cit.

17

I.L.O. op.cit.

18

Per capita personal incomes in 1974 were $139 p.a. on I.T.L.
and $53 p.a. on S.N.L. for Swazis. In the urban areas and
including Swazis in multi-national corporation employ,the
figure was $ 506 p.a. The per capita personal income for nonSwazis living in Swaziland was $1782 p.a. (I.L.O.op.cit.Table 8.4).

19

Swaziland Government.Second National Development Plan.1972.
p 245-51.

20

Thanks are due to Mr. Doug Levy,Surveyor-General of Swaziland,
for directing my attention to the existence of these maps when
the fact of their very survival was in doubt.

CHAPTER TWO

1

Both Soja and Riddell have retracted much of their earlier
work. See E.W.Soja,Topian Marxism and Spatial Praxis.A.A.G.
Meetings.New Orleans.1978.

2

E.W.Soja,Review Of Brookfield's 'Interdependent Development',
A.A.A.G..68:1.1978. in turn criticises Brookfield for seeing
this as the primary flaw of orthodox perspectives.

3

Union of Socialist Geographers, Study Papers> on Imperialism,
contains a critique of the views of Blaut and Porter & De_Souza
on imperialism.

4

See P.M.Sweezy.The Theory Of Capitalist Development.1962. +T.Kemp, Theories of Imperialism.1967. E.R.J.Owen & R.B.Sutcliffe,
(eds.).Studies in the Theory of Imperialism.1972. M.Barrat-Brown,
The Economics of Imperialism. 1974, and V.G.Kiernan, Marxism and
Imperialism. 1974.

5

6
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Notably, C.Wilson, The Economic Role and Mainsprings of
Imperialism, in P.Duignan and L.H.Gann.(eds).Colonialism in
Africa.1870-1960. Vol 4 : The Economics of Colonialism. 1975.
For extensions of this view see L.H.Gann, White Settlers in
Tropical Africa, 1962, and M.P.K.Sorrenson, Origins of European
Settlement in Kenya.1968.

CHAPTER THREE
1

Attributed, at least from the Swazi side, to a dream of Sobhuza 1
in which dire consequences were predicted for the shedding of
white blood (Matsebula,1972).

2

A.Atmore and S.Marks, The Imperial Factor in South Africa :
Towards a Reassessment, in E.F.Penrose.(ed.).European Imperialism
and the Partition of Africa. 1975, present a convincing argument
for the paramountcy of British capital interests in determining
the direction of British colonial policy in South Africa at this
time. But for the aims of the South African Republic, see N.G.
Garson, The Swaziland Question and the Road to the Sea.1887-1895.
1955.

3

In 1881, Article 24 : "The independence of the Swazies within the
boundaries of Swaziland, as indicated in the first Article of this
Convention, will be fully recognised." This was made more explicit
in 1884,Article 1 : "The independence of the Swazies,as recognised
by the Convention of 1881, is confirmed, and no inroad on that
independence shall be allowed without the consent of both her
Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African
Republ c." (See c.2998,3914, Appendix lb).

4

See A.N.Boyce, The Swaziland Concessions and their Political
Consequences,1876-1908, 1947, and R.W.F.Drooglever, The Role
Of Offy Shepstone in Swaziland.1886-1895. 1976. Mr. A.N.Boyce,
of Johannesburg,S.A., kindly loaned a copy of his work for
personal study. Nyeko(1976) was unable to trace a copy in any
South African library.

5

In 1887, Mbandzeni refused to sign a document of cession
presented by a Boer commando, despite its presentation under
false pretences as a mining concession (C 5089 Appendix lb).

6

Drooglever, op.cit.. shows that the Swazi Resident Adviser,
T.Shepstone, was on the payroll of the South African Republic
when the concessions were granted.
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7

Details are carried in c 5089 (Appendix lb).

8

Knutsford to Salisbury,28.1.1889,9.6.1889,9.6.1889 (c.5089).

9

c.5089.

10

c.6200,pp 65-75.

11

c.6200,Introduction. The Commission consisted of Sir.Francis
De Winton,D.J.Esselen,Capt.Baden-Powell(later founder of Boy
Scouts),Colonel R.S.R.Martin,General Smit,General Joubert.

12

De Winton's Report,c.6200.

13

The administrative problems encountered during the period of
dual control (Aug.1890 to Nov.1893) are discussed in C.7212
(pp 1 - 166).

14

Paul Kruger in an interview with The Times Of London.8.9.1892.
Reported in Boyce, op.cit.

15

The influence of capitalists Rhodes and Hoffmeyr in negotiations
is elucidated in R.Robinson & J.Gallagher.Africa And The
Victorians.1961.I.R.Phimister.Rhodes.Rhodesia and The Rand,
Journal of Southern African Studies 1:1,1974,and J.S.Galbraith,
Cecil Rhodes And His "Cosmic Dreams" : A Reassessment.Journal
Of Imperial and Commonwealth History.1.1973.

16

The 1893 Convention proved an embarrassment to both states.
It gave the Republic leave to annex Swaziland on the condition
of Swazi consent. Not only was Swazi consent unobtainable
but the Swazi sent a delegation to London to protest the
transfer. The 1894 Convention unilaterally waived this
condition. See B.Nyeko,Pre-nationalist Resistance To Colonial
Rule : Swaziland On The Eve Of The Imposition Of British
Administration.1890-1902.Trans-African gournal of History.5:2.1976.
The 1894 Convention contained the following articles;
Article 11 Without the incorporation of Swaziland into the
South African Republic,the government of the Republic shall have
and be secured in all rights and powers of protection,legislation,
jurisdiction and administration over Swaziland.
Article Vll All British subjects residing in Swaziland,or having
in Swaziland any property,grant,privilege or concession,or any
right to,title to,or interest in,any property,grant,privilege or
concession shall be secured in the future enjoyment of all their
rights and privileges of whatsoever nature and kind.
Article Xlll The Government of the South African Republic
withdraws all claim to extend the territory of the Republic,or to
enter into any treaties with any native or native tribes to the
north or north-west of the existing boundary of the Republic,and
undertakes to aid and support by its favouring influence the
establishment of order and government in those territories
ruled by the British South Africa Co. within the limits of power
and territory set forth in the charter granted by Her Majesty
to the Company.
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17

Natal Witness. Special Report on Swaziland,11.5.1887, (c.5089).

18

See C.C.Watts.Dawn In Swaziland.1922.

19

Population statistics are from the De Winton report (c.6200).

20

Times of Swaziland,21.11.1908. The d 12,000 p.a. was payment
to the Swazi by the South African Republic for possession of
the Private Revenue Concession. This concession permitted the
holder to collect all concession rentals and dues for a payment
of ptl2,000 p.a. to the Swazi.

21

Both states agreed to invalidate concessions granted after the
death of Mbandzeni on 13.9.1890 (article 5, 1890 Convention).

22

83 concessions contain this guarantee in explicit form ( see
Rubie's report,Appendix lb).

23

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1909.

24

The majority of concessions were granted during the terms of
office of T.Shepstone and A.Miller. Both acquired extensive
personal interests and Shepstone was a witnessing signatory
to over 150 concessions. An agreement with the Swazi gave
him 50% of the income of the country for a period (£ 19,000)
and it was thus in his interest for there to be a liberal
granting of concessions. Drooglever.op.cit.. notes that this
enabled him to pay off extensive personal debts acquired
outside Swaziland.

25 Mbandzeni to a meeting of concessionaires,1887 (c.5089).
25a For contemporary co-option strategies of capital see Friedman(1972).
26 De Winton Report conclusions (c.6200). S.Trapido,The South African
Republic : Class Formation and the State; 1850-1900. University
of London ,1971, incidently, presents a convincing case for
the early commitment of the Boer to surplus extraction from
black labour.
27

De Winton Report conclusions (c.6200).

28

See c.6217.

29

On the death of Mbandzeni the Swazi were ruled by the Queen
Regent,Labotsibeni,until Bhunu came to power in 1894.
In the 1890 Convention(Article 2h), the Swazi nation were asked
to prepare a list of concessions it approved of for the court.
Shepstone prepared the list and obtained proclamations from
the Swazi authorising the court and giving it the power to
verify concessions not on the approved list. 352 out of 364
concessions were legally confirmed. The Queen Regent ineffectually
protested in 1894 that she was not a party to the proclamations
nor the approved list and that she was unaware of the sitting
of the court (see c.7611).

30

Colonial Secretary to Sir H.B.Loch(High Commissioner),1.12.1892,
c.7212.
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See Times of Swaziland.4.10.1907.for mention of this scheme
in an obituary to N.H.Cohen.

32

Government Committe Report,1894,c.7611.

33

See A.M.Miller.Swaziland.1900

34

The following corporate interests all ;petitioned the Colonial
Office around this time; Umbandine Concessions Syndicate,
Acton's Swaziland Concession,Bird's Swaziland Concession,
Havelock Gold Mining & Exploration Co. and the Chambers of
Commerce in London,Glasgow,Leeds and Birmingham. The letters,
petitions,etc. are published in c.7611.
Ripon's enigmatic response to these petitions was, " I do not
attach much importance to their opinion....knowing how they
are manufactured", Ripon to Roseberry,4.9.1894, reported in
Robinson and Gallagher.op.cit.p 414.

35

A.M.Miller.op.cit.

CHAPTER FOUR
1

This confusion is highlighted by an extract from the Privy
Council Appeal hearing of 1926 in the case "Sobhuza 11 v
A.M.Miller" :
Viscount Haldane : Is your proposition that we annexed Swaziland?
Attorney-General : Not so as to make it part of our dominions
but for all practical purposes,so far as jurisdiction is concerned,
yes.
Viscount Haldane : I do not know what you mean by that; either
it became part of our dominions or it did not.
Attorney-General : It did not ; it became part of our protectorates.
Viscount Haldane : What do you mean,that we intruded into an alien
country and went there and established ourselves like the
Barbarians used to do and dominated the place ?
Attorney-General : I do not like the analogy of the Barbarians;
but we in effect assumed a jurisdiction which has been acted
upon and submitted to by the native population and I submit that
in all but name we are sovereign there;we have many of the attribute
of sovereignty.

2

In practice, Selborne as Governor of the Transvaal in 1906
became Governor-General and High Commissioner. Thus control
was vested respectively in Milner (1903-5),Selborne (1905-10)
and Gladstone (1910-14).

3

Colonial Secretaries during this period were Lyttleton(1903-5),
Elgin (1905-8) and Crewe (1908-10).

4

Enraght-Moony (1903-7) and Coryndon (1907-16) were Resident
Commissioners in Swaziland.
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5

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 3 of 1904.

6

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 28 of 1907

7

Crown land in the Swaziland case was land once owned by the
South African Republic which became Crown property on the
transfer of Swaziland to the Britain. It also comprised land
which was not granted by Mbandzeni to concessionaires.

8

Selborne to Grey (Confidential),1907, Bodleian Library (B.L.)
MS.Selborne 71.

9

High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908 and No 53 of 1909.

10

Swaziland Corporation.Swaziland and The Swaziland Corporation.1903.

11

In all ,£350,000 (110,000 oz.) of gold was recovered, primarily
on the Forbes Reef Concession. But only one dividend was
reportedly paid by the companies i.e. /10,000 by the Forbes
Reef Gold Mining Co. ( Killie Campbell Library (K.C.L. MS.MIL.
1.08.11).

12

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a.

13

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a.

14

Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1906 to 1910. The total
wage bill in 1906 was ,£18,000 or a mere /1.10s per worker per
month.

15

K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a. See also Swaziland Annual Colonial
Report,1911.

16

Times Of Swaziland.18.5.1907.

17

Miller,1900, op.cit.

18

Swaziland Corporation,1903, op.cit.

19

Swaziland Mining,Commerce & Industrial Chamber, Swaziland.
California Of South Africa.1907.

20

Swaziland Corporation Annual Report,1907, K.C.L.MS MIL 1.08.3
MS 191a.

21

A.C.G.Best.The Swaziland Railway.A Study In Politico-Economic
Geography.1965.advances some possible reasons for the failure
of this scheme. These include a new government in Britain,
Portugese interference and political pressure by the Natal
Government. True to the general tenor of the work the reasons
advanced are primarily political ones.

22

K.C.L. MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a. There is no suggestion of how
it was intended to popularise the work. Certainly the proposed
wage of 20/- per month .would hardly appear to be sufficient
incentive. The optimism must be directly attributed to the
imposition by the British colonial state of a tax of 40/- per
male head in 1903. This was ostensibly to generate income for
the administration(in 1906,80% of Government revenue) but served
the purpose of forcing Swazi to accept wage-employment.
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23

Selborne to Maydon (Confidential),3.4.1906,B.L. MS Selborne Box 170,

24

Chamber of Mining,Commerce & Industry,1907, op.cit.. The Chamber
planned to instigate a scheme to sell 2000 acre Highveld
blocks at 10/- per acre, 300-500 acre Middeleveld blocks at
20/- per acre, and 1000 acre Lowveld blocks at 20/- per acre.
The speculation implicit in these proposed selling prices is
worthy of note. In 1907 the Swaziland Concessions commission
evaluated Highveld land and Middleveld land at 4/- per acre
and Lowveld land at 2/- per acre.

25

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1907.

26

Jones,1968.op.cit.

27

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1906.

28

Swaziland Chamber Of Mining,Commerce & Industry.1907.op.cit.

29

Times Of Swaziland.21.10.1905 and 28.10.1905.

30

High Commissioner's Notice No 10 of 1908.

31

Milner was also considered an ally of capital interests in
Kenya around this time (Personal communication from Dr R.
Bullock,University of Waterloo).

32

A.R.Booth,Lord Selborne and The British Protectorates,
Journal Of African History.10:1.1969. and D.E.Boyce & J.O.Stubbs,
F.S.Oliver,Lord Selborne and Federalism.Journal Of Imperial And
Commonwealth History.5:1.1976. are recent works on the work
of Selborne in South Africa, Both mention that there is no
biography in existence.

33

Booth.1969.op.cit. points out that Selborne had a greater
liking for the Basotho but even here paternalism was his
hallmark.

34

Selborne to a delegation of farmers,March 1907,Swaziland National
Archives (S.N.A.) 45/07/140.

35

Selborne to Grey (Confidential),10.10.1908, S.N.A. D09/2.

36

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),30.3.1908,quoted by Booth,1969,
op.cit.,p 137.

37

Personal communication from C.Youe,March 1978.

38

Rhodes House Library (R.H.L.) MSS Afr S 633 Box 10 File 1.

39

It is possible that a further motive in encouraging capital
was to increase revenue for the state, though this is
undocumented.
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40

Rubie's Report (Appendix lb),Sections 26-46. In ascertaining
pre War value speculative val ue and the capital of joint
stock company owners was ignored, The procedure was to ascertain
the annual value of the rights to the holder,to capitalise such
value for the remainder of the term of the concession at 6% p.a..

41

Rubie's Report,1903 (Appendix lb).

42

Swaziland Concessions Commission : Report On The Expropriation
Of Monopolies,1906 (Appendix lb). See also Times Of Swaziland.
11.2.1905 to 13.5.1905.

43

The history of the Corporation is apertinent one. Concessions
obtained in the 1880's by J.Thorburn and A.M.Miller were
floated into a Company in London on 29.5.1891, under the name
of the Umbandine Concessions Syndicate, witha share capital
of ,£50,000. This syndicate acquired sundry other concessions
and in 1898 parted with its interest to a new company,the
Swaziland Corporation Ltd., with a capital of «£ 3,000,000.
In 1908 there were 850 British shareholders. A.M.Miller was
the Swaziland Manager, responsible to a London Board of
Directors . Source : Swaziland Corporation.1903.op.cit.

44

Almost simultaneously Milner had declined to receive any
representation from the Swazi except through the Resident
Commissioner, Milner to Moony (Confidential),30.1.1905,SNA J190/05.

45

Directors of the Swaziland Corporation to Selborne (Confidential),
21.2.1907, SNA J 120/06.

46

Swaziland Corporation.1903.op.cit.

47

Elgin to Directors of Swaziland Corporation (Confidential),
25.5.1907 (SNA J120/06). See Times of Swaziland.21.11.1908.
for the Corporation view.

48

J.Marlowe.Milner:Apostle of Empire.1976 traces Milner's growing
disenchantment with British policy towards the place of South
Africa in the Empire which eventually led to his resignation
with a Liberal government coming to power in 1905.
Swaziland Concessions Commission to Selborne,(Confidential),
7.7.1905 (SNA J 190/o5) and Honey to Miller (Confidential),
18.7.1905 (SNA J190/05).

49

50

Miller to Honey (Confidential),20.10.1905 (SNA J190/05).

51

Directors of Swaziland Corporation to Selborne,21.2.1907
Colonial Secretary to Swaziland Corporation(London),23. 3.1907
Selborne to Swaziland Concessions Commission,17.1.1908
(SNA 45/07/2129).

52

Miller to Honey (Confidential),3.2.1908.
Miller to Coryndon (Confidential),5.2.1908

SNA 45/07/2129.
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53

Swaziland Concessions Commission: Report Of Details,1908.

54

Colonial Secretary to Selborne (Confidential),7.12.1907
Selborne to Coryndon (Confidential),12.12.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129).

55

Selborne to Commission,11.12.1907, SNA 45/07/2129.

56

High Commissioner's Notice No 10 of 1908.

57

Times Of Swaziland.21.11.1908. The difference between the two
evaluations is explicable in that the Commission took the
lapsed concessions clause to mean concessions lapsing within
one year of the grant of the concession ; patently not what
the holders had in mind.

58

Rodwell to Miller,19.9.1908, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 229.

59

Times Of Swaziland.21.11.1908.reports the final acceptance
of the Corporation's shareholders.

60

Coryndon to Miller (Confidential),12.10.1908, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3
MS 281a. In 1909 Coryndon made an arrangement with the
Corporation to exchange Corporation land in the Lubombo Mts.
for crown land near Mbabane :
"It is proposed that an arrangement be made for the mutual
benefit of the Corporation and Government"(Coryndon,SNA D09/65a).

61

Swaziland Corporation Annual Report,1909,KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a.

62

Times of Swaziland.21.11.1908.

63

Elgin to Selborne (Confidential),7.12.1907,SNA 45/07/2129.

64

Swaziland Concessions Commission :Report Of Detailed Decisions,
1908 (Appendix lb). See below 64 (Cont.).

65

Swaziland Concessions Commission.1908.op.cit.. R.Palmer.Land And
Racial Domination in Rhodesia.1977.shows how large land grants
during the period of British South Africa Company rule proved
a considerable hindrance to agricultural development in the
early years of this century.

64 (Cont.) The Report notes that Miller's duties as Agent & Adviser
were to protect the King's interest"a duty which was apparently
ill-discharged'.' At the time of the grant there was no evidence
to prove Miller was interested in it. But 6 weeks later he
acquired a 1/3 interest in it and for his interest he received
1000 shares on the flotation of the Umbandine Concession Syndicate,
of which he later became Manager.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1

Rubie's report.op.cit..Section 71.

2

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),14.5.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163.

3

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 3 of 1904.

4

As it was the total cost of the settlement of the concessions
question was/171,000 (Annual Colonial Report,1910)

5

See Selborne's correspondence with Elgin in BL MS Selborne Box 163.
On 17.7.1906 Selborne was empowered by the Colonial Office to
make and implement all decisions to resolve the land question.

6

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),17.11.1906. Elgin approved
Selborne's idea of a partition on 28.2.1907 in a telegram and
30.3.1907 by letter, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

7

Selborne to Elgin,(Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163.

8

Chamber of Mining,Commerce and Industry to Selborne (Confidential),
29.9.1906, on the outcome of discussions between Selborne,
Coryndon and Chamber representatives including A.M.Miller
(SNA J 205/06). The Times of Swaziland.15.9.1906.contains
details of the meeting. White evidence included testimonies
to "native interference" which had "ruined farming operations".

9

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163.

10 Quoted in the Morning Star.2.2.1905.
11 On his visit to Swaziland Selborne was treated to two stories
of how veld fires "started by natives" had ruined two farmers,
Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163.
12 Ermelo farmers to Selborne,19.12.1906, SNA J205/06.
13 D.Forbes to Selborne,20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.
14 D.Forbes to Selborne,20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.
15 Selborne to Elgin(Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163.
16 Selborne to Elgin(Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163.
In a reference to the Zulu 'uprising' of 1906 Selborne saw it
as related to the question of land in Natal and feared that a
native war in Swaziland might eventuate if the plans were pushed
through to partition. For an excellent study of the Zulu protest
see S.Marks.Reluctant Rebellion : The 1906-8 Disturbances In
Natal.1970.
17 Times Of Swaziland.7.10.1905.
18 Times Of Swaziland.23.12.1905.
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19

Times Of Swaziland.21.10.1905

20

No maps of the concessions they partitioned could be located.
It is believed that one was to the north-east of Mbabane and
the other in the Lebombo Mts. On the former they demarcated
four parcels for the Swazi and on the latter,three.

21

Times Of Swaziland.7.10.1905. Also, "Swaziland Crisis" (Times Of
Swaziland.21.10.1905) reports a meeting of Transvaal interest
holders and an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber. "Unanimous
Meeting in South Swaziland"(Times of Swaziland.28.10.1905) reports
a meeting of southern interest-holders pledging support for the
Chamber. Also, a statement by W.Penfold(Local Manager,Henderson
Consolidated Corporation) in Times of Swaziland.1.7.1905. and
an editorial comment entitled "The Settlement" in Times of
Swaziland.7.10.1905. At "Meeting in Pretoria Between Commission
and Concessionaires".Times of Swaziland.23.12.1905 and 16.12.1905,
a memorandum from the Chamber was presented and many unanimous
protests voiced. On 20.1.1906 a deputation visited Selborne.

22

Times of Swaziland.21.10.1905.

23

A.M.Miller at a meeting with the Commission (Times of Swaziland.
23.12.1905.

24

Times Of Swaziland.21.10.1905.

25

Chamber of Mining,Commerce & Industry to Selborne,20.9.1906,
SNA J 205/06).

26

The desire of the whites for locations on the peripheries of
their farms was not confined to Swaziland. See for instance,
R.Palmer.Land and Racial Domination In Rhodesia.1977. and
B.Pachai,Land Policies in Malawi : An Examination Of The
Colonial Legacy.Journal Of African History.14:4.1973.

27

Meeting between Selborne and the Chamber (SNA J 205/06).

28

SNA 45/07/1464.

29

Swaziland Corporation Annual Report,1908 (KCL MS.MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a)

30

SNA 45/07/1464.

31

Times Of Swaziland.18.5.1907.

32

In a meeting with Coryndon in June 1907,however, the Regent
denied that she had made any such offer (SNA 45/07/640).Yet
in meeting with Elgin in London in December 1907 a member of
the delegation,Josiah Vilikazi,maintained the Swazi would be
content if they were given two thirds of the land surface.

33

Times Of Swaziland.10.8.1906.

34

Selborne to Smuts (Confidential),6.1.1908,SNA D09/2. An original
copy of this memorandum is in the private papers of Mr Sidney
Williams,Manzini,Swaziland. It was also published in the Times
of Swaziland.12.10.1907.
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35

Forbes to Selborne,20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

36

Elgin to Swaziland deputation,December 1907,BL MS Selborne Box
163 f 157. Yet as Elgin wrote to Selborne afterwards no
concessions were intended to the Swazi and none were made.
"I think you will admit that I gave them no ghost of a
chance for hoping the decision would be reversed...we shall
do all we can to ship them off. I hope the result will
strengthen your hands", quoted in R.Hyam.Elgin and Churchill
At The Colonial Office.1905-8.1968.p 385. Matsebula's
interpretation that this was a definite promise is therefore
open to question. See J.S.M.Matsebula.A History Of Swaziland.1972.
p 138 (1976 edition).

37

Coryndon to Swazi Chiefs at a meeting,7.3.1908 (SNA 45/07/640).

38

Selborne's Partition instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163.

39

BL MS Selborne Box 163.

40

Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1910-1926.

41

A further 37,000 acres were purchased from private interests
for this scheme. As early as 1909 Selborne appears to have
been involved in the financing of this settlement scheme in
Swaziland. Thus even while Coryndon was attempting to pacify
the Swazi with promises of a larger proportion of the land
surface (37), Selborne wrote to him privately with:
"I do not consider myself prohibited from putting a white
man on any crown land which may become available" (23.11.1907,
SNA 45/07/640). The extent of Selborne's involvement is
unfortunately not admitted or articulated. Indeed it was not
until the 1930's that his role was even openly admitted. A.Miller
also appears to have had a major role in the scheme though even
he was careful to dissociate himself from it publicly.
In 1912, the Swaziland Development and Ranching Co.,another
company in which A.Miller had extensive personal interests,
bought 84,000 acres of crown land and 87,000 acres of private
land. A further 100,000 acres was purchased in 1917 (KCL MS MIL
1.08.47 MS 725a).

42

Selborne to Grey (Confidential),10.10.1908,SNA D09/2.

43

Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 15.10.1908,SNA D09/2.

44

Grey was a close contact of Selborne and prioe to his Swaziland
commission was General Manager of Katanga Mines from 1901-6. This
commission appears to have been an attempt by Selborne to
introduce Grey into the colonial service (Selborne to Grey, BL
MS Selborne Box 71). In a letter to the Colonial Secretary
Sept.,1908, (BL MS Selborne Box 71) Selborne writes of his
appointment of Grey and also suggests the possibility of Grey
entering the colonial service in Swaziland.
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44 (Cont.) R.T.Coryndon.Some Account Of George Grey and His Work
in Africa.1914.describes Grey's fieldwork :
"Armed with district maps,cut up into sheets suitable for use
on horseback, he covered without haste the whole area of the
country in a close examination of the character of soil and
density of native population. He told me there were few large
valleys upon which his eyes had not rested, and few dominant
mountains from the. top of which he had not searched out the
native kraals,the cultivated lands and the concession boundaries.
The examination caused him to mark on his maps almost every
kraal in the whole territory, and his acquaintance with every
corner was so close that it no doubt enabled him to arrange
an acceptable solution".
That only one Commissioner was appointed by Selborne was to
hasten the partition process and to minimise colonial expenditure
Times of Swaziland.12.10.1907.
45 High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908,Grey's Official Report,
Section 6.
46 High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908,Grey's Official Report,
Section 6.
47 Selborne's Partition instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163.
48 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908 (SNA D09/2).
49 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),3.5.1908 ( SNA D09/2).
50 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908 (SNA D09/2).See
Chapter 6 for a discussion of Swazi uncooperativeness. Grey
reports a correspondence in which Coryndon tried,without success
to persuade the Regent to order the chiefs to assist Grey.
51 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 34 (SNAD09/2).
52 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 36 (SNA D09/2).
53 Times of Swaziland.21.11.1908
54 Typed copies of these notes,covering about 60% of the country,
are to be found in SNA D09/2. These notes were sent to Selborne
direct.
55 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),18.2.1908 (SNA D 09/2). In the
final partition exactly 1/3 was deducted from 62 concessions,
more than 1/3 from 51 concessions and less than 1/3 from 68
concessions. Thirty two compensation schemes were devised by
Grey (High Commissioner's Proclamation No 15 of 1909).
56 Selborne to Grey (Confidential),16.11.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129).
57 SNA 45/07/1464.
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58

For instance :
"The chief object of the reserves is not to compel all natives
to go into these areas but to move of their own free will.As
a rule natives make little use of these reserves. The native
chooses his Master and looks up to him for help,advice and
protection" (Selborne, SNA 45/07/1464)
and,
"It is likely that most farmers will try to keep the natives
they have on their land" (Grey,SNA D09/2)

59

Selborne to Grey (Confidential),16.11.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129)

60

At the time of writing it had proved impossible to trace the
whereabouts of either the originals or copies of these maps.
High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908 mentions them as
on a scale of 1 inch : 1 mile.
There is reason to suppose that all or a number of these maps
are to be found in File J 53/06 in the Swaziland National Archives.
This particular file was missing from the shelves.

61

Grey to Selborne,13.2.1908 (SNA D09/2).

62

High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908,Grey's Official Report.

63

Selborne's Partition Instructions to Grey,BL MS Selborne Box 163.

64

SNA D09/2.

65

The map from which this data was extracted from a map made in
the Surveyor General's Office,Pretoria,1914. The Swaziland
National Museum recently acquired an original map from S.B.Williams
and the Swaziland National Archives has a photstat copy of the
map.

66

Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 35 (SNAD09/2).

67

Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 26 (SNA D09/2).

68

Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 31 (SNA Do9/2).

69

Enraght-Moony to Selborne,8.9.1906 BL MS Selborne Box 163.

70

R.T.Coryndon.op.cit.. p 8.

CHAPTER SIX
1

B.Nyeko,Pre Nationalist Resisitance to Colonial Ru^e.Trans-African
Journal of History.5:2. traces the rise and consolidation in
power of the Queen Regent,Labotsibeni.

2

Swazi Petition to Milner,30.12.1904,to protest the 1904 Proc.
(SNA J 138/05). White and black legal advisers,Parsonson,Bremer
and Seme. ,were employed to draft petitions for the Swazi.
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3

Swazi Petition to Milner,30.12.1904, SNA J 138/05.

4

Sir Francis Hopwood to 1907 Delegation to Britain, December 1907,
SNA 45/07/640.

5

The attitude of the colonial state to the 1890 Concessions
Court was largely a matter of convenience. In cancelling the
industrial monopolies the function of the Court was minimised,
but in dealings with the Swazi it was always used as an
immutable legal tribunal with far-reaching powers of concession
confirmation.

6

RHL MSS Afr S 633 Box 10 fl.

7

Malunge to Elgin,21.11.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

8

Queen Regent to Coryndon,7.3.1908, SNA 45/07/640.

9

J.S.M.Matsebula.A History Of Swaziland.1972. reveals that this
view is still held by contemporary Swazi. In conversation with
Matsebula, the author claimed that the payments made to the
King were interpreted as traditional forms of tribute to the
monarch.

10

Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,SNA D09/2. Swazis
were later given leave to appeal against any of the partition
details. A mere 34 appeals were made through District
Commissioner's, a function of Swazi dissatisfaction with the
partition as a whole. 90% of these were rejected anyway by
Grey ( SNA 45/07/140).

11

Selborne to Swazi Delegation,1905,BL MS Selborne Box 163 f 157.

12

These perceptive comments are hopefully also a rebuke to
Mashasha.op.cit..1973. for his acceptance of colonial policy
at its face value. (SNA 45/07/640).

13

SNA RCS 379/14. Also,High Commissioner's Proclamation No 24 of
1913.

14

Times of Swaziland.12.10.1907. This ploy to give added weight
to locally-made decisions was often used in dealings with the
Swazi.

15

Coryndon to Selborne (Confidential),6.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

16

Selborne to Elgin,17.8.1907,SNA 45/07/640. The failure of
the delegation to obtain any concessions from the colonial
state was pre-supposed. Selborne's private view of the Regent
was less charitable. The Swazi were not supposed to protest
actions of the colonial state undertaken in their supposed
best interests : "These are the whims and intrigues of an
autocrat who is intemperantly selfish and ambitious and has
frequently exhibited a dangerous credulity for the advice of
irresponsible and unsrupulous adventurers"(Selborne to Coryndon,
6.6.1907,SNA 45/07/640). Swazi tradition attributes guite a
different character to the Regent,Matsebula,op^cit..
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17

Coryndon's proposal is in RHL MS Afr S 633 Box 10. The
Swaziland National Archives contains a file of intercepted
correspondence between the Regent and Parsonson,a Pietermaritzburg attorney.

18

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

19

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

20

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

21

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),28.8.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

22

Coryndon to Queen Regent,16.9.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

23

Selborne to Elgin (confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

24

Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),28.8.1907,SNA 45/07/640.

25

The delegation was also granted an audience with King Edward.
A prepared statement of allegiance was read. The delegation
attempted to express their grievances direct to the King but
Marwick,the translator,refused to translate under orders from
Elgin , SNA 45/07/640,Marwick memorandum on the 1907 Delegation.

26

Marwick memorandum,SNA 45/07/640.

27

Queen Regent to Coryndon,7.3.1908,SNA 45/07/640.

28

Queen Regent to Coryndon in retrospect,16.6.1914,SNA RCS 375/14.

29

Within a short period the numbers of Swazi employed in the
South African mining industry rose dramatically,but tapered
off after 1914 (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1909-1930).

30

Loans were sought from the National Bank of Africa (c^30,000)
and the Standard Bank (</l00,000). The Banks were discouraged
by the colonial state from making the loans.

31

Seme to Coryndon,16.6.1914,SNA RCS 375/14.

32

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 2 of 1915. Land was
bought from two whites,Torrens and Du Pont,who had themselves
apparently bought it from the crown. Some speculation is
therefore postulated though there is no apparent evidence.
C.P.Youe.Imperial Land Policy In Swaziland and The African
Response.1977. writes that the colonial state allowed this
transaction as an appeasement exercise.

33

Miller to Coryndon,30.4.1914,KCL MS MIL 1.08.47 MS 725b.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
1

The number of whites involved in agriculture was 533 in 1921
and only 570 in 1936 (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1921,1936).
P.M.Mutibwa,White Settlers In Uganda:The Era of Hope And
Disillusionment.1905-23.Trans African Journal Of History.5:2.1976.
examines a similair process in Uganda though attributing it
to different reasons.

2

For instance,the Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme,which never
managed to attract the numbers of settlers solicited. The
Swaziland Corporation was also unable to attract settlers for
its holdings.
In 1960 there was no cultivation at all on 42% of landholdings
and 40% of all holdings were owned by absentee landlords. The
large proportion of externally-held land can be in one sense
attributed to speculation by South Africans in the post war
period of rising land prices.

3

The Swaziland National Archives carry a full set of European
Advisory Council minutes from its inception in 1924 until 1964.
Examination of these records would undoubtedly show the impact
of the petit-colon on local colonial policy throughout the
colonial period. For instance,on several occasions a tax on
unutilised land was proposed by the colonial state,opposed by
the petit-colon and subsequently dropped. M.P.K.Sorrenson,
Origins Of European Settlement In Kenya.1968.is a good study
of the petit-colon impact on Kenyan policy.

4

The loan fund was instituted by High Commissioner's Proclamation
No 36 of 1929 as the Agricultural Development and Loan
Fund Act. Between 1929-37,.* 30,000 was loaned to whites at
easy interest rates for fencing,boring and land purchase
mortgages. Grants in Aid amounted to ^300,000 between 1928-38
but even as late as 1932,tax on blacks was still generating
40% of colonial administrative income (Swaziland Annual Colonial
Reports,1927-39).

5

The question of transfer has been treated in detail by works
such as F.A.Hoernle,Native Opinion and The Transfer Of The
Protectorates.African Observer.2:2.1934. L.Curtis and M.Perham,
The Protectorates Of Southern Africa : The Question Of Their
Transfer To The Union.1935.R.C.Fitzgerald.South Africa And The
High Commission Territories.World Affairs.4.1950. and
W.E.Barker,South Africa's Six Point Claim To The Protectorates,
Race Relations Journal.23:1.1956.

6

See the work of T.J.D.Fair on the South African space economy;
For instance.T.J.D.Fair.Polarisation.Dispersion and
Decentralisation In The South African Space Economy.1975.

7

Hertzog to Secretary of State,25.4.1934,in H.M.S.O..Basutoland
The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.1952.p 46.

8

No stock of weight less than 8001bs was allowed entry to the
South African market. The major colon ranching enterprise,
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the Swaziland Ranching and Development Corporation (Capital:
^170,000) in which the ubiquitous A.M.Miller was a major
shareholder,controlled 200,000 acres of land and built up
large herds in the early 1920's by importing stock. The Company
went into liquidation in 1928 as a direct result of the Union
embargo (KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 268).
9

National Development Plans were first instituted in 1946 and
appeared at regular intervals for the remainder of the colonial
period. The commitment of the colonial state to encouraging
British multi-national capital in Swaziland is clear from
these plans and is re-iterated in the reports of various
economic survey missions.See V.Liversage.Swaziland Development.
H.M.S.O.,1948, A.Symon.Economic and Financial Report On The
High Commission Territories.H.M.S.O..1954 and sections on
Swaziland in colonial economic reports of 1951,1960,and 1965.

10

The role of the Colonial Development Corporation is appraised
by A.R.Kendrick.The Role Of The C.D.C. In Project Formulation
And Implementation In Swaziland,in J.Barrat (ed).Strategy For
Development.1976. and by several propaganda publications of
the C.D.C. (particularly.Notes In Explaining The Corporation's
Work In Helping The Countries Of THe Developing World To Raise
Their Standards Of Living.1976).Multi-national Corporation
activities in Africa are considered in Langdon(1975),Widstrand(1975
There is no indication who the land was purchased from but
a large proportion is believed to have belonged to South
African absentee landowners,and possibly speculators.

11

12

For foreign capital,the construction of company towns with
sharp black-white urban morphology (Mhlambanyati,Bunya,
Mhlume and Big Bend) and the 1965 Railway to export iron ore,
pulp and sugar.
In 1945,40.3% of colonial state expenditure was on agriculture
and only 5.6% on urban infrastructure. By 1963, the position
was reversed (11.1% and 76.5% respectively).Swaziland Annual
Colonial Reports,1945,1963.
In 1936 700 Swazi were employed in mining and 2900 in white
agriculture. In 1970 foreign capital controlled a Swazi labour
force of over 25,000.

13

C.P.Potholm.Political Development In Swaziland.1960-5.1967

14

For the texts of these petitions see SNA 45/07/640. Matsebula,
op.cit..1972.P 177-8(1976 ed.) documents the 1958 petition
and the colonial response.
The Swazi National Archives library carries a detailed account
of the proceedings of the Privy Council Appeal(No 158 of 1924)
in the case of A.M.Miller and the Swaziland Corporation v.
Sobhuza 11. Detailed comment on the appeal is carried in,
The British Protectorates and The Privy Council.Calcutta Weekly
Notes.30:41.1926.

15

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1934.

16

V.Liversage.op.cit..1948. See also Appendix 4c for a comparison
between 1946 population and stock figures on reserves with
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Grey's carrying capacity estimates made in 1909.
17

Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1936.

18

High Commissioner's Proclamation No 2 of 1946.

19

The implementation of the Native Land Settlement Scheme is
covered in the Reports Of The Native Land Settlement Dept.
(1946-54).

20

G.Whittington and J.Daniel,Problems Of Land Tenure and
Ownership in Swaziland, in M.F.Thomas and G.Whittington (eds),
Environment and Land Use In Africa.1969. comment that former
Land Settlement Areas show no obvious differences in appearance
or organisation from longstanding Swazi areas.

21

Sir Evelyn Baring,Resident Commissioner, meetings with Sobhuza 11
(July 1945) in SNA File 1018.

22

Sir Evelyn Baring to Colonial Office,Feb.1946,SNA File 1018.

23

Speculation was rife around this time by landowners,resident
and absentee.

24

It was not possible to confirm or deny the supposed
mismanagement of LIFA funds suggested by some informants.

25

From.Secret Meetings Of A Special Session Of The 3rd European
Advisory Council of Swaziland.1953. The quotation is a
compilation of comments from C.TodcKa),J.Murphy(b) & R.Stephens(c),
all of whom were later senators in the first independent
Swaziland Government.

26

The colonial agricultural officials desired the culling of the
poorest stock in herds whereas the Swazi, for whom quality is
traditionally a side issue,wanted to sell the stock that
fetched higher market prices, SNA File 1018.

27

Times of Swaziland.February 1968.

28

For the importance of this in other contexts see B.J.Berman,
Clientelism and Neo-Colonialism : Centre Periphery Relations
and Political Developments In African States.Studies in
Comparative International Development,9:2,1974, and C.Leys,
Underdevelopment in Kenya : The Political Economy Of
Neo Colonialism.1975.

29

The market value of land quickly fell to ]0% of that for
similair quality land in the Transvaal.

30

Personal communication,Ministry of Agriculture official.
King Sobhuza,
Times of London. Special Report on Swaziland,October 1976.

31
32

See 1st and 2nd National Development Programmes (1968-78).
Jones (1977) suggests that a land grant claim by the Swazi was
supported by the petit-colon who preferred the prospect of being
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33

bought out than having their land confiscated. That there has not
been a general expropriation of land is attributed to the influence
of the settler&the desire to retain foreign capital.
The land question was invariably central to the Pan Africanist
rhetoric during this period. Nationalisation of all land holding
and the restoration of traditional Swazi rights was an oftreiterated policy of the opposition N.N.L.C. party until its
banning in 1973. The policy of accepting British funds for
land repurchase was particularly attacked. See Ngwane Forum.12:11,
1972, and Kusile Ngwane.1:3.1968.

34

R.P.Stephens , currently Minister of Finance, was once general
manager of Peak Timbers and is a powerful advocate of petit-colon
and foreign capital interests. Two other senators, the late
C.Todd amd J.S.Murphy, held extensive landed interests in
Swaziland.

35

M.Franssman, University of Sussex, is researching for a doctorate
on this period of Swaziland's history. Other workers in the
field of Swaziland's history are B.Nyeko of Makerere University
and F.Mashasha of the University of Oxford.
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APPENDIX ONE

A. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS
B. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS:ARCHIVES LIBRARY
C. RESEARCH LETTERS : Killie Campbell Library
Government Archives,Pretoria
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: PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS

SWAZILAND NATIONAL ARCHIVES (S.N.A.)

at Mbabane and Lebomba,Swaziland

l.DEmarcation Of Native Area
HX D09/2,J155/02,J205/06,J53/06,RCS 3 2 1 / 0 9 , F i l e 1291,File 769.
2.Deeds Office Records
RCS 8 9 1 / 3 0 , F i l e 80,J212/02,RCS 153/15.
3 . C o l o n i a l S t a t e and the S e t t l e r Companies
J53/03,D09/65A,RCS 520A/08,45/07/1464,45/07/2129,S51Q,RCS 763/32,RCS 738/37,
RCS 244/25.
4.Swazis On Individual Tenure Land
D08/80,RCS 579/13,RCS 247/14,RCS 249/14,RCS 336/14, RCS 450/11,RCS 379/14,
RCS 619/14,RCS 462/14.
5.Treksheep Farmers
File 546, RCS 78/03, File 2203.
6.Purchase Of Land By Swazi Nation
File 1018,RCS 375/14,RCS 273/15,RCS 281/15,RCS 84/18,RCS 270/14 - 14b/16,
D09/88
7.Native Tax
Jl/03-17b/03,JS2/04,Jl8/05,Jl38/05.
a.White Settlement Schemes
RCS 62b/26, File 1269, RCS bb8/27,HCS 579/22.
9.Colonial Settlement Schemes
File 86b, File942, RCS b94/3b,RCS 369/39,File 1861A.RCS 7bl/23,RCS 347/26,
RCS b70/28
lO.Unconsulted Files for period after 1949
File 3014,0,(>11, J/1,B
Kile 3306

KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY(K.C.L.)

at Durban,South Africa

Allister M. Miller Papers (MS.MIL.)
(.MS,MIL.1.08.3
KCM 2355,2362,2364-68,MS 229,191a,268 Correspondence concerning the Swaziland
Corporation(1908-22) including Annual Reports
MS 281a Correspondence with R.T.Coryndon(1908).
I. MS.MIL.1.08.10
MS 406 Correspondence with Lord Milner on Protectorate administration.
J. MS.MIL.1.08.11
MS 418 Information about mining companies in Swaziland.
i. MS.MIL. 1.08.23
MS 558 Memorandum on various concessions and syndicates in Swaziland.
MS 547 a,b Mineral prospects and coneessions in Swaziland.
MS KCM 2459-67 Papers presented to the Swaziland Concessions Syndicate(including
original copies of concessions L44 to 82)
MS.MIL.1.08.37
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5.MS.MIL.1.08.37
KCM 2295-2363,MS 645,MS 936 Correspondence about the Swaziland Development
and Ranehing Co, and Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme.
6.MS.MIL.1.08.38
MS 661,651 Attitudes to incorporation.
7.MS.MIL.1.08.47
MS 72b Memo relating to land purchase by natives.

RHODES HOUSE LIBRARY (R.H.L.) at Oxford,Kngland

R.T.Coryndon Papers
Box
Box
Box
Box

9 :
1'.):
12:
12:

(MSS.Afr.S633)

f 1-20,t" b If 1-32
ril ff 16-82
f 1 ff 2-4
i'4 If 1-3

BODLEIAN LIBRARY (.B.L.J at Oxford University, Of ford, England
Selborne Papers (us.selborne)
I IS.Selborne 7\,
±' l^b-6
72, l 1VJ-80
163, f IbV
170k, f MM
Milner Papers (nSS.Eng.Hist)
bb(b3),9(yj,c.fJ88
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pi-UMAKY SOURCE1 MATERIALS (Swaziland National Archives Library)

COLONIAL BLUE BOOKS
1748
2316
2b0b
269b
2y9K
3152
3419
3914
4037
4ti4b
b08!)
6200
1)217
7212
7611
7878
9b02

Of
of
of
of
Of

of
of
of
of
of
Of

of
Ol

18/y
1879
1880
1880
18H1
1882
1882
1884
1884
1886
1887
1890
1890
18 y j

of
of layb
Of 189b
o f layy

Convention of Transvaal

Convention of 1884

Report of De Winton Commission
Convention of 1890
Concessions Listings
Handing over of Swaziland to the Soutn African Republic

SWAZILAND CONCESSIONS COMMISSION REPORTS
1903
190b
1905
1908

191b

J.HUBIE: Sv/aziland Concessions Report(including a digest of concessions)
Report to tne Governor(relating to a suggestion by A.M.Miller on behalf
of the Sv/aziland Corporation)
Report On The Expropriation of Monopolies
Report . Of Detailed Decisions (relative to boundaries,registration of
servitudes,periods of enjoyment,etc. in respect of land,grazing and
mineral concessions)
j.SMUTS: Report ON Registration of Land in Sv/aziland (unlocated).

HIGH COMMISSIONER'S GAZETTES
Swaziland Order-m-council of iy03
Proc.No.3 of 19U4
concessions Proclamation
Proc.No.4 of lyuv
partition Proclamation
Sv/aziland Order-in-Council of 1906
JtfPoeJSo! 28 of lyuv
Demarcation oi Native Areas
Notice No.119 of 19U8 Grey»s Report
proc.No.70 oi lyoa
Swaziland Crown Lands order-m-council iyo7
Swaziland Crown Minerals Order-in-Council 1908
Notice No.53 of 1909
Grey's Compensation Report
Proc.No 15 of 1909
. .
Proc.No 39 of 1910
Preserving Native rights on Native Area
Proc.No 13 of 1911
Disposal Of Crown Lands
Notice No.19 Of 1912
Cancelled Concessions
Proc-.No 24 of 1913
Natives still on Individual Tenure land
Proc.No 2 of 1915
Control of African Land Purchases.
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MISCELLKNEOUS
Times of Swaziland,1897-1912 (published weekly)
Annual Colonial Reports for Swaziland,1905-1966
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THE CAMPBELL COLLECTIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NATAL
KILUE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY

WILLIAM CAMPBELL MUSEUM

MASHU BANTU MUSEUM

MUCKLENEUK
3 2 0 MARRIOTT ROAD, DURBAN
REPUBLIC OP SOUTH AFRICA

Telephone 33-6476
OurRefe.™*.: K C 6 1 1 . 5 1 / 6 2 7 CRUS

1 5 November 1 9 7 7 .

Your Reference:

Mr. D.S. Crush
P.O. Box 728
MANZINI
Swaziland.

Dear Mr. Crush,
A.M. Miller's Papers

Thank you for your letter of 5 November 1977.
The Allistsr Mitchell Millar Papers housed in this Library form
a large collection, extending in all over a hundred files and
covering a wide range of topics, viz. administration, communications,
agriculture, mining, Swazi history and customs, certain companies
operating in Swaziland, as well as personal and business correspondence
of A.M. Miller. Incidentally, the Library has also a virtually
complete set of the Times of Swaziland from its inception in 1897.
Should you
from 08h30
to 12h00.
will close

wish to consult the Papers, the Library is open on weekdays
to 13h00 and 14h00 to 16h45, and on Saturdays from 09h00
However, with the coming Christmas vacation the Library
at midday on 23 December 1977 and re-open on 3 January 1978.

Yours sincerely,

(Miss) 3.F. DuggarrAfricana Librarian

3FD/pjb
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DEPARTEMENT VAN NASIONALE OPVOEDING
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL EDUCATION
STAATSARG1EF-GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES

PrWaatsak

1

PrW,«B,g)X236
£""?•

Ref

&

"","m
[~~
Mr* J*S* Crush
P.O. Box 728
Manzini
SWAZILAND

T.16/4/2
/V

_,
I

PRETORIA
0001
3 0 -ft- 1977

i_

J
Dear Mr* Crush

I am writing in reply to your inquiry dated 8-11-1977 o o n o e m i n g the concession
boundaries i n Swaziland*
The Report of the Commission appointed under the Swaziland Administration
Proclamation. 1904. as t o the Expropriation o f the Rights referred to i n
Section 1 2 o f the Proclamation with appendices (PM 1/2/17O-48/30) is i n the
custody of the Transvaal Archives Depot* The report covers 210 pages; s i x
maps are also inoluded in the report*
Xerox-copies can b e supplied at 6 cents per copy plus 4 cents postage for
every ten copies ordered, payable in advance* A n order form is included*
I regret to inform you that I could not trace any information regarding Mr*
George Grey or his private papers*

Yours faithfully

tW CHEEP :'THANSVAAL

ARCHIVES DEPOT
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APPENDIX TWO

A. ROYAL SWAZI DYNASTY
B. EXTRACTS FROM SETTLER'S ACCOUNTS : Forbes
Miller

i
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APPENDIX 2a
GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE ROYAL SWAZI DYNASTY

DLAMINI 1

I
I

MSWATI 1
NGWANE 11

I

DLAMINI 11

Pre 1750

I

NKOSI 11

I
MAVUSO 1

I

MAGUDULELA

LUDVONGA 1

HLUBI

DLAMINI 111

I

NGWANE 111

d.1780

NDVUNGUNYE (Zikodze)

d.1815

SOBHUZA 1 (Somhlolo, Ngwane IV)

1815-1836

MSWATI 11

1840-1868

DLAMINI IV (Mbandzeni)

1875-1889

I

J

NGWANE IV (Bhunu)

1
SOBHUZA

11

1897-1899
1921-

Note : Traditionally a chosen King does not attain full sovereignty
until reaching his majority ar age 21. In the interim period
the Queen Regent, generally the mother of the new King,rules
in his stead. Labotsibeni held this office from 1889-1897
and again from 1899-1921 when Sobhuza 11 was installed as
King.

Source : Matsebula (1972).
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Extract from D.Forbes.My Life In South Africa.1938.

Then came the concessions era in Swaziland. We had returned
to find it at its height. We realised that all was lost as regards
the mineral rights all over Swaziland held by my uncle and father.
So my brother and I decided to share in the spoils,and get concessions
for ourselves. It was an exciting and also an amusing game. There
were dozens of men walking around the King's kraal with concessions
papers written over in their pockets ready to put before the King
to be signed. Each man kept his own particular piece of ground as
secret as possible in case another man forestalled him. He had a
Swazi Chief as his agent to secure an audience with the King for
him.
We all walked or sat around the kraal to all outward appearance
for no other reason than for the sake of our health. Only with our
friends did we discuss the concession.
On getting an audience with the King you would tell him you
just wanted a piece of land as big as your hand on which you wanted
the rights. You would give the King some money now, but thousands
of pounds later,when you discovered gold and worked it. He got
j£3000 when Forbes Reef was floated into a company. If your luck was
in and the King was in a good mood he would say "Let me see the
money " and never in your life did you part with your money quicker
and more willingly. The King would say "Where is the pen?". He would
make a cross where indicated,as his signature. Then there would be
a scramble with the chiefs present to sign as witnesses and the
custom was to give each chief who signed £l. A place was always
reserved for Sandhlana and Tecuba to sign.
The King was now very ill and,I am sorry to say it,we whites
saw the end coming to our harvest of securing concessions,and most
of us had just one more we would like to secure;I in common with
the others. So I approached the King one day,as others were doing.
He looked at me and said "You,Mahleka,son of my friend,are you also
joining the vultures that want to pick my bones before I die? I
did not expect it from you." Never have I felt such a crushing
rebuke in my life.
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2b (Cont.)

Extract from A.M.Miller.Swaziland ; The land Of Green Pastures
And Running Streams.1936.

The year 1887 saw the birth of a concessions-hunting boom.
It may have been picturesque but was definitely sordid. Roads were
made and footpaths worn to bedrock by the horses of the would-be
concessionaires. The King's sweeper, his brewer, his snuff-bearer,
his nail-parer, were sanctified entities in the eyes of the
suppliants. Into ever-open hands a constant stream of silver fell
in the expectation that it might disclose some veiled path to
the giver of good things. The ndunas were still more substantially
rewarded. Gold was their guerdon and uncounted wealth was distributed
in enlisting their assistance.
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APPENDIX THREE

A. SWAZILAND ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1903
B. COLONIAL BIOGRAPHIES
C. LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED CONCESSIONS : Land
Minerals
D. SWAZILAND CORPORATION MEMORANDUM
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- ,
SWAZILAND ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1903.
j, (As amended by the Swaziland Orders in Council, 1906,1909 and 1934.)
** •

*AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE,
THE 25TH DAY OF JUNE,

1903.

Present :
THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL.
the Government of the late South African Republic
exercised rights and powers of protection, legislation, jurisdiction,
and administration in and over the Territory known as Swaziland;
And whereas the late South African Republic was conquered
by His Majesty's Forces and was annexed to and now forms part
of His Majesty's Dominions, and provision has been made for the
government thereof as one of His Majesty's Colonies under the
name of the Transvaal;
And whereas all the rights and powers of the late South African
Republic with respect to Swaziland have, by virtue of the conquest
and annexation of the said South African Republic, passed to
His Majesty, and His Majesty has by treaty, capitulation, grant,
usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, power and jurisdiction
in Swaziland;
New, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue of the powers by the
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or othenvise in His Majesty vested,
is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order,
and it is hereby ordered as follows:—
WHEREAS

I
I

1. This Order may be cited as the Swaziland Order in Council,
1903.
f2. In this Order unless the contrary appears " Swaziland "
means the territory known by that name bounded on the North,
the West, and the South by the Transvaal, and on the East by
the Colony of Natal and the Portuguese territories. " His Majesty "
includes His Majesty's heirs and successors. " Secretary of State "
means one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. [" High
Commissioner" means His Majesty's High Commissioner for
Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.

*
\
f
J

v
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(3a C o n t . )

" Gazette " means the Official Gazette of the High Commissioner
for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.]
*3. The [High Commissioner] may, on His Majesty's behalf,
exercise all powers and jurisdiction which His }fajesty, at any time
before or after the date of this Order, had, or may have, within
Swaziland, and.to that end may take or cause* fo be taken all such
measures, and may do or cause to be dfeiK oil such matters and
things therein as are lawful and as in the interest of His Majesty's
»ervice he may think expedient, subject to such instructions as he
mav from time to time receive from His Majesty, or through a
Secretary of State.
*4. The [High Commissioner] may appoint a Resident Commissioner and so many fit persons as, in the interest of His Majesty's
service, he may think necessary, to be Assistant Commissioners,
Judges, Magistrates, or other officers, and may define from time to
. time the districts within which such officers shall respectively
discharge their functions.
Every such officer may exercise such powers and authorities
as the i High Commissioner] may assign to him, subject nevertheless
to such directions and instructions as the [High Commissioner]
may from tune to time think fit to give him. The appointment of
such officers shall not abridge, alter, or affect the right of the [High
Commissioner] to execute and discharge all the powers and
authorities hereby conferred upon him.
The [High Commissioner] may remove an}' officer so appointed.
*5. In the exercise of the powers and authorities hereby conferred
opon him, the [High Commissioner] may, amongst other things,
,r
t^1 *^ me t o t ' m e ^ Proclamation, provide for the administration
Of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order,
and good government of Swaziland, and of all persons therein,
iftduding the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb
Hje public peace.
- :TfiIre fHigh Commissioner] in issuing such Proclamations, shall
a y native laws b
'SJI** "
y which the civil relations of any native
3
tr lbeS 0 r
nW ' ,
P ^ ^ t i o n s under His Majesty's protection are
. "awRegulated, except so far as the same may be incompatible with
r
frL!re e X C T C l s e o f H i s Majesty's power and jurisdiction, or clearly
- . tetyww to the welfare of the said natives.
' * « » l ^ & r > ' 1 t P r ^ l a m a t i o n o f t h e High. Commissioner shall be
'" * b h b S i ? Ul , GauUe' a n d s h a U f r o m a n d a f t e r the date of such
- " « M I C * i P ° i ° m a n d a f t e r s u c h o t h e r d a t e M m a y b e mentioned
>Mi«stv oi
T i 1 0 " * a n d t h e r e a f t e r u ^ i l disallowed by His
J
rt,
^
;-- L
Pea««a or modified by any subsequent Proclamation,
^

>a^...

~"~'

—.-•.. .

208

(3a C o n t . )

have effect as if contained in this Order, and the High Commissioner '
shall take such measures as he thinks proper for giving due publicity
thereto within Swaziland.]
*7. His Majesty may disallow any such Proclamation wholly or
in part, and may signify such disallowance by Order in Council or
through a Secretary of State, and upon such disallowance being
notified in the Gazette, the provisions so disallowed shall from and
after a dale to be mentioned in such notification, cease to have effect,
but without prejudice to anything theretofore lawfully done
thereunder. Due notification shall be publicly made by the [High
Commissioner] within Swaziland of the disallowance of any such
Proclamation.
8. (Revoked by the Swaziland Order in Council, 1906.)
*9. The [High Commissioner] may as he shall see occasion, '
when any crime has been committed within Swaziland, or for which
the offender may be tried therein, grant a pardon, in His Majesty's
name, to any accomplice, not being the actual perpetrator of such'. 1
crime, who shall give such information and evidence as shall lead to the apprehension and conviction of the principal offender; and i
further, may grant to any offender convicted of any crime in any ;
Court, or before any Judge, Justice, Magistrate, or other Officer
within Swaziland a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, ',
or any respite of the execution of the sentence of any such offender, «
for such period as to the [High Commissioner] may seem fit, and '
may remit any fines, penalties, or .forfeitures which may become '
due and payable.
10. (Revoked by the Swaziland Order in Council, 1906.)

-'1

" "i

11. This Older shall be published in the Gazette, and shall there- Ki
upon come into operation, and the High Commissioner shall give ''i
directions for the publication of this Order at such places, and in ^
such manner and for such time or times as he thinks proper for ft
giving due publicity thereto within Swaziland.
|
12. His Majesty may from time to time revoke, alter, add to, "1
or amend this Order.
h
And the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, one of His ',<
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary i-1
directions herein accordingly.
A. W. FITZROY.
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MAJOR COLONIAL OFFICIALS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SWAZILAND,1902-14.

SIR ALFRED MILNER
Career Details : Private Sec. to Chancellor of Exchequer(1886-8),
Private Sec. to Viceroy of India(1888-9),Director-General of
Accounts,Cairo(1889-92),Chairman of Board of Inland Revenue(1892-7),
Governor of South Africa and High Commissioner for Protectorates
(1897-1905),Sec.of State for War (1916-8).Colonial Secretary(1918-20)
Capital Linkages : Directorships of London Joint Stock Bank, Bank
of West Africa,Northern Assurance Co.,Rio Tinto (1906-16).Chairman
of Rio Tinto (1922).
Biography : J.Marlowe.Milner:Apostle of Empire.1976.

SECOND EARL OF SELBORNE
Career Details : Undersec.of State for Colonies (pre 1900),First
Lord of Admiralty(1900-5).Governor-General of South Africa and
High Commissioner for Protectorates(1905-14).Minister of Agriculture
(1915-16).
Biography : none, but see
D.G.Boyce & J.O.Stubbs;F.S.Oliver,Lord Selborne and
Federalism.Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
5:1,1976.
A.R.Booth, Lord Selborne and The British Protectorates,
Journal Of African History.10:1.1969.
Publications
Earl of Selborne, The South African Protectorates,
Journal of African Society.13.1914.

SIR ROBERT CORYNDON
Career Details : Private Sec. to Rhodes(1896).Administrator of
of N-W Rhodesia (1897-1907).Resident Commissioner for Swaziland
(1907-16).Rhodesian Native Affairs Commission(1914-15),Governor
of Uganda(1917-22) and Kenyat1922-25).
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3b (Cont.)

Capital Linkages : Administrator for British South Africa Co.
(1897-1907).
Biography : R.Palmer.Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia.1977.C.5.
C.P.Youe,Dalhousie University,is currently doing PhD
reserach on Coryndon's career.
Publications :
R.T.Coryndon.Swaziland.Journal Of African Society.14.1914

GEORGE GREY
Career Details : Special Commissioner for Swaziland(1907-9)
Capital Linkages : Manager,Northumberland Syndicate (1891),employee
of Zambesi Exploration Co.(1895-99),General Manager of Tanganyika
Concessions Co.Ltd. in Katanga (1901-6).
Biography : R.T.Coryndon.Some Account Of George Grey And His Work
In Africa.1914.
W.S.Brelsford, Generation of Men.The European Pioneers
Of N.Rhodesia.1965.
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APPENDIX 3c
LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED LANDS CONCESSION

Embekelweni,
29th July 1889.

Enclosure 1 in N o . 33.
Duly registered in the books of the King.
(Signed)
ALLISTER M. MILLER,
Resident Secretary and Agent, Swazie King.

T o ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

BE it hereby made known that I, Umbandeni, King and Paramount Chief of the
Swazie Nation, acting with the advice and consent of my Indunas in Council assembled,
hereby grant, cede, and assign unto and on behalf of John Thorburn and Frank Watkins,
their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, the sole, full, free, and exclusive farming
right over all such pieces and portions of my country of Swazieland bounded on the north
by the Komatie River, on the west by the Transvaal border, on the south by the Transvaal border, on the east by the Portuguese and Tongaland borders, and lying within these
boundaries, as have not at the date of signing of these presents been granted for farming
and agricultural purposes.
The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall further enjoy the
full right and privilege to divert streams, make and utilise watercourses, make roads,
build dwelling-houses, store-houses, and cattle kraals and stables, and do all such actsand things as may be requisite and necessary for the better carrying out of the business of
a farmer on any and all such pieces, plots, and portions of ground as are contained in the
boundaries aforesaid, and become their property by the signing of these presents.
The said John Thorbuin and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall also have the
right to use such water for irrigating and other purposes as they may deem necessary, the
right to cut and use wood on the farms above referred to, the right to import any and
every description of machinery and farming implements which they may deem requisite
and expedient for furthering the interests and requirements ceded to them by this grant,
as also the right to import all grains, cereals, and manures for farming purposes.
The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall have the right to
sublet, sell, or transfer to any person or persons, or company, syndicate, or companies ot
persons, any portion or portions or the whole of the ground made over to them by virtue
of this grant, and such person or persons or companies aforesaid shall acquire all and
singular the rights, privileges, and benefits, granted under these presents.
The period during which the said concessionaires and their foresaids shall enjoy the rights
made over to them shall be for a period of fifty (50) years, to be reckoned from the date
of the signing of these presents, provided, should they so desire it, they shall obtain a
renewal of the rights hereby made over and granted for a further term of fifty (50) years,
subject to the same terms and conditions as herein are provided.
As and in full consideration for the rights and privileges hereby granted and made over,
the said. John Thornburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall pay to me or my
successors by way of yearly rental the sum of fifty pounds (50/.) sterling.
The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins, on behalf of themselves and successors,
agree and bind themselves to respect all prior rights, should such exist, affecting, this
grant, and further in no way to interfere with the rights of my native subjects ; and I,
Umbandine, on behalf of myself and successors, agree to afford them all protection in. the
enjoyment of the rights hereby granted and recognised by me. •
\

I
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And itj s the true intent hereof—
(1.) Thathe said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall enjoy the
M ..jll and exclusive grazing rights over all portions of my country Iyiusj to the south of the
C Komatie River, and bounded as above described, and which have not at the date of these
fl, presents been granted to anyone else ; as also the grazing rights over all portions of mv
^| kingdom already granted, but which may during the continuance of this grant lapse and
* heconie null and void through any cause whatsoever ; further, the right to carry on dairy
.Operations in connection with the grazing rights; and also, as aforesaid, the right to
Ktnuke use of and import all machinery and dairy appliance hich may be considered
(^necessary
AM*
.•'(2.) The full, sole, free, and exclusive right in that portion of my country lying to the
'south of the Komatie River, and bounded as already described, to cultivate and carry on
SP„ any and every species of agriculture and arboriculture and planting, on all portions or
% pieces of land where such rights have not been granted at the date of these presents to
*" anyone else ; as also the full and exclusive right to carry on any species of agriculture,
planting, or arboriculture on all portions of my country over which such rights have already
been granted, but which may during the continuance of this grant through any cause
^whatsoever lapse and fall back to m e ; and, further, for the purpose of carrying on
^agricultural operations, to make use of all such agricultural machinery and appliances as
S*may by the concessionaires be deemed needful aud necessary.
y The concessionaires and their foresaids shall enjoy and have the full, free, and undisturbed use and enjoyment of the rights hereby granted them, for which grant I have this
day received good and sufficient consideration, and I engage, on my protection being
•asked, to prevent anyone whomsoever from destroying and trespassing upon or injuring
* the agricultural operations or works of the said concessionaires.
Given under my hand and seal at my Head Kraal, Embekelweni (Gufane), Swazieland, on this, the twenty-sixth (26th) day of July, in the year one thousand
eight hundred and eighty-nine (1889), in the presence of the subscribing
witnesses.
(Signed)
UMBANDENI, King, his X and (L.S.)
Their
n't

T'KUBA

X
X
M'T.SHASA
X
JOSEBOMOU
X
BOISOSA
X
MAKAHLALAOA X
INCABANA
X
LANGABALALA X
A'MABELE
X
LUNTSHENGA
X

lIixr.Mi.

&

mark
As Witnesses:
(Signed)
#»
#

ALLISTER M. MILLER.
CLAUDE H. VERUALL.
A. O. GOULD.

• I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I, this twenty-sixth day of July in the year
Ji889, duly and truly interpreted the contents of the above document to King Umbandeni
f^&nd to his Indunas whose names arc subscribed above.
(Signed)
E. COOPER.
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LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED MINERALS CONCESSION
W

—
Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

I

I
'
.
>

Duly registered, 24th December 1888.
(Signed)
THKOPHILUH SHEPSTONE,
Resident Adviser and Agent, Swazie King.

BE it hereby made known that I, Umbandeni, King and Paramount Chief of ;
the Swazie nation, acting with the full consent of my Council, do hereby give, grant, 'J
assign, and make over unto John Thorburn, his heirs, executors, administrators, and $
assigns, the sole, full, free, and exclusive right to prospect, mine, dig, search, or otherwiseq
explore for gold or other minerals or precious stones on all such pieces, parcels, plots,if
or portions of ground or country in this my kingdom of Swazieland, as have not up to \'
the date hereof been granted, assigned, or apportioned as mineral concessions or rights A
and further, the sole, full, free, and exclusive right of refusal of all such concessions, I
mineral or otherwise, as may from time to time from the date hereof be abandoned or. r
forfeited by the present holders ; the said John Thorburn and his foresaids in each and, *
every instance abiding by the conditions laid down for the working and rental of such'
concession or concessions, unless I, the said Umbandeni, or my ?- ~?*»ssors, agree to thef]
modification of the same ; and the said John Thorburn and his . , ,jaids on discovering"'
gold or^ftprecious stones or minerals of any description on or in any parcels or plots of ^
ground or country which are by these presents made over to him or them, or which mar,4
from time to time, either by forfeiture or abandonment or noncompliance with document^
or agreement, become the property of the said John Thorburn or his foiesaids, shall?'*
have the sole, full, free, and exclusive right to treat the same by machinery or otherwise, *
according to the usages of mining in all its branches, and for the sole and exclusive C^i
benefit of the said John Thorburn and his foresaids, to whom shall belong the full andf ~
undivided profits thereof.
£
The period during which the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall enioy the4
rights made over to him and them by these presents shall be a term of fifty (50)*?]
years, to be reckoned from the date hereof; provided that, should he or they so desire it,*^
the said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall obtain a renewal of the rights heifib||
granted for another term of fifty (50) years, subject to the same terms and conditions^
as herein are provided.
_
' ^1
As and in consideration in full for the rights hereby granted him and theffl2&be,j
said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall yearly pay to me or to my successors in office/
the sum of 100/. (one hundred pounds sterling), for each and every Concession/
whether mineral or otherwise, becoming the property of the said John Thorburjj
or his foresaids, through forfeiture or abandonment of the original holder or holders,
or his or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, the said John Thorburn
shall pay to me, or my successors in office, a yearly rental as set forth in the ^ginal
Grant or Concession Deed of the Concession so acquired by the said John Thorburn
or his foresaids. And, furthermore, the said John Thorburn and his foresaids hereby
agree to pay to me or to my successors in office a bonus of 3,000/. (three thousaua
poflnds), on the completion of" the erectiou of the first stamping machinery or batter,"
on any of the mineral concessions granted to him and his foresaids by virtue of jljhjj
document.
^, t<
The said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall have the sole, full, free, and undivided,
right to divert watercourses, dig and construct water-races, build houses and workshops,']
and cut, timber on each and every piece or parcel of ground on which he or. njS
foresaids may by virtue of these presents mine, or dig for precious stones, such rights,
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bonever, onjy to be exercised for the better development of the mineral rights and
privileges hereby made over to him and them.
AndViurther, the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall have the sole and
% xclnsive right and privilege to build stores and trade goods and liquors on such mineral
concessions and mining lands as are by these presents granted him and them.
And the rights hereby granted and made over to the said John Thorburn and his
foresaids is a sole and exclusive grant and concession for the whole of Swazieland,
whereby the said John Thorburn and his foresaids become possessed of mineral rights
over each and every portion of this my country which has not at the date and signing
hereof been granted for mining purposes; and further, of the sole, full, and free
rpht to take over on the original terms, unless modified terms are mutually agreed
upon between I, the said Umbandeni, and the said John Thorburn or his foiesaids
all Concessions, whether mineral or otherwise, abandoned or forfeited by the original
holders, their heirs, executors, or assigns, such rights and privileges being further
extended to the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the said John Thorburn.
And, furthermore, 1, the said Umbandeni, on behalf of myself and successors, agree
and bind myself not to grant any further mineral concession or concessions for the
mining of and for precious stones in this my country after the date and signing of these
presents; nor to grant a similar right for the first refusal of each and every concession
abandoned or forfeited by the original holders, their heirs, executors, administrators,
or assigns, to anv other person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or
' syndicates; but, on the other hand, to forbid, disallow, and prevent any other person or
persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates from infringing on any one or
each of the rights and privileges for the finding and treatment of gold, and the securing
of abandoned and forfeited concessions hereby granted to the said John Thorburn
and his foresaids.
The said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall have the right of disposing of and
transferring the rights granted under this Concession, or portion of such rights, to any
person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates, who shall thereby
acquire all and singular the rights or portions thereof which arc enjoyed by the said
John, Thorburn and his foresaids in respect of same.
It is the true intent heieof that the said John Thorbuin and his foresaids shall enjoy
and have the full, free, and undistuibed use, occupation, and enjoyment of the rights
hereby granted him; but it is required of him that he and his foresaids shall duly
' respect all prior lights granted by me.
In making this Grant or Concession I do not alienate any part of my dominion, but
reserve to myself and successors the sovereignty of the country.
Thus done and passed at Embekelweni Kraal, Swazieland, this twenty-second day of
December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, in the presence of
thejsubscribed witnesses.
',
*
(Signed)
UMBANDINE, King, his X and (L.S.)
Their
T. KUBA
UNYCBEKA
HELEMI:

JoiiliE

x
X
X

X

marks.
Witnesses:—
(Signed)

T. B. RATHBONE.
ALLISTEK M. MILLER.

!
J "

I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that the foregoing deed of Concession or Grant
was duly and truly translated and interpreted by me to the Swazie King, Umbandeni, in
• the presence of his Council and of the witnesses before mentiomed.
(Signed)
T. 13. RATHBONE,
Interpreter.
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MEMORANDUM compiled by Lord Milner after discussions with A.M. Miller
of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd., (28.12.1904)
The following is a proposal, which, if accepted by the
Governor, Mr. A. Miller is prepared to reccommend the Swaziland
Corporation to accept for the settlement of all its claims
under its various conditions in Swaziland, in accordance with
the terms of Section 12 of Proclamation of 1st October, 1904.
This proposal is not intended to exclude the Concession
Commission. Indeed it is only the Commission which could give
effect to it in detail. All that is desired to arrive at by the
agreement are the lines on which the Commission would proceed
in dealing with the particular case of the Swaziland Corporation.
The propsal is as follows:
The Corporation is to surrender, without compensation, all its
concessions, on being confirmed in perpetuity in the sole and
exclusive mineral right over certain areas, and receiving freehold
titles to certain other areas, subject ineither case to the
burdens imposed on mineral or land owners by the Proclamation and
further subject, in the case of the land given to it in freehold
to the servitudes hereinafter referred to.
The arease over which the Corporation is to have mineral
rights or aforesaid are those comprised in the following concessions:
1. Forbes Reef Mineral Concession
2. Horo Mineral Concession
3. McNab Mineral concession
4. Albu & Davis Mineral Concession
5. 7/9 of Kannemeyer Mineral Concession.
The Coroporation is only to be confirmed in mineral rights
over these areas, to the extent to which there is no present
conflicting claim to any of them which the Commission may deem to
have priority over that of the Corporation, and the decision of
the Commission as to boundaries is, in all cases, to be final
and unquestionable.
The land to which the Corporation is to receive freehold
title is not to exceed 1,000,000 acres in all minus any amount
which the Commission may set aside of the cole and exclusive
use and occupation of the natives. In order to establish its
right to under the agreement, the following course is to be
pursued;
The Corporation is to receive freehold title to all lands
already in its possession, and in which no other land concessionaire
has any rights, whether its claim is based on purchase or on the
operation of the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession (L.U.L.C.).
Subject to proof of such claim and to the delimitation of boundaries,
all these lands, minus the portion set aside for the sole and exclusive
use and occupation of natives, are to be vested in the Corporation.
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It is to be clearly understood that the above provision gives
the Corporation no right to any land at present in its possession
which the Commission may find to have been acquired by mistake
or usurpation.
Mr. Miller estimates the extent of the land lawfully in the
possession of the Corporation and free from servitude, though
of course, subject to Native rights at upwards of 500,000 acres,
but it is not proposed that this estimate should form any part
of the agreement of that any argument should be based on it.
Whatever may be the amount ultimately given to the Corporation
in freehold under the above provisions, that amount is to be
made up to 1,000,000 acres, if possible (including any land which
may be set apart for natives) by giving the Corporation freehold
title.
1. To any land, which it at present claims, either on the strength
of the seperate documents or under the L.U.L.C., but over which
other concessionaires have other rights, such as grazing (in the
case or any such land, subject the proof of the Corporations's
reversionary rights and to the delimitation of the boundaries,
the freehold title is to be given to the Corporation; concessionaires
being endorsed as servitudes on the title).
2. To any land which will fall to the Corporation under the L.U.L.C.
between this date and the end of 1939 (in any such case also, subject
to the proof of theGoxporation's reversionary rights and to the
delimitation of boundaries, the freehold title is to be given to
the Corporation immediately, the rights of the present lease-holder
or life interest holders being endorsed on the title as servitudes)
It is to be understood that all the claims of the Corporation,
to any lands under (1) and (2) above is to lapse, as soon as the
Corporation has bee given freehold in an extent of land of 1,000,000
acres in all, including the areas to be set apart for natives.
It is also to be understood that if the land, at present in
the possession of the Corporation, to which it suceeds in proving
its claim, together with the lands under (1) and (2) above, to
which it suceeds in proving its claims, do not collectively amount
to 1,000,000 acres is only an upward limit. Moreover, whether
the amount much land as is required for the use of natives is to
be taken out of such amount.
With regard to the land to be set apart for the sole and
exclusive use and occupation of the natives, and which will be
a deduction from any land, in which the Corporation would otherwise
have the freehold title, the Commission is
to determine, in every case, what amount it is reasonable to
reserve, having regard to the requirements of the natives actually
residing on, or habitually using any particular land.
As however a perfectly unlimited discretion in this respect
might make the present arrangement absolutely useless to the
Corporation, it is proposed that the quantity of land to be reserved
for natives should not exceed, on the average, 20 acres per native
family, or in the aggregate 15% of the land allotted to the
Corporation i.e. if the land reaches 1,000,000 acres not more
than 150,000 acres.
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It is further proposed that the Corporation should agree
to offer not less than 50,000 acres of its freehold land to
agricultural settlers, for purchase in installments.

*-
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APPENDIX FOUR

A. PARTITION PROCLAMATION, 1907
B. GREY'S CARRYING CAPACITY ESTIMATES
C. EXTRACT FROM GREY'S NOTES
D. CARRYING CAPACITY CALCULATIONS
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APPENDIX

: 4a

h.

OFFICIAL GAZErEE
OF T H E

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH A F R I C A : ^ !
PUBLISHEO BY AUTHORITY OP HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIOH COMMISSIONER
.

Vol. XXI.
No. 28,of 1907.]

B T H I S EXCBILENCY THE HIOII COMMISSIONER.

HEREAS by tlie Swaziland Ahninistiation I'rorlamation I'JOl provisi m was made amongst other
things for the constitution ul it Commission to ileal in
manner provided by smli Proclamation with ronco>kions
or grant* made by or on behnll ul' the King or I'tiramounl Cliiof of Swaziland HII<I rnulirmcd by the Chief
Court established in the. s.n<l territory by the Organic
Proclamation 18'W;
And whereas it is expedient to amend in certain
respects the provisions <>! the said Swaziland Administration Proclamation 1004 relative to t'ie concessions to
be dealt with bv the slid Commission and in particular
to provide for the setting apart ot land foi the «ole
and exclusive occupation of natives of tlio territory
and the grant of freehold or other rights to persons
holding concessions in respect of land not so set apart;
Now therefore under and by \iitue of the powers
authorities and jurisdiction conferred* upon and committed to me by His Majesty under the Swaziland Order
in Council 190") as amendeef by the Swaziland Order in
Council 4000 1 do hereby declare proclaim and rniko
known as follows:—
Dt«mtioB..
1. in this I'roclam ition unless inconsistent
with the context:
" Commission " shall mean the Concessions
Commission appointed under section
eleven of the principal law
•' Concessionaii e" shall mean in relation
to a concession the holder for the time
being of such concession.
" Gazette " shall mean the Official Gazette
of tlio High Commissioner.
''Land concussion" sh.ill mean any con,
,•
cession confirmed by the Chief Court
(other than amiiieia'i concession) which
confers any title or tight (not being a
light included in section twelve of the
principal law) to land m-the use thereof
for ugrictilliiial grazing or o her purposes.
'• Liter land concession' shall mean a
land concession of suh-c(|iictit djte to a
piior laud collection but cont'crimg
rights simitar to and over the wine
area or a pnitinn ul the name iiiv.i as
that covered by and exercisable only
after tlio expiry "f the rights granted
under such prior land couiession.
" .Mineral concession " shall mean a rouCCHHIOII loiilirined hy the Chief Court
eonfirrinu a light (not being a light

W

'•I

r

i">.

i .

r i ml, M

included in section tmle of the principal ! •'
law) to minu dig sear-li or otherwise t \
explore for precious or base metals o r ; * ;.'
coal or for precious stones'or in the \. '
cas« of any such concession which e o n - ' i
• few any such right in addition to other "\,
rights such concession tn as far as it ;.;.
relates to such right.
t »'
"Principal law" shall mean the Swaziland '
Administration Proclamation IllOi.
'• Pi mr land concession " shall mean a land v
concession nrior in ditto to a later land
concetsinii but conferring rights similar ,
to and over the same area or a portion
/
of the same area as that covered by the rights conferred by such later laud con- .
cession.
" •
"Special Commissioner" shall mean the
person appointed under section three of, '.
this Proclamation.
«" * ;> > , j . d
''Territory" shall mean the territory of ., ?'- ' >r'<T.A<Sp
Swaziland.
.''« -.',*/'»&i

PROCLAMATION
'~**

11_

No. 812

JOHANNESRURQ, FRIDAY, 25TH OCTuNKR, 1907.

PART I.

,

.

.•

-

r , tv-.:"%.

,

(*>.'' V i

SETTINO
ETTINO ASIDE OF LAND ron ExcujsrvE, >"'^ ^ /;'•'*<
Oc
OCCUPATION OE NATIVES OK THE TKMUTORY.
,»-', tu "t '$$£»
n
£. . .
.
, of
.• the
,i
i i i law
i
- i ' '"*
y A, * iMj
2. Section
twenty
principal
»>I>MI
of'i

Mellon *>«*'•• 3

shall be and is hereby repealed.
*

'

•
,
'^.

HtrutUwl < v-V
AiliMlut.tcmr^.tJ"
lion I t o i l i . ' i v
> nuften l«M.«'$*

•

' 3. The High Commissioner may from time Appoint. '*£
to time appoint the Resident Commissioner !!""". »' .. ^uiW
or some other fit and proper person to be SKShMiifTnJW
a S|ieciiil Commissioner to carry out t h e ;
'"'V^
provisions of this part of this Proclamation.'
The Special Commissioner shall in carrying
out, sucti provisions art in accordance with
the lawful directions and instruetionmf the
High Commissioner and with any i emulations
that inny bo from time to turn.* Iramed under
•t
.section etrwn.
' ., ^
fl
4. (1) The Special Couitniisioner shall set s«tt'iii< »t»rt." ••'",
apart portions-of land alKtud hy any land jJ^'J'jJJJ.a' '"
concession or land concessions tor the sole |,y \ ^ ^
and exclusive us<' and occupation of natives oourMiion'
of the territory and shall for such purjKise fi"«v«»'"l
cause laud so fct apart to be surveyed and HM!'\1
diagrams thereol framed at tlio cost or the
concessionsiro or concessionaires and if
ncutssaiy ap|iortion such costs pro rata '
amongst such concessionaiiet. The provisions ,'
,
ol section tixleen of the principal law shall
»ii(/a/is mutitruiis apply to the re|>ayinent of
> '3
^
such costs with int'ii'st theri-on by Instal;, t
iiiniits.
' •l

,.:..T
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on-'ieiu. <t\/r:i TK OK TIII. IIK'II COMMINMONKU roil snurn AKUUW
('2) III i\etii>mg hi" dtiliei lindu tins'ctlon the epical Commissioner -h.il
demarcate one-thud ut the area ul land the
subject of any l.n.d ror ei-sion iinUss theie
shall he Mime -nlllcienf icuson approied \,\
the High ''oinioissiuner for not demarcating
any pinion ol stub area or lor deiiiaicjlii'g
a portion or poitions tli'icd less in extent
than such one-third ard the site or «ite« ol
the niea deinaicated shall ho a- the .-i>'eiui
Commission!!' may in his discielion iletiTmine subject to" un appeal to the High
Cominis-ioiier as in *iction nine is pmvidod.
(3) The H'gh Co!iiu>i<-nioiipr uuy in ids
disi return IC<|UIIC the Special Comn issiom r
to demarcat" inoie than one-thud of ihe
area of land the subject of a laud i one s<-ion;
piovtdcd that the concessiunane slut 1 in
such lase be entitled to be com|*nsatci|
in respect of the extent ol aiea in
excess of the one-third aforesaid. The
amount of such eomp< nsatum shall in
default of agi cement bo detci mined by an
aibitiator appyinUd by the Chief Jii-tne ol
the Transanal tlio rtinuuer.ilion ol such
arhiti ator ami tl o cn.its neces-anly iru h'ental
to arbitration piocecdings not including an\
costs inclined by the concessionaire heti g
paid out ol the revenue of the tciritoiv.
The amount of any compensation paid oi
estimated to become payable under this
suh-sectinn shall be recoierable Iroin all
holders of any land or mineral concession
or of any title to land isjuel in subaudition
for any such concession in such propoi lionand in such mannei as the High Commissioner ma) hereafter determine.
(4) If no poition of Ihe area ot land the
subject ol a land concession is domarcaled
as aforesaid or if the poition or poitions
demarcated do not "|iial in extent onc-tliiid
of tho area ol land the subject of a land
concession the High Commissioner may i cqun e
i.
tho Special (Jommis-sioner:—
(a) to select a delimd piece or defined
pieces of land which together with the
area demarcated as aloresaid if any
will make up such one-third and to
demand transfer of such piece or
pieces of land from the concessionaire.;
or
(6) to demand transfer from the concessional! e of an undivided share of such
lirouoition of land the subject ol his
land concession as togither with the
niea demarcated as aforesaid if any will
vmuke up such one-third.
Such piece or pieces of land or undivided
sharo shall be transferred free of cost to
the concessional! e into the name of tho
., • t
High Commissioner who may in his discretion sell the same and apply the proceeds
of sale to reduction of any expenditure
incurred in the exercise of the powers of
this section or may exchange or otheiWise
dispose of such pioce or pieces Of land or
undivided tharo as to him may appoar
expedient.
(5) Any lights with legaid to piecious or
base metals precious stones mirerals or
mineral products exeiciseablg whether under
a mineral concession or otherwise in respect
of any portion of laud demarcated selected
or transfencd under this section shall not
t'\- . v.v- .v* be affected by such demarcation selection
or transfer but such rights shall be subject
to tho provisions of section ten of this
Proclamation.
5. A concessionaire mny after the exercise
;* t\* rroTlaton far
J '<s Mproprlaof tho powers of the last preceding section
If'/ i • Hon of luid in respect of his land concessit n make
',' *.' soncttalona
*>!"./"on »ppMca- application that such portion of land the
•r / ' , tlon of coll- subject of his land concession which has
ie J'
cwrionalns. not been demarcated si lected or trnnsfened
as aforesaid he expropriated and the High

Conriii-sifiii r m.ij giant ir leluse -in Ii
application ; pioiidcd that it -iicli application
he gt.inted tin' punluc-i' pile.- of the poition <•>> cxiuoi'i ati d shall in delimit ol
agieement Ii" dotoi mined b\ an arbitiator
to lie appointed hi the Chief Justice i.l the
Transvaal sin Ii pen e and the costs neiessanly incidental to such determination not
ii'rliiduig any costs tuiiiirfd by the Coiiocssionniie In ifig paid <<tit ot the general
reienues ol the tointuiy.
;nr'l
• >. All right- or inliicsts conferred upon <»l«>nalra
*
a ciinccs-iiiiiaue hy his land concession shall ]»t»r*>t
In
in respect ol any poition ol land demarcated lao<l M - I
un.ler
seheted or tiaii-leiied under section four •• •|.«rt
cease and deti i mine ami MII Ii concessionaire t i t"l(hI f' mt i i U4h e i t
shall saie as -perially pionded in sub- att.l Un<l not
section tliiei- ul the s<i't section have no *> v : apftit
4 from
< laim to compensation in any court of law free
i m t l t « new
or any place whatvieier m respect ol rights fllxl
or interests so i vtingnished. Any poition I I < apKtion
ti*
not «o demaic.itfil seleitid or trnnsfened Mtltjrct
i-ituln
shall he freed Irom anv rght pofs»s-ed hy rrijr|i>lor.s.
natiM'sot the teiriton t" u.-e and ouupalion
of the «aine -ulject to vthe lolloping provisions :—
(a) Knr a peiio.l of five yeais alter the
ilem.it i .ilinii selection or transfer of land
as aforesaid no native from lime to time
actually ie-i'leiit on such land shall be
rompeiled to move therelrom nor shall
any mmii y oi other con«ideiatloti he
exacted ti om him by a concessionaire
in respect of his occupation thereof.
(6) Alter such period of live years any
native tamili may continue to occupy
such land on such terms as mny by
agreement with the coiuessionairc be
deteimined. Any such agreement shall
he subject to the confirmation of the
Resident Commissioner,
(c) All land the subject of n land concession
whether demarcated selected or transferred as aloresaid or whether the same
be I reed Irom ii'e and occupation by
natiies shall be subject to any rights of
way and outspau and to any tights to
take water wood or reeds which maybe
awarded by the Special Commissioner
in respect ot such land and shall further
be subject to such rights of way and
outspau as bine been or may hereafter
Irom time to time be by law established.
7. If a concessionaire has under a land
concession been granted:—
(a) Title to the owneiship of land; or
(6) a lease of land which with or without
rights of leuewal is of not less than
ninety-nine years' duration;
there shall be issued to such concessionaire
freehold title in respect of any portion ol
land held under such title or lease not demaicated selected or transferred as aforesaid
subj< ct to such leases and servitudes as may
be determined by the Commission under
suction fiflten of ti o principal law as amended
by section fourtein of this Proclamation and
to such other servitudes as maybe awaided
by the Special Commissioner under the last
preceding section; provided that if such land
is the subiert of a later land concession tho
concessiouaiie who is at the date of this
Proclamation entitled to beneficial enjoyment
of the right under his land concession for
the longer unexpired pciiod shall have the
prcferent right to claim freehold title under
this seitionj provided further that if such
concessionaire be the holder of the prior
land concession he shall not be entitled to
claim such freehold title unless the High
Commissioner is satisfied that he has compensated tho holder of the later land concession for the \aluc of rights which, would
by tho grant of such freehold title ho

!»*ue ol
fMHliold
till- In
ie*p»c« of
land not
" t apait
fot natlrn.

(4a
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extinguished.
The minimi of such compensation shall in tin- absein e of agieement
l>e fixeil bv an inbitr.il'U appointed hy the
t'hicl Justice of t i c Tiansv.'ul.

I

a n l lines mentioned in section ei'jht md
g e i i e i . d l i loi' Ihe better carrying out of the
object*, .ind p u r p i s e s ol this part of this
I'rui lam ilmn.

S. Kvory giant ol ficehold title made
uiiiler the l i - t pieceiling section «-h:t!t bo

subject to the following conditions: that is
to sav : —
(<() The pi.mice shill continue p.ivmciit ol
any iciils royalties or other u i n u c p due
under the ci'i —ion on which disclaim
to freehold title is based; provided however that in substitution lor any such
rents louillics <>r oilier moneys" which
are payable to the Swaziland Administration the giaiitee may be required to
pay 'piitreut ol such amount and atsuch
pi'iioos as may be fixed by legulation ;
(l>) The grantee shall mil by virtue of the
grant become entitled to receive any
lents royalties or other moneys payable
under aiiy concession affecting the land
included in Ihe grant or any portion of
such land which he was not entitled to
icceive by \iitue of the concession on
.,
which his i laim to Ireehold title is based ;
'.' (o) the gi.intee shall in the event of his
•;,,.'failing lenelicially to occupy the land
by himself or one or more white1 male
substitutes of lull age to the satisfaction
of the High Commissioner bo liable to
pay to the Swaziland Administration
fines of such amounts and at such periods
as may be fixed bv regulation;
(d) all lights to precious or base metals
precious s t u m s minerals mid minetal
pioducts shall he excluded from the
g r a n t ; with the exeeiitiou of any such
rights which arc «peciltcallv granted bv
the concession on which th» grantee's
claim to freehold title is based;
(e) such other conditions not b- ing inconsistent with the conditions above-inenlioncd as are by the laws of tho Transanal imphed in* grants ol Crown land.
The term " t h e g i n n t e e " as used in this
section shall be deemed to include any
persori who is the giantee's successor iii
title to any land included in a grant or
any portion of such land.
9. An appeal shall lie to the High Commissioner against any exercise hy tho Special
Commissioner of the powers ol this part of
this Proclamation but there shall be no
other appeal against any exercise by the
Special Commissioner of such powers and
the decision of the High Commissioner shall
' be final.
10. (1) Tho High Commissioner may from
time to time by notice in the Gazelle define
areas which arc occupied by or are in the
neighbourhood of native kiaals of special
importance or are the sites of the giavrs of
native chiels as protected areas and notwithstanding anything contained in any mineral
concession it shall not be lawful to c a n y
on any prospecting or mining operations iii
such piotected aieas.
('2> The exercise of rights under mineral
concessions shall be subject in all respects
to such restrictions on the disturbance of
or interference with water buildings works
kraals cultivated lands and other improvements and to such provisions as to compensation for any such distiubarice or
interference as the High Commissioner may
hereafter from time to time by Proclamation
determine.
11. The High Commissioner may from
time to time make niter and rescind legulations not inconsistent with the: provisions
of this part of this Proclamation as to the
amounts and times of payment of quitrents

PART II.
(iKS'UlAI. \MI NhMF.VrS OK THE SWAZILAND
AliMIN|S||l\TIOS PlIOCl.AMATIllN 1904.

I'J. (I) N i lion I'-n of the principal law
shall be an I is hereby amended by tho
niseiticiii at ihe end tljcrcol of the following
word • :—
" \VI ore any such concession or grant was
so corilii iiicd in part onlv the same shall
not he recognised by any Court of Law
except to the extent of such limited
conliriiiatioii. And such additional words
shall he deemed to have been inserted
•it the dale of tho taking effect of the
principal law.

AncMtclmtiit
of viMlon 10
or SwaiiUii.l
Ailmlblalrallon
,,
Proolama- i.
Il»n ItcM.

111. Whenever in section fourteen of the
principal law tlio woids "President of the
Uomuussion" occur the words ''the Commission" shall be substitute I therefor; and
wlieuevei in tlie principal law the term
"Resident Magistrate" occurs the same shall
bo doomed to moan the Resident Commissioner
appointed under the Swaziland Administration Proclamation 1!HI7.

.Meaning uf
leriua ilaecl
In Stratlland
Atlmlnlilr*.
• bin
I'roflasiallou 1IXM

I i . Section ftfU-i'ii of the principal law
shall be and is hereby amended:—
(a) Hy the addition to tho erul'of subsection one thereof of, Ihe following
words:—
" And any dec ision ol the Commission
under this section shall forthwith be
tiansmiltcd in wiiting to the Registrar
of Heeds by tho President;"
(6) by theadditiori thereto of the following
new sub-sections:—
(3) " I t shall be lawful lor the Commission Irom time to time to appoint
any member thereof or any duly qualified
surveyor to take; evidence on oath on
nnv question relating to the boundaries
of tho hind affected by any concession
and tho record of any evidence so taken
shall be made by or under the supervision of the pei sou so apixiintod and
authenticated bv him and the evidences
so recorded shalf bo doomed to beevldcnce
taken before the Commission. Any person
appointed by tho Commission to take
evidence under this sub-section shall have
and exorcise-all the powers privileges
and jurisdiction conferred bv the Commissions Powcis Oidiuance 1002."
(41 " T h o Commission shall further
inquire into and deride the extent to
which any concession the boundaries of
which have been determined under subsection (1) of this section is registcrablc
(it at all) as a servitude or leato against
any other concession the boundaries ol
which have heo.ii similarly determined
and upon receipt ed' such decision bv
by the Registrar of Deeds such officer
, shall cause the necessary ontrios to be
made in his registers and endorsements
to be made on the cony of each jurli
concession which is filed in his oflice
and also on the registered copy of the
holder of each such concession. Within
two mouths or sin Ii lurther time as
the High Ornmissioner may allow ol
the notification to any such holder of
any decision by tho Commission under
this sub-section the holder of any concession allected by «-url| decision shall

A mewi.
nii'nia of and
a.lilitlona to
•"lion IS et
Straillaiui
Aitiulnlatrar
lli.it
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No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

GREY'S CARRYING CAPACITY ESTIMATES
Estimated
Population Stock

Area(Acres).

469
5,411
371
6,293
10,570
4,704
1,715
476
1,687
2,219
6,146
10,892
4,452
1,827
5,558
3,647
11,151
1,729
1,204
2,611
8,169
2,667
1,036
882
777
4,690
9,660
11,298
1,155
9,016
24,668
2,128
159,278

2,776
40,,586
5, 617
56 645
95 ,162
42,,344
20,,607
14 230
17, 711
26, 670
55 337
65 348
40, 102
21, 903
58, 370
27, 338
100, 336
25 973
7 ,224
11 ,762
61 ,301
27 ,985
10. 865
13, 266
11 222
49 ,264
144 ,854
118 614
20 798
67 632
258 997
15 952

* 1946 Figures ^

335
3,865
265
4,495
7,550
3,360
1,225
340
1,205
1,585
4,390
7,780
3,180
1,305
3,970
2,605
7,965
1,235
860
1,865
5,835
1,905
740
630
555
3,350
6,900
8,070
825
6,440
17,620
1,520
113,770

Grey's Carrying Capacity

Source : S.N.A. D/09/2

Area/
Family
41
53
106
63
63
63
84
209
73
84
63
42
63
84
74
52
63
105
42
31
53
73
73
105
101
74
105
74
126
53
73
52

1946
Population
1,430*
5 ,652*
—

5 230
6 ,610
3 ,800
1 ,500
1 ,990*
1 ,860*
3 ,910*
10 ,100*
7 ,030
3 ,980
1 ,960*
5 ,940*
3 ,970*
14 ,300*
1 ,060
1 ,260*
1 030
11 940*
620
2, 100*
1,900*
860*
5 ,530*
8 ,120
5 ,140
1 240*
6 ,040
18 940
3 ,580*
148 ,381

Stock
a.

11,446*
675*
10,983*
17 ,176*
5 ,961*
2 ,367*
1 ,627*
3 ,199*
4 ,902*
16 208*
18 ,322*
6 ,502*
3 ,559*
14 ,583*
7 ,919*
20 329*
3 000*
1,,673*
3,118*
17, 398*
3, 380*
2, 362*
1,894*
1 243*
12 ,241*
23 ,638*
17 ,699*
1 ,621*
12 909*
45, 010*
4 536*
297 ,480
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APPENDIX 4c : EXTRACT FROM GREY'S NOTES

SECTION Ilia

NATIVE AREA NO. 2

This area is chosen so as to include the country in which the
graves of the Kings Ludonga, Mbandini & Bhunu are situated, and to
include the kraals of the chief Zulongangeni, the custodian of the
graves, and his son Dinabantu who will succeed him.
I am satisfied that I have included all the country reverenced
by the Swazi Nation in respect of the graves of these three Kings
though the information I obtained as to their exact situation was
rather vague owing to Zulongangeni's reluctance to give any but
very general information.

But this is a point on which I hope to

get more exact information later.
All of this area chosen in connection with the graves is very
rugged rocky mountain and completely uninhabited, but the neighbourhood of Zulongangeni and Dinabantu's kraals while hilly are in
places fairly fertile and capable of considerable agriculture while
the valley of the Mbuluzi contains much cultivated land.
My inspection of this Section has shewn me that it will be
necessary to alter the proposed partition north of the Mbuluzi in
Section II so as to include both sides of the Mbuluzi valley in an
area giving more contiguous land to Zulongangeni and his people.
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: GREY'. CARRYING CAPACITY CALCULATIONS

Grey arrived at his estimates as follows :
1. Estimate of Total Swazi Population
a. Total number of males over 18 from tax records = 23,204
b. Assumes these are 50% of the male population
= 46,408
c. Assumes the number of males is less than females
d. Formula for total population = 4J$ X over 18 males
e. TOTAL POPULATION = 104,418
2. Increase of Swazi Population
a. Selborne and Grey agreed a 50% margin of increase.
b. TOTAL POTENTIAL POPULATION = 156,627

3. Land Required for Agriculture
a. Estimates average family size as 7
"whether 7 is a correct average or not is of no importance
What matters is that the amount of land estimated as
capable of supporting a native family in each area should
be able to provide food and grazing for the stock of a
group of 7 natives"
b. Total number of families is 156,627/7 = 22,372
c. Estimates Land Productivity
i.Assumes each family of 7 consumes 21bs each per day of grain food
grown on own land (14 lbs).
ii.Total annual requirement per family is 14 X 365 = 5110 lbs/year
iii.Best land in Swaziland "cultivated by native methods" yields
1000 lb grain food/acre/annum.
iv.Concludes a minimum of 5 acres cultivation each season is
necessary to supply a family with food for a year.
d. Cropping Frequency
Assumes Swazi crop fields for 3 years and fallow for 2-3 years.
Thus minimum agricultural land requirement should be doubled
e. TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LAND REQUIRED : minimum 10 acres/family of 7.
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4. Land Required for Grazing
a. Estimates number of cattle held as 5/7 population. This takes
into account the decimation of rinderpest and east coast fever :
"The Swazi being a stock loving people will undoubtedly try,
once east coast fever is stamped out,to take every opportunity
to acquire new herds. It is necessary to provide sufficient
land for the grazing of a normal quantity of stock not
found in Swaziland under the present abnormal conditions"
b. Could not verify empirically the carrying capacity of land
Estimated an average 13 acres per head was necessary.
c. Concludes areas chosen can carry 5/7 population
5. Examined chosen areas with theoretical figures in mind. Concluded
that a TOTAL POPULATION of 159,278 could be supported (a 52%%
increase).
Total stock carrying capacity : 113,770.
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APPENDIX FIVE

1907 SWAZI DELEGATION PETITION
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APPENDIX 5
The humble petition of Malunge Nkosi,Nogcogco Nkosi,Mamkiniki Kambule,
Josiah Vilikazi and Heheraiah Vilikazi on behalf of themselves,the Chief
Regent,the Councillors and people of the Swazi Nation.
SHEWETH : The Independence of the Swazie Nation was recognised by the
Governments of Great Britain and of the South African Republic by
the Conventions of London of 1881 and 1884.
In October 1889 King Umbandini died,and on the 18th of December
1889 the Queen Regent,the Headmen and Councillors of the Swazie Nation
(the new king Bhunu being a boy of tender years) issued a Proclamation
creating a Provisional Government Committee with powers defined by the
said Proclamation but which poweres in effect related exclusively
to jurisdiction over persons of European birth or extraction and over
matters and things in which any such persons were concerned.
In July 1890 a convention was entered into between Great Britain
and the South African Republic by which the independence of the Swazies
as recognised by the 1881 and 1884 conventions was affirmed. The
Provisional Government Committee was with the consent of the Swazie
Government continued in its powers subject to certain conditions one
of which was that a Judicial inquiry should be held into the validity
of the Concessions granted by King Umbandine and with the like consent
of the Swazie Government a special Court was established to exercise
jurisdiction over Europeans - Articles 5,6 and 10 of the said
Convention were in the following words:Article 5.Saving all existing rights the sovereignty and
ownership of the Swazie Nation in respect of all land within the
boundaries of Swazieland shall be recognised and respected,but no
disposition of any such land,or any right in respect of any such
land,and no grant or concession whereby any privileged or exclusive
right is granted or conceded,or any right directly or indirectly
interfering with the powers and jurisdiction of the Government
Committee,shall after the date of such organic Proclamation be
recognised as of any validity unless it shall be made with the
approval of Her Majesty's High Commissioner and of the State President
of the South African Republic.
Article 6.The control and management by the Swazie Government
of all affairs in which natives only are concerned shall remain
unaffected by such organic Proclamation as aforesaid,and shall be
regulated according to native laws and customs,save in so far as
by such laws and customs any danger may arise affecting good and
orderly government under the provisions of the organic Proclamation
aforesaid.
Article 10. The Government of the South African Republic
withdraws all claim to extend the territory of the Republic or to
enter into treaties with any natives or native tribes to the north
or north-west of the existing boundary of the Republic,and undertakes
to aid and support by its favouring influence establishment of order
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and government in those territories by the British South Africa
Company within the limits of power and territory set forth in the
Charter granted by Her Majesty to the said Company.
Save as provided by the last mentioned Convention the late South
African Republic neither possessed nor exercised any rights of
legislation,jurisdiction or administration over Swazieland either
in law or in fact by the said South African Republic by agreement
or otherwise,or became binding upon the Swazie Nation.
Your petitioners admit that the late South African Republic
was conquered by Your Majesty's Forces and was annexed to and now
forms part of your Majesty's Colonial Possessions but Your Petitioners
deny and are ready to prove that no rights or powers over the territory
of Swazieland ever passed to Great Britain by the conquest and
annexation of the South African Republic and that the independence
of Swazieland recognised by the Conventions of London of 1881 and
1884 has not been otherwise destroyed or impaired.
In June 1903 shortly after the South African War Your Majesty
on the advice of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies by the
Swazieland Order in Council 1903 was pleased to invest His Excellency
the Governor of the Transvaal with all powers and jurisdiction which
your Majesty by the conquest and annexation of the South African
Republic may have possessed within Swazieland. This Order in Council
proceeded upon the assumption that the late South African Republic
had exercised rights and powers of legislation and jurisdiction over
Swazieland and that these rights by r son of the said annexation
passed to and became invested in your Majesty. The Swazie Government
has always protested against the issue and execution of this Order
in Council.
Your petitioners are now threatened in the execution of this
Order in Council with a confiscation to your Majesty of all Swazie
territory, the annihilation of all their rights and interests as well
as the confiscation of the revenue of the King and government and the
destruction of the national life and political independence of the
race. Your Majesty's Resident Commissioner has proclaimed to the
Swazie Nation that the policy of the future will partition the country
into allotments and inter alia make grants of land in freehold and
other tenure to concessionaires and others and will retain other
portions of the land as Crown Lands and set apart certain areas as
tribal lands for the use of the native race and will altogether
exclude the native race from the ownership of all minerals underlying
the said lands or any part thereof and will also after a period of
five years exclude the native race from the use and occupation of any
lands they now enjoy which may become the subject of any such
Crown grants ;
Your petitioners humbly pray :
That Your Most Excellent Majesty will be graciously pleased to
take this petition into Your Most Gracious Consideration and refer
the same to a Commission or Board of Your Majesty's Privy Council
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or to some such other competent Tribunal to inquire and report as
to the truth of the recitals contained in Swazieland Order In Council
1903 and otherwise to determine the validity of the said Order and
if it shall appear that the said Order ought not to have been made
or that it is contrary to International Law that Your Majesty will
be pleased to revise,alter or vary the said Order or that Your
Petitioners may have such further and other relief in the promises
Your Majesty in Your great wisdom may seem meet.
And your petitioners will ever pray,etc.
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